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ABSTRACT
In this research the impact of board governance orientation and board processes on board role 
performance and board effectiveness is examined. Building on existing literature, a model that 
relates board governance orientation (agency, stakeholder, stewardship  and resource dependency) 
and board processes (cohesiveness, cognitive conflict, affective conflict, communication quality, 
effort norms, trust and the use of knowledge & skills) to board effectiveness via three mediating 
variables, board control role, board service role, and board strategy role is developed. The model 
was tested through a survey of listed companies in the UK. The results are based on 74 companies. 
The findings show (a) the board undertakes two distinct roles, control and service; (b) process 
variables, most  notably cognitive conflict and the use of knowledge & skills, significantly  influence 
board effectiveness mediated by the board’s control and/or service role; (c) structural variables, 
specifically the proportion of outsiders on the board, impacts on the board control role; (d) 
understanding board effectiveness requires a multitheoretic perspective.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Outline of the Research Project
 Corporate governance is a topic that has generated a large amount of interest in recent times. 
This interest is reflected in a variety of ways, including the increasing amount of newspaper space 
reporting on issues of corporate governance, the various government reports into corporate conduct 
and governance (e.g. Cadbury, Higgs, Combined Code, etc.), and government legislation directly 
relating to corporate governance (e.g. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Norwegian Quota Law). This increasing 
attention has also been replicated in academic research in corporate governance with a vast amount 
of literature emerging over the last ten or so years. The majority of the academic research has been 
financial economic and taken an agency  theory perspective (e.g. Dahya & McConnell, 2005; Dalton 
et al, 1998; Johnson et al., 2004; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). However, agency theory has come under 
increasing criticism as the primary theoretical lens through which to undertake corporate 
governance research (e.g., Daily et al, 2003; Ghoshal, 2005; Roberts et al, 2005). In particular, 
researchers such as Aguilera (2005), Forbes & Milliken (1998), Lynall et al (2003), Pye & 
Pettigrew (2005), Roberts et al (2005) and Shen (2003), examining the role of the board of directors 
in corporate governance, have been critical of the extent to which agency theory assumptions and 
predictions are sufficient to explain board roles and performance.
 These criticisms of agency theory  have led to a call for alternative theories of corporate 
governance to be developed (Daily et al, 2003; Roberts et al, 2005). The primary alternative 
theoretical perspectives utilised in corporate governance research have been stewardship  theory 
(Davis et al, 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991), stakeholder theory (Freeman & Evan, 1990), and 
resource dependency theory (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). These different theoretical 
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perspectives are all advancing an understanding of corporate governance yet no one theory is seen 
as sufficient to explain corporate governance in general, and more specifically what makes boards 
of directors effective. This has led to calls for a multitheoretic approach to corporate governance 
from various researchers working in different academic disciplines (Daily  et al., 2003; Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2003).
 In recent years, research in corporate governance has increasingly moved away from 
traditional studies examining the impact of board structural characteristics on firm performance 
towards a greater interest in process studies, examining the impact of behaviours in the boardroom 
on board performance outcomes (Minichilli et al., 2009; Payne et al., 2009; Pugliese et al., 2009; 
Van Ees et al., 2008; Wan & Ong, 2005; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). This thesis continues this tradition 
by developing and testing a model, derived from the seminal work of Forbes & Milliken (1999), to 
examine the impact of board governance orientation and board processes on board role performance 
and board effectiveness. This thesis thus seeks to contribute to our understanding of board roles and 
board effectiveness.
Most specifically, the objectives of this research are:
• To identify gaps in existing board research by reviewing the literature;
• To develop and test a model of the relationships between board governance orientation, board 
processes, board role performance, and board effectiveness; 
• To develop  a comprehensive board governance orientation scale and board effectiveness scale 
in the context of UK listed companies;
• To investigate the factors affecting board effectiveness 
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• Derive recommendations for policy-makers and boards on how they individually and 
collectively can contribute to adding value to the firm.
1.2. Rationale for the Study and the Contribution to Knowledge
 Corporate governance in general and the board of directors specifically, have seen a 
considerable volume of research since the empirical work of Mace (1970) who contended boards 
were largely rubber-stamps for senior management’s decisions. The development of agency theory 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) provided a theoretical framework for a vast amount of empirical work 
focusing on board composition. Following the seminal paper of Forbes & Milliken (1999) there has 
been an increased attention to the opening up of the ‘black box’ of boardroom activities, primarily 
as a result  of the equivocal findings of agency-based studies examining the relationship between 
board structures and firm performance using archival data sources (Huse, 2005; Minichilli et al., 
2009; Payne et al., 2009; Pugliese et al., 2009; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005; Ruigrok 
et al., 2006; Van Ees et al., 2008; Wan & Ong, 2005; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). This research 
continues in the recent  tradition of board process studies to explore the actual workings in the 
boardroom through a survey based study. 
 Whilst there has been an increase in our knowledge about what actually goes on in company 
boardrooms, there is still scant evidence on the antecedents of board effectiveness (Minichilli et al., 
2009; Payne et al., 2009; Ruigrok et al., 2006). Through this research, a greater understanding of 
what actually makes a board effective is developed. To investigate board effectiveness, a model is 
developed from a review of the existing literature and tested using survey data from a sample of UK 
listed companies obtained from the Hemscott Company Guru database. 
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 Specifically, this study examines the relationship between board governance orientation, 
board governance processes, board role performance and board effectiveness.
 The approach used for this study is a deductive, quantitative, positivist approach  (Popper, 
1959). Quantitative research is often concerned with establishing causal relationships between 
concepts and trying to establish that the results of a particular investigation can be generalised 
beyond the confines of the research location (Podsakoff & Dalton, 1987). Replication of established 
findings is often a key characteristic of quantitative research and is a means in which the findings 
applicable to other contexts may be checked (Bryman & Bell, 2007; Podsakoff & Dalton, 1987). A 
survey of board chairpersons was undertaken to collect the necessary data to test the model and 
hypotheses. Survey research is the most widely used quantitative approach in the social science 
field (Alreck & Settle, 2004; Bennett in Smith & Dainty, 1991; Blumberg et al., 2008; Bryman & 
Bell, 2007; Jobber in Smith & Dainty, 1991). A survey has the capacity for generating quantifiable 
data on large numbers of people who are known to be representative of a wider population in order 
to test theories or hypotheses has been viewed by many as a means of capturing many of the 
ingredients of a science (Alreck & Settle, 2004; Bryman & Bell, 2007). There is a need to do 
surveys on boards. Previous studies used archival data which are unable to measure the intervening 
processes between board structure and firm performance. 
 The original contribution to knowledge of this study is four-fold. First, a new measure of 
board effectiveness is developed and validated. Second, board role performance is found to be a 
mediator of the relationship between a comprehensive set of board governance processes and board 
effectiveness. Third, the study provides new knowledge about the workings of boards in the UK. It 
is one of the first empirical, quantitative studies to examine board processes and their impact on 
board role performance and board effectiveness using UK companies. Fourth, the study  finds that 
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UK boards perform two principal roles, control and service. Specifically, this study  intends to 
contribute to the existing literature in several ways.
• First, from a theoretical and empirical viewpoint, a board effectiveness scale is developed in 
this study. The four item construct is developed using general questions relating to the board’s 
contribution to performance. 
• Secondly, the study  examines the antecedents of effectiveness of boards in the UK context 
and thus contributes theoretically and empirically to knowledge on board performance.  
• Thirdly, it provides boards and especially board leaders with information pertaining to board 
processes that are likely to enhance board role performance, board effectiveness and firm 
performance. 
1.3. Summary of the Thesis Contents
 This thesis contains eight chapters including the introduction. The following section 
provides a general summary of the content of these chapters.
Chapter 2 - reviews previous literature regarding research on corporate governance, focusing on 
the traditional board structure-firm performance empirical studies. It covers the primary theoretical 
approaches used in this research - agency, resource dependency, stewardship and stakeholder 
theories. 
Chapter 3 - reviews previous literature on small teams and team processes that have formed the 
basis of the recent research on boards of directors. Drawing on the seminal model developed by 
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Forbes & Milliken (1999), an increasing volume of empirical studies have focussed on board 
processes and board behaviours and how they  affect board performance. This chapter reviews the 
small team literature from which Forbes & Milliken develop their model, followed by a separate 
review of the literature on the specific processes identified in small team research. Finally, the 
small, yet burgeoning literature examining board processes is reviewed.
Chapter 4 - develops the conceptual model and hypotheses to examine the relationship between 
board governance orientation, board governance processes, board role performance and board 
effectiveness.
Chapter 5 - presents the methodology of the thesis. This study was based on a quantitative 
approach. The sample frame was derived from Hemscott Company  Guru database. A total of 74 
usable responses are obtained, making the response rate 4.64%. The chapter discusses different 
approaches to research methodology and reports the process of research design, sampling, 
questionnaire design and administration, as well as the response rate, non-response bias, common 
methods bias, company profiles of respondents. It also reports on the validity and reliability  of the 
measurement model. Factor analysis and reliability analysis are utilised to develop  the instruments 
used to test the model. Issues pertaining to the board governance orientation measurement scale are 
also identified.
Chapter 6 - presents the results and findings of model and hypotheses testing to examine the 
relationship  between board governance processes, board control role performance, board service 
role performance, and board effectiveness. Regression analysis is employed to test the hypotheses 
developed in chapter 4. 
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Chapter 7 - discusses the findings of the analysis in relation to existing literature. Contributions to 
knowledge stemming from this research are identified and discussed, and it also outlines the 
implications for board theory and for board practice and policy. 
Chapter 8 - concludes the study by highlighting the new contributions to knowledge emerging 
from this research. The limitations of this study are explained and directions for future study  are 
proposed. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
LITERATURE REVIEW: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
THEORIES ON BOARDS OF DIRECTORS
2.1. Introduction
 This chapter reviews the literature on corporate governance and the board of directors in 
order to identify the research gap and research questions that will be used to guide this research. 
 There is a large body of research, both theoretical and empirical, that examines corporate 
governance in general, and the role of the board of directors in corporate governance more 
specifically. According to Jensen (1993), the board of directors is at the apex of internal control 
mechanisms of corporate governance. An increasing emphasis in the corporate governance 
literature is with the effectiveness of the board of directors. In this regard, there are largely two 
different approaches. The first, primarily, though not solely, drawn from agency theory  is that board 
effectiveness is determined by the structure of the board of directors. The second and more recent 
approach, drawing largely on psychology theories regarding the workings of small teams contends 
that board effectiveness is determined by behavioural processes in the board. 
 This chapter will review the traditional structure-performance approach to corporate 
governance and is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides various definitions of corporate 
governance and insight into differing corporate governance mechanisms. Section 2.3 reviews four 
of the principal theories of corporate governance: agency theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder 
theory, and resource dependency theory. This section also provides a critique of agency theory 
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research in corporate governance. Section 2.4 summarises the traditional approaches to corporate 
governance and identifies their limitations.
2.2. Definitions and Mechanisms of Corporate Governance
Definitions of Corporate Governance
 There are a wide variety of definitions of corporate governance. Shleifer & Vishny (1997) 
define corporate governance as the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment. Daily et al., (2003) define corporate governance 
as the determination of the broad uses to which organisational resources will be deployed and the 
resolution of conflicts among the myriad participants in organisations. Alternatively, Denis & 
McConnell define corporate governance as the set of mechanisms both institutional and market-
based that induce the self-interested controllers of a company  (those that make decisions regarding 
how the company will be operated) to make decisions that maximise the value of the company to its 
owners (the suppliers of capital). John & Senbet (1998) take a broad perspective by defining 
corporate governance as the mechanisms by which stakeholders (equity holders, creditors, other 
claimants who supply capital, employees, consumers, suppliers, and the government) of a 
corporation exercise control over corporate insiders and management such that their interests are 
protected. This latter definition leads John & Senbet (1998) to suggest that the ways in which 
stakeholders control management is the subject of corporate governance. Aguilera & Jackson 
(2003) suggest the lack of common definition is unsurprising given the diversity of corporate 
governance practices across the world. Whilst there is no common definition, most definitions take 
either a shareholder perspective or a stakeholder perspective to the firm. The shareholder approach 
to the firm contends that the primary role of a corporation is to maximise shareholders’ returns since 
shareholders are viewed as the owners of the corporation because they provide capital for managers 
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to use for the benefit of the shareholders (Jensen, 2002). Alternatively, the stakeholder approach 
takes a broader perspective to include those who have an interest  in the organisation. Stakeholder 
theorists suggest the firm should balance the financial interests of shareholders with the legitimate 
interests of other stakeholder groups such as employees, customers, and the local community 
(Freeman, 1984; Phillips et al., 2003). Whilst there may be disagreement as to who deserves the 
residual rewards from corporations, both shareholder theorists and stakeholder theorists largely 
agree that corporate governance is primarily about the mechanisms that ensure those with a stake in 
the firm get a return on the profits of the firm. 
Mechanisms of Corporate Governance
 In addition to the various definitions of corporate governance, researchers have provided 
differing classifications of corporate governance mechanisms. Jensen (1983) separates the corporate 
governance mechanisms into internal mechanisms and external mechanisms. The internal 
mechanisms are primarily  the board of directors and the ownership structure of the firm, whilst the 
external mechanisms are the market  for corporate control and the law. Gillan (2006) divides internal 
mechanisms into five categories: 1) The Board of Directors (and their role, structure, and 
incentives), 2) Managerial Incentives, 3) Capital Structure, 4) Byelaw and Charter Provisions (or 
anti-takeover measures), and 5) Internal Control Systems. He further divides external mechanisms 
into five categories: 1) Law and Regulation, 2) Markets 1 (capital markets, the market  for corporate 
control, labour markets, and product markets), 3) Markets 2 (providers of capital market 
information, such as equity  analysts), 4) Markets 3 (accounting, financial and legal services external 
to the firm), and 5) Private Sources of External Oversight (media and external lawsuits). Whilst 
Gillan (2006) provides specific detail of corporate governance, he is similar to Jensen (1983) in 
identifying two broad categories of corporate governance mechanisms, internal and external. Luo 
(2005) provides an alternative classification of corporate governance mechanisms. He suggests that 
10
corporate governance works through three distinct  types of mechanisms. These are identified as 
firstly, market-based mechanisms including, board composition, board size, market discipline, 
board chairs, executive compensation, and interlocking directorate, secondly, culture-based 
mechanisms including, governance culture and corporate identity, and thirdly, discipline-based 
mechanisms including, executive penalty, internal auditing, conduct codes, and ethics programmes. 
Summary of Definitions and Mechanisms of Corporate Governance
 This variety  of classifications of corporate governance largely arises from the considerable 
number of different approaches that have been taken in corporate governance research. A variety of 
theories have been advanced in corporate governance from a wide range of disciplines including, 
economics, finance, law, organisation theory, psychology, sociology, and strategic management. The 
following sections will review four of the more important traditional theories of corporate 
governance: agency theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory and resource dependency theory.
2.3. Traditional Corporate Governance Theories and Empirical Studies
 This section reviews the most important theories of corporate governance. There are a wide 
variety of theories that have been used in corporate governance, including agency theory, 
stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, resource dependency theory, institutional theory, social 
network theory and others. This section will review the literature using four of the most widely-
used theories: agency theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory and resource dependency 
theory (Daily et al., 2003).
2.3.1. Agency Theory
 The dominant theoretical perspective applied in corporate governance research is agency 
theory  (Daily  et al., 2003; Huse, 2005). By describing agency  theory  as the bible of corporate 
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governance Huse (2005), highlights its importance in corporate governance research. Agency theory 
derives from economics and finance predominately as an attempt to explain the success of modern 
corporations despite the separation of ownership and control. Jensen & Meckling (1976) proposed 
agency theory  as an explanation of how the public corporation would exist, given the assumption 
that managers are self-interested, and a context in which those managers do not bear the full wealth 
effects of their decisions. Since Berle & Means (1932) first gave prominence to the ‘Separation of 
Ownership  and Control’ thesis within modern corporations, there had been little theoretical 
literature in economics that could satisfactorily explain the success of organisations where 
ownership and control were in the hands of different people. Agency theory  takes a contractual 
approach to the firm (Fama, 1983; Grossman & Hart, 1986; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 
1984), based on the premise that the modern corporation is run by managers (agents) on behalf of 
owners (principals) and that managers attempt to maximise their own utility  rather than the utility  of 
the owners. The agency problem occurs through the difficulties that the principal faces in ensuring 
that the agent acts in their best interests. In the terms of Shleifer & Vishny (1997: 741), “the agency 
problem in this context refers to the difficulties financiers have in assuring that their funds are not 
expropriated or wasted on unattractive projects.” Thus, agency  theory is primarily concerned with 
two problems occurring in the principal-agent relationship. The first is the expense involved in the 
principal monitoring the agent’s behaviour. The second problem arises from the different attitudes 
of the principal and agent toward risk (Eisenhardt, 1989). In agency theory, the principal is assumed 
to be risk neutral, whereas the agent is risk averse (Eisenhardt, 1989). These problems lead to what 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) refer to as agency costs, incurred as principals/owners attempt to ensure 
that agents/managers act in the principals’ interest. “Agency costs are therefore defined as the sum 
of the costs of structuring, bonding, and monitoring contracts between agents.” (Jensen, 1983: 331). 
Agency theory then focuses on attempting to solve the above problems using a contractual approach 
to the firm. 
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 In the contractual approach (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Williamson, 
1984; Grossman & Hart, 1986), the firm is viewed as a legal fiction created by a nexus of contracts, 
written and unwritten, among owners of factors of production and customers. According to Alchian 
& Demsetz (1972), the firm is just like an ordinary market contracting between two people. Within 
this framework, managers and financiers sign a contract that specifies what the manager does with 
the funds provided by the financiers. In addition, the contract also specifies how the returns on the 
financiers’ investment are divided between the manager and the financiers. The contract is therefore 
written to try  and align the interests of both the principal and the agent.  The key issue is the 
adoption of an optimal incentive scheme to align the behaviour of the managers/agents with the 
interest of owners/principals. According to Eisenhardt (1989), the critical issue is whether an 
outcome-oriented contract (e.g., stock options, transfer of property  rights, market  governance) is 
superior to a behavioural-based contract (e.g. salaries, and hierarchical governance).  The 
determination of the optimal contract is based on the availability of complete information. If the 
behaviour of the agent is fully  observable, a behaviour-based contract is optimal (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Alternatively, when the agent’s behaviour is not fully  observable, an outcome-oriented outcome is 
superior (Eisenhardt, 1989).
 Agency theory lends itself to a number of predictions that have led to a considerable body of 
research. Dalton et  al. (2003) divide this research into two broad themes. The first they refer to as 
‘alignment’ and the second is what they term ‘control’. 
 The alignment view is broadly concerned with the achievement of congruence in the 
interests of owners and managers (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), 
based on the premise that there is an inherent  conflict between the interest of a firm’s owners and 
management (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The solution to the problem of managerial self-interest is to 
align the interests of owners and management through compensation packages, which are based on 
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the performance of the company, and include providing managers with equity stakes in the firm. 
This solution would help ensure managers’ and owners’ interests were more closely aligned and that 
by achieving this it is presumed firm performance will be improved (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). In 
this case, the executives’ wealth should be closely and directly correlated with company 
performance. Without an equity  investment  in a firm, executives are more likely to behave 
opportunistically by supporting investments that  further their own interests; at shareholders’ 
expense, and to behave in a manner that further enhances their job security  (Himmelberg et al., 
1999). This self-interested behaviour was identified by Eisenhardt (1989) as a fundamental element 
of agency  theory. Thus, agency theory  suggests inside directors should own significant levels of 
company stock to ensure managers have the incentive pursue value-maximising behaviour (Seifert 
et al., 2005).
 The control approach concerns the monitoring of firms’ management and suggests 
concentrated shareholdings may facilitate the monitoring of managers’ performance and lead to 
improved firm performance. According to Demsetz & Lehn (1985) the ownership shares of two 
types of outside owners, institutions and ‘blockholders’, are typically sufficiently large that these 
equity owners are in a position to see to it  that management serves their interests and this 
monitoring should lead to higher profit rates.
 Thus, the clear implication for corporate governance from an agency perspective is that 
there are adequate managerial incentives that align the interests of senior management to those of 
shareholders and that there are adequate monitoring or control mechanisms to protect shareholders 
from management’s pursuit of self-interest. This is required as a consequence of the so-called 
agency costs of modern capitalism (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Consequently, numerous studies have 
examined the recommendations that arise from agency theory in terms of managerial incentives/
compensation and corporate governance controls, which are necessary in order to ensure managers 
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act in the best interest of shareholders. These specifically relate to a wide range of internal and 
external matters relating to the firm, including executive compensation, the relationship between 
board composition and firm performance, board characteristics, capital structure, the role of 
blockholders, the labour market for directors, and the market for corporate control.
Executive Compensation
 As identified by Core et al., (2003) and Daily et al., (2003), the call by  agency theorists to 
align the interests of executives and shareholders has led to an increased reliance on equity-based 
forms of executive compensation, driven largely by stock options (Core et al., 1999). In recent years 
there has been a considerable variety of academic work focussing on the use of option-based 
compensation. In particular, there is a wide body of research examining stock option repricing 
(Acharya et al., 2000; Brenner et al., 2000; Carter & Lynch, 2001; Chen, 2004; Chance et al., 2000; 
Chidambaran and Prabhala, 2003). Other similar themes of research include stock options 
expensing (Carter & Lynch, 2003), measuring stock option incentives (Core & Guay, 1999; Guay, 
1999; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Johnson & Tian, 2000a), and indexing stock options (Johnson & 
Tian, 2000b). McGuire & Matta (2003) in a study examining the ownership and performance 
implications of the exercise of CEO stock options find that the exercise of stock options has no 
effect on the levels of CEO equity or on subsequent financial performance. 
 An alternative and more recent body of research has studied the association between option-
based compensation and the propensity of firms to restate earnings, commit fraud, or be subject to 
class action lawsuits (Burns & Kedia, 2006; Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006; Denis et al., 2006; 
Johnson et al., 2009; O’Connor et  al., 2006). In general, these papers find that higher incentives are 
associated with increased likelihood of firms restating earnings, or committing fraud. In this 
respect, as Denis et al., (2006) suggest there is a dark side to incentive compensation. 
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 Whilst there is evidence that executives today hold greater percentages of firm equity  than 
30 years ago (Core et al., 2003; Daily  et al., 2003), there is less clear evidence of a strong 
relationship  between executive compensation and shareholder wealth at the firm level. A survey of 
executive equity compensation by Core et al., (2003) concluded that it is inappropriate to make a 
simple normative prescription that more equity ownership is always better than less ownership. This 
view that the empirical evidence does not always support agency  theory prescriptions is supported 
by a meta-analysis of pay and performance by Dalton et al., (2003). Contrary  to most of this 
empirical evidence is recent research from Nyberg et al., (2010) who find a much stronger link 
between the returns to CEOs and returns to shareholders. In treating senior executives as employee-
shareholders, and looking at  CEO returns rather than CEO compensation Nyberg et al., (2010) offer 
an alternative conceptual focus on which to consider the relationship  between CEO-shareholder 
financial alignment. Given the recency  of this finding, it is difficult to judge whether this alternative 
theoretical focus may change the perception of the previous findings of a weak relationship  between 
executive compensation and shareholder wealth.
 To further cast doubt on the agency theory recommendation that inside directors should own 
significant equity  stakes in the organisation, Morck et  al., (1988) warn that when managers own a 
substantial part of the equity of a firm, they  may feel entrenched and, as a result, they may  not 
always pursue objectives benefiting the shareholders. There is a wide body of literature studying the 
implications of managerial entrenchment on the likelihood of value-maximising decisions (e.g., Hu 
& Kumar, 2004; Ryan Jr., & Wiggins III, 2004; Stulz, 1988; Zweibel, 1996).  A further similar area 
of research on management compensation has examined the use of ‘golden handshakes’ or 
separation pay for dismissed CEOs. Such policies act to increase management entrenchment 
(Yermack, 2006). 
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 An alternative body of research on management compensation has focussed on the way 
various corporate governance mechanisms have influenced CEO compensation (Jiraporn et al., 
2005; Khan et al., 2005; Morgan et al., 2006; Ozkan, 2007). In a study of 414 large UK companies, 
examining the influence of ownership  and board structure on CEO compensation, Ozkan (2007) 
finds that active monitoring by  block-holders and institutional shareholders has a negative impact 
on CEO compensation, and firms with a larger board size and those with a higher proportion of 
non-executive directors pay  their CEOs higher compensation. Ozkan (2007) suggests this latter 
result indicates that non-executive directors are less effective monitors than executive directors. 
Examining the effect of institutional ownership  concentration levels and CEO compensation, Khan 
et al., (2005) find that higher levels of institutional ownership dispersion are associated with 
increased levels of CEO compensation and greater use of incentive compensation. In addition, Khan 
et al., (2005) discovered that higher levels of CEO ownership lead to a significant reduction in 
options-based compensation. These findings suggest greater levels of CEO ownership leads to 
lower incentives-based compensation and thus is supportive of the potential implications of 
management entrenchment identified by Morck et al., (1988). In an investigation of the strength of 
shareholder rights on CEO compensation, Jiraporn et al., (2005) find that CEOs of firms where 
shareholder rights are stronger obtain less favourable compensation. In addition, Jiraporn et  al., 
(2005) suggest  their findings indicate that higher CEO pay is associated with higher degrees of 
managerial entrenchment. Based on their findings, Jiraporn et al., (2005) conclude that CEO 
compensation practices reflect rent expropriation rather than optimal contracting predicted by 
agency theory. On a similar theme, Morgan et al., (2006) examine how shareholder voting has 
influenced executive compensation schemes through the period 1992-2003. Their results point to 
changing trends in voting, such that shareholders are becoming increasingly  sensitive to potentially 
harmful compensation plans. This finding indicates that  shareholder activism is leading to less 
beneficial compensation terms for CEOs. 
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Board Composition and Firm Performance
 According to agency theory, large companies require a greater number of directors to 
monitor and control a firm’s activities. A larger board is likely  to be better able to monitor agency 
problems because a greater number of people will be reviewing management’s actions. However, 
agency theorists recognise that there is an upper limit to boards. Jensen (1993) suggests this limit is 
about eight directors, as any  greater number will interfere with group dynamics and inhibit board 
performance.
 An alternative perspective is that it is not the size of the board that  matters, per se, but rather 
the number of outside directors on the board. With respect to board composition, agency theory 
suggests a greater proportion of outside directors will be able to monitor the actions of self-
interested managers (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Fama, 1980). Thus, firms with higher proportions of 
outside directors on their board should show superior levels of performance compared with firms 
dominated by  inside directors. Agency  theorists argue that the same person should not hold the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) role and chairman role simultaneously, as this will reduce the 
effectiveness of board monitoring. CEO-chair duality  can lead to one person having large amounts 
of power to influence decision-making, control board agendas and enhance management 
entrenchment.
 Although this prediction has some intuitive appeal the empirical evidence supporting the 
hypothesis is less convincing. In a review of the economics literature on boards of directors, 
Hermalin & Weisbach (2003) suggest firstly, that board composition is not related to corporate 
performance, and secondly, that board composition is related to the quality of the board’s decisions 
on CEO replacement, acquisitions, poison pills, and executive compensation. These findings 
suggest that whilst firms with higher proportions of outside directors do not  perform better they do 
make different decisions. A number of more recent  studies provide further support  for this latter 
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contention. Ryan & Wiggins III (2004) employed a bargaining framework to examine the 
relationship  between director compensation and the proportion of outside (independent) directors 
and find that shareholders’ economic interests are best served when the board remains independent. 
To the degree that the board remains independent, director compensation provides incentives more 
closely aligned with those of the shareholders. To the extent that the CEO has power over the board, 
the compensation structure weakens the alignment between managers and shareholders. Their 
results suggest that  independent boards receive compensation packages that are more closely 
aligned with shareholder wealth maximisation. Dahya & McConnell (2005), in a study  of 523 CEO 
appointments in UK firms over the period 1989-1999 find a significant positive correlation between 
the likelihood of an outside CEO appointment and the fraction of outside directors on the board. 
The results of Dahya & McConnell (2005) indicate that increasing the representation of outside 
directors on the board is likely to influence one of the key decisions of boards, that of the 
appointment of inside or outside CEOs. 
 A variety  of approaches have been utilised by researchers examining the link between board 
composition and firm performance. The first method has been to examine correlations between 
accounting measures of performance, such as return on capital employed (ROCE) and the 
proportion of outside directors on the board. A number of studies have used this approach and found 
insignificant relationships between accounting performance measures and the proportion of outside 
directors on the board. (Bhagat & Black, 2001; Daily & Johnson, 1997; Dalton et  al., 1998; 
Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; and Peng, 2004). In his research using 405 publicly listed companies 
in China, Peng (2004) finds some evidence that outside directors do make a positive effect on sales 
growth, but not on financial performance using accounting measures. Peng (2004) contends that 
institutional theory can be used to explain the increase in the number of outside directors on boards, 
arguing that increases in the representation of outside directors is merely  a result of attempting to 
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comply with institutional pressures. A second approach has been to use Tobin Q as a performance 
measure. Here again the empirical work of Hermalin & Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat & Black 
(2001) finds little support for the relationship between outside directors and firm performance. A 
recent study  by Coles et al., (2008) provides further evidence to doubt the importance of outside 
directors. They  find that Tobin Q increases with the proportion of inside directors for R&D 
intensive firms, thus challenging the notion that  firms with more insiders perform worse than those 
with more outsiders. A third method undertaken by  Bhagat & Black (2001) examines the effect of 
board composition on long-term stock market and accounting performance and similarly to the 
other methods find little to support the hypothesis that firm performance is related to the proportion 
of outside directors on the board. 
 Whilst this empirical evidence appears powerful in its opposition to agency theory 
predictions, there are a number of issues to consider before such a conclusion can be reached. The 
first issue is the definition of inside and outside directors. Most of the empirical research has 
attempted to capture the independence of outside directors, but there have been various definitions 
of what constitutes an outside director. For example, Weisbach (1988) classifies directors as inside, 
outside or grey, with grey directors being those directors who are not employees or managers, but 
who may not be independent of current management because of business dealings or family 
relationships. Similar to the grey classification is the affiliated directors category  used by  Johnson et 
al., (1996) and Pearce & Zahra (1992). Affiliated directors include those who have business 
dealings with the firm, or have relatives of current  or former executives or employees. Daily  & 
Dalton (1994) provide a further refinement of the outsider classification, defining an outside 
director as ones who were appointed to the board prior to the incumbent chief executive.  Given the 
importance placed on independence of the board in agency theory, this lack of clear definition of 
what it means to be an outside director does create difficulties in measuring the effect of board 
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composition on firm performance. Some authors suggest that ‘independence of mind’ is the key 
attribute rather than a notional measure of independence (Roberts et al., 2005; Zattoni & Cuomo, 
2010). 
 The second issue is the endogeneity of board composition. Hermalin & Weisbach (1998) 
suggest that firms which perform poorly are more likely to appoint outside directors. In a cross-
sectional study, this effect is likely  to make firms with more outside directors look worse because 
this effect leads to more outside directors on firms with historically  poor performance. However, the 
research by both Hermalin & Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat & Black (2001) has attempted to 
mitigate for this particular problem by using simultaneous equation models in which they  used 
lagged performance as an instrument for current performance. Even with the corrections for the 
identified endogeneity the results from both studies fail to show an empirical relationship between 
board composition and firm performance. 
 The third issue is one argued by MacAvoy  & Millstein (1999) and is that the findings 
between measures of board independence and firm performance have used data preceding the time 
boards take a more active role. To support  their point MacAvoy & Millstein (1999) find evidence 
that the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) grading of board procedures, 
as a proxy for board independence, is positively  correlated with accounting-based measures of 
performance. To a large extent, as Hermalin & Weisbach (2003) suggest, one can only presume that 
MacAvoy & Millstein’s contention can only be proven using more recent data. 
 A fourth issue relates to the performance measures used in the empirical research. As 
Hermalin & Weisbach (2003) point out firm performance as measured by accounting or economic 
measures is likely to be a function of many different factors, of which board performance is only 
one. Helland & Sykuta (2005) use a different measure of performance to determine board 
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performance than firm performance. They  consider the effect of board composition on the 
probability  a firm will be sued by shareholders. They find that  firms that are defendants in litigation 
have higher proportions of inside directors on their boards. Helland & Sykuta (2005) conclude that 
the results suggest that boards with higher proportions of outsiders do a better job of monitoring 
management. However, this result could also simply arise due to the fact that shareholders are more 
likely to bring litigation if they believe the board is insufficiently independent and therefore be less 
likely to take action when there are more outside directors on the board. This may simply be 
because they perceive boards with more outside directors to be acting in the interest of the 
shareholders whether they are or not. 
 Other similar research has explored how board composition has influenced various board 
decisions, including the appointment of a new inside or outside CEO, levels of CEO compensation, 
mergers, research and development (Gillette et al., 2003; Henry, 2004). A further stream of research 
into board composition has examined whether boards with more inside directors are more likely  to 
engage in earnings management (Park & Shin, 2004; Xie et al., 2003). This body of research 
provide little empirical support for the benefits of more outside directors. 
 To sum up, the majority of empirical research fails to support the prediction that firms with a 
higher proportion of outside directors will outperform those firms with a lower proportion. 
However, there is a considerable body of evidence that  suggests firms with more outside directors 
make different decisions. A conceptual paper by Drymiotes (2007) provides an innovative angle on 
why an insider-dominated board might make better monitors than outsiders. This is not solely due 
to information asymmetries that may exist between insiders and outsiders, but also according to 
Dymiotes (2007) because boards with more inside directors have greater incentives to monitor 
agents ex post. This is an interesting idea that could explain the lack of evidence supporting the 
benefits of more independent boards, and one that requires empirical testing.
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 A further aspect of board composition that has been the focus of a considerable amount of 
empirical work is the roles of the chair of the board and the chief executive officer. Jensen (1993) 
contends that the same person should not hold the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) role and 
chairman role simultaneously, as the board cannot undertake one of its principal functions that of 
evaluating and hiring CEOs. Similarly, Fama & Jensen (1983) argue that concentration of decision 
management and decision control in one person gives this person too much power and consequently 
lowers the effectiveness of board monitoring. Evidence from a study by  Goyal & Park (2002) 
provides supporting evidence for the proposition that the roles should be separated. In a study of 
CEO-Chair duality, they  find that the sensitivity  of CEO turnover to firm performance is 
significantly lower when the CEO and chair duties are vested in the same individual. Goyal & Pak 
(2002) suggest that their results are consistent with the view that CEO-Chair duality makes it 
difficult for boards to remove poorly performing managers. However, Brickley  et al., (1997) 
advance an alternative perspective and that is separating the CEO and chair of the board will create 
costs and these will outweigh the benefits of separation. Using a survey of 737 firms in 1988, 
Brickley et al., (1997) find evidence supportive of a unitary  leadership structure. They advance four 
principal reasons to support their argument. First, there are additional costs of separating the CEO 
and the chair. These include agency costs of controlling the behaviour of the chairman, information 
costs, costs of having firms change their succession processes and costs relating to inconsistent 
decision making. Second, they find that chairs are often former CEOs within the company  and thus 
have detailed knowledge of the company and relatively  high stock ownership. Brickley et al., 
(1997) suggest this is consistent with the hypothesis that the potential agency and information costs 
are important determinants of leadership  structure, and that the titles are separated only when these 
agency and information costs are low. Third, they find evidence of passing-of-the-baton succession 
process where firms employ the title of chairman as a reward for CEOs who perform well. They 
suggest that separation of the titles would force firms to find different  incentive schemes for top 
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management. Fourthly, they find evidence that unitary leadership structure is associated with 
superior accounting and market returns. The Brickley at al., (1997) findings provide some support 
for stewardship  theorists advocating CEO-Chairman duality, which will be discussed further in 
section 2.3.2. Summing up, it would appear that the evidence is not overwhelmingly supportive of 
the contention that the roles of CEO and Chair should be separated.
Multiple Board Appointments
 The majority of the initial research on boards of directors has examined the effect of board 
size and structure on firm performance and no consistent  findings have been obtained (Daily et al., 
2003; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). An alternative body  of research focuses on the impact of 
multiple board appointments. Fama & Jensen (1983) contend that multiple board appointments can 
signal director quality. The appointment to numerous boards might be the result of the superior 
performance enjoyed earlier by  the firm for which the individual serves as a board member, either 
as an outsider or an executive. Assuming there is a market for directors, then logically it follows 
that firm success can generate additional offers of board employment. Following Fama & Jensen 
(1983), there has been a variety  of research examining the market for directors. Gilson (1990) 
suggests the number of directorships held by  a director might act as a proxy for reputational capital, 
with persons holding multiple directorships being a signal of high quality. Theoretical support for 
this proposition is provided by resource dependency theory, as serving on multiple boards allows 
firms access to a wider range of resources, such as expertise and advice from individuals with wide 
experience (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This will be further discussed in section 3.2.4.
Empirical support for Fama & Jensen is provided by Ferris et  al., (2003) who find that firm 
performance has a positive effect on the number of appointments held by  a director. Furthermore, 
Ferris et  al., (2003) find that busy boards do not harm shareholder wealth. Keys & Li (2005) offer a 
similar conclusion. They  characterise outside directors who sit on a number of boards at the same 
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time as professional directors and find that after a takeover, professional directors are three times 
more likely to receive new appointments than other types of directors. In addition, they find that the 
proposition of professional directors in above-average performing targets is significantly greater 
than that in under-performing targets. This they  suggest indicates that professional directors have 
valuable general human capital. Fairchild & Li (2005) provide further support for the signalling of 
director quality hypothesis. In a study of hostile takeovers, they find that directors of above average 
quality are related to hiring firms with above average post-takeover performance. However, the 
results from Fich & Shivdasani (2006) provide an opposite conclusion. They  find that firms with 
busy  boards, which are defined as those boards in which a majority of outside directors hold three 
or more directorships, are ineffective monitors of management. Their results show firms with busy 
boards exhibit lower market-to-book ratios, weaker profitability, and lower sensitivity of CEO 
turnover to firm performance. Supporting the findings of Fich & Shivdasani (2006) is research by 
Core et al., (1999) which reports that busy directors set excessively high levels of CEO 
compensation and this in turn leads to poor financial performance. 
A similar research theme is provided by various studies on board interlocks, defined by Fich & 
White (2005) as the phenomenon whereby a person is on the board of directors of two or more 
corporations, thereby providing a link or interlock between them. Dooley (1969), in one of the first 
studies on interlocking directorates, accounted for the frequency of interlocking in terms of 
economic considerations. He undertook a comparative study of interlocking directorates of the top 
200 US non-financial and 50 financial corporations between the years 1935 and 1965 and found a 
slight increase in interlocking directorates in 1965 compared with 1935. He suggested that there 
were five principal reasons for the occurrence of interlocking directorates: (1) the size of the 
corporation; (2) the extent of management control; (3) the financial connections of corporation; (4) 
the relationship with competitors; and (5) the existence of local economic interests. Dooley (1969) 
25
concluded that his findings supported the view that external interests on the board limited 
managerial autonomy. Supporting Dooley’s conclusion with regard to external interests on the 
board is a study by Pfeffer (1972). In a study of 80 US corporations, Pfeffer (1972) found that board 
size and composition were related to factors measuring the organisations’ requirements for co-
opting sectors of the environment. Mizruchi & Stearns (1994) provided similar findings. In their 
longitudinal study of 22 major US corporations, they discovered that interlocks are strongly 
determined by  the economic condition of the environment at the time. Declining solvency of firms 
was likely to lead to increased linkages with financial institutions and firms that required additional 
capital were found to appoint directors of financial institutions to their board of directors.   
 In a study  on joint ventures between firms, Gulati & Westphal (1999) found that the mere 
presence of a board interlock tie between firms does not predict the strategic alliances between 
firms. In summary, they  suggest that interlock ties may either increase, or decrease, the likelihood 
of alliance formation, depending on the nature of the CEO-director relationship that underlies the 
tie. Gulati & Westphal (1999) contend that board monitoring of managers creates distrust between 
companies, whilst CEO-board co-operation in strategic decision-making and alliance formation 
enhances trust. 
 Useem (1982) examined interlocking directorates as a network of corporate elites (senior 
managers and directors of large corporations) in the United States and Great Britain. According to 
Useem (1982), the overriding concern of the corporate elite is corporate profitability and interlocks 
are the mechanism to strengthen the elite. In a further study of managerial elites, Pettigrew (1992) 
found that interlocks were important in reducing information uncertainties created by resource 
dependencies between firms. 
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 An alternative trend in studying interlocks has been to examine relationships between the 
number of board interlocks and CEO pay (Core et al., 1999; Geletkanycz et al., 2001; Fich & 
White, 2003; Hallock, 1997). The results of these studies have been mixed. Hallock (1997) found 
that CEOs serving in employee-interlocked firms earn higher salaries than they  would otherwise do. 
However, similar to Core et al.,’s (1999) findings, Hallack (1997) does not find any  association 
between director interlocks and total compensation. Geletkanycz et  al., (2001) report similar results 
in their study testing the relationship between CEO external directorships and CEO pay using a 
sample of 460 Fortune companies. They  found the positive relationship between CEO external 
directorships and CEO compensation is weak. However, Geletkanycz et al., (2001) also found that 
firm diversification moderated the relationship. Alternatively, Fich & White (2003) report a 
significantly positive relationship between the number of interlocking directorships and the 
compensation that CEOs derive from executive stock options. This latter finding suggests CEOs 
benefit from interlocking directorships. This view is supported by the empirical findings of Fich & 
White (2005), who contend that CEO interlocks primarily  benefit the CEOs rather than the 
shareholders. 
 Alternative studies on board interlocks find the number of interlocks is positively  related to 
market size (O’Sullivan, 2000), and that board interlocks are positively  or negatively  related to 
involvement in strategic decision-making (Westphal, 1999; Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Ruigrok et 
al., 2006).
 In summary, the literature on interlocks find mixed results for the impact of interlocks. Some 
evidence suggests interlocks primarily  benefit management elites and negatively  affect  shareholders 
(e.g. Fich & White, 2005; Useem, 1982), whilst  other evidence finds no significant impact (e.g. 
Core et al., 1999; Hallack, 1997).
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Capital Structure and Corporate Governance
 According to Jensen (1986), debt mitigates the agency costs of free cash flow. The argument 
here is that debt can act as a self-enforcing governance mechanism. Issuing debt acts as a control 
mechanism on managers, forcing them to generate cash to meet interest and principle obligations 
(Grossman & Hart, 1986; Jensen, 1986). Subsequently, a number of papers have examined the 
relationship  between capital structure and corporate governance. Shleifer & Vishny (1997) discuss 
the role of debt  and equity  in governance in considerable detail, and John and John (1993) focus on 
the link between capital structure and management compensation. A more recent paper by 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., (2006) finds that firms with strong corporate governance benefit from 
higher credit ratings than firms with weaker corporate governance. 
 On a similar theme, Bryan et al., (2006) examine the link between management 
compensation and agency costs of debt and equity. They  suggest that contracting theory predicts 
that greater equity-related compensation will decrease the agency problems of equity, but may 
exacerbate the agency problems of debt. Using a sample of 1623 firms with at least one year of data 
between 1992 and 1999, Bryan et  al., (2006), employing a Tobit model, find that agency costs of 
debt declined and agency costs of equity increased in the 1990s. They contend that firms became 
more difficult to monitor in the 1990s and this explains the increase in agency costs of equity. Bryan 
et al., (2006) conclude that their findings explain why there has been an increase in the use of 
option-based compensation. 
 In a paper examining the cost of debt financing and anti-takeover measures, Klock et al., 
(2005) find that strong anti-takeover measures lower the cost of debt financing. This finding enables 
Klock et al., (2005) to suggest that anti-takeover measures are viewed favourably in the bond 
market.
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 In summary, evidence on the relationship between capital structure and corporate 
governance is mixed. A number of studies find the use of debt benefits shareholders (e.g. Grossman 
& Hart, 1986), whereas other studies contend that debt is only  beneficial where shareholders’ 
interests are protected (e.g., Ashbuagh-Skaife et al., 2006).
The Role of Blockholders
 This section discusses the importance of ownership structure to corporate governance. The 
previously  referred to control approach of Dalton et al., (2003) concerns the monitoring of firms’ 
management and suggests concentrated shareholdings may facilitate the monitoring of managers’ 
performance and lead to improved firm performance. If shares are widely  dispersed, then 
shareholders are unlikely  to have much incentive to monitor management. According to Hart 
(1995), monitoring has the characteristics of a public good: “if one shareholder’s monitoring leads 
to improved company performance, all shareholders benefit” (Hart, 1995: 681). As monitoring is 
likely to be costly, both financially and in time, Hart (1995) suggests that  each shareholder is likely 
to free-ride in the expectations that other shareholders will do the monitoring. This is likely to mean 
that no, or virtually no, monitoring will take place. This view expressed by Hart (1995) is 
suggestive that monitoring of managers is therefore more likely  to take place with more 
concentrated shareholdings. 
 According to Demsetz & Lehn (1985) the ownership shares of two types of outside owners, 
institutions and “blockholders”, are typically  sufficiently large that these equity owners are in a 
position to see to it that management serves their interests and this monitoring should lead to higher 
profit rates. Tadesse (2004) suggests a primary function of financial markets is facilitating 
responsible governance within the firm. In a world of uncertainty and incomplete contracting, 
problems of imperfect information and moral hazard may prevent first-best value maximising 
behaviour by agents. Markets and institutions mitigate the consequences of imperfect information 
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and moral hazard by producing information and facilitating monitoring (Tadesse, 2004). 
Furthermore, according to Khan et al., (2005), large institutional investors can and will monitor 
agents. Large institutional investors have the incentive to exercise closer oversight and control of 
management and corporate decision-making in order to reduce agency  costs and protect shareholder 
wealth (Ingley & van der Walt, 2004; Khan et al., 2005). It is therefore suggested that institutional 
monitoring of management will reduce agency costs. 
 More evidence from Wu (2004) provides some support for the contention of Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) that blockholders can ensure managers serve their interests rather than their own. Wu 
(2004) using extant research investigated the effects of legal mechanisms and shareholder activism 
on corporate governance. Wu (2004) examined how The California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System (CalPERS) influences public opinion by publicly  naming the companies having poor 
corporate governance. Wu (2004) found that companies are more likely  to decrease the number of 
inside directors after being publicly named by  CalPERS. In addition, departing inside directors are 
less likely to take up  future directorships after their companies are named publicly by CalPERS. 
Furthermore, the likelihood of CEO dismissal increases and the relation between performance and 
CEO dismissal becomes stronger after CalPERS name companies publicly. These findings enabled 
Wu (2004) to conclude that CalPERS influences public opinion and that reputation concerns are 
effective in compelling companies to improve their corporate governance system. 
 The findings of Wu (2004) are given further support by a variety of empirical studies 
examining the effects of institutional activism using CalPERS (Anson et al., 2003; English et al., 
2004; Smith, 1996; Wahal, 1996). These studies find that CalPERS activism consistently leads to 
short-term positive returns associated with performance related targetings, “the CalPERS 
effect” (Nelson, 2006: 188).  These findings suggest that institutional activism has a positive impact 
on shareholder returns at least in the short run. Contrary to these results, Nelson (2006) finds no 
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CalPERS effect. Nelson (2006) contends that, whereas, there was a clear CalPERS effect shown in 
the earlier studies of Smith (1996) and Wahal (1996), he questions the findings of the more recent 
studies of Anson et al., (2003), and English et  al., (2004). Nelson (2006) argues that once 
adjustments are made for methodological issues in the more recent studies, then there is no 
evidence to support the persistence of a CalPERS effect.  
 The findings of Nelson (2006) may partly be explained through the suggestion that the 
involvement of institutional investors is not necessarily costless in agency  terms (Ingley & Van der 
Walt, 2004). Institutional investors often play a dual role as principals and as agents with a fiduciary 
responsibility to their beneficiaries and are thus potentially conflicted in serving as both owner-
shareholders and intermediaries. Ingley & Van der Walt (2004) advance an associated governance 
issue. They suggest that because most fund managers in institutions are short-term speculators, not 
long-term owners, they face a conflict of interest when fund managers’ largest clients are firms that 
comprise the corporate investment pool. This view is supported by Monks’s (2002) contention that 
the fund industry  is a “web of mutually self-supporting interests” and highlights “the conflicts of 
interest that envelop the institutional ownership world” (Monks, 2002: 119). Further, empirical 
evidence from Faccio & Lasfer (2000), in a study of occupational pension funds in the UK found 
that firms that  hold large stakes added little value or force the firms to comply with various 
governance codes. This enabled Faccio & Lasfer (2000) to conclude that  institutions are not 
necessarily good monitors.   
 Seifert et al (2005) in a study of the effects of equity ownership by insiders and equity 
ownership by block-holders and institutions on performance using a sample of firms from the US, 
UK, Germany and Japan find no consistent pattern between equity ownership by owners and 
performance across the four countries. This may partly be explained by  the different definitions for 
insiders, block-holders, and institutions across the four countries. Seifert et al (2005) conclude that 
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their findings may suggest the relationship between equity ownership and performance is weak. 
However, they go on to suggest that the results may be location dependent and that  local laws or 
governance practices may influence the outcome. The national differences in the strength of block-
holders are further highlighted by  Zattoni & Peterson (2011), who find significant differences in 
block-holdings between continental Europe and the UK.
 Whilst there has been a variety of research on block-holders, a number of papers have 
reported potential problems with block-holder data from CDA Spectrum (now Thomson Financial) 
and that using such data may lead to considerable bias in research findings (Bhagat et al., 2004; 
Dlugosz et al., 2006). Moreover, Dlugosz et al., (2006) argue that  using uncorrected block 
ownership data as an independent variable can result in significant errors-in-variables biases. 
Consequently, they contend that it  is necessary to use clean data when using block-holder data as 
the independent variable and that research not doing so can be viewed as invalid.
 In summary, the results on the impact of block-holders is equivocal. The findings of various 
research (e.g., Khan, 2005; Wu, 2004) contends that block-holders have beneficial effects on firm 
performance. Alternative research (e.g. Nelson, 2006) is less supportive of a positive relationship 
between block-holders and firm performance. There is also evidence of significant variances across 
countries in the degree of block ownership  which suggests the possibility of national institutional 
influences.
Labour Market for Directors
 Labour market literature on corporate governance focuses on CEOs, the board of directors 
and senior executive teams. Agency  theory  writers argue that labour market forces and directors’ 
reputation concerns have a disciplining effect on managers and board of directors (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Good performing CEOs or other executives or non-
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executive board members enhance their prospects of positions at  larger firms, or promotion, or 
board seats at other companies at some point in the future. Alternatively, poor performance is liable 
to be punished with job loss and lowering of prospects of obtaining new positions.     
 In developing a theoretical model of the supply of executives for outside directorships, 
Conyon & Read (2006) explain why firms allow their executives to accept outside directorships and 
determine whether outside directorships enhance shareholder value. The model considers the costs 
and benefits facing both the firm and the executive when the officer accepts an external 
directorship. A key assumption underpinning the model is that accepting outside directorships alters 
the CEO’s effect on the value of the executive’s firm. The potential benefit to the executive’s firm is 
an improvement in the quality of the CEO. The costs include the opportunity cost of the CEO’s 
time. The model illustrates that executives will choose to spend more time on external directorships 
than is optimal for the CEO’s firm (Conyon & Read, 2006).
 There has been a relatively  large volume of empirical work focussing on the association 
between firm performance, CEO turnover, governance, and organisational form (Berry  et al., 2006; 
Dahya et al., 2002; Goyal & Park, 2002; Heaney et al., 2007). In an examination of CEO turnover 
to firm performance, Goyal & Park (2002) find that those firms with a separation of the CEO and 
chair have higher CEO turnover when performance is poor than firms with CEO-Chair duality. 
Berry et al., (2006) report that CEO turnover is more sensitive to firm performance in focussed 
firms than in diversified firms.  On a similar theme, using a sample of 9817 firms from 52 countries, 
Heaney  et al., (2007) report that there is a positive relationship between prior period firm 
performance and changes in the size and stability of the board of directors. This suggests that board 
size and stability are sensitive to firm performance and according to Heaney et al., (2007) indicates 
that corporate governance works effectively. In related work investigating succession planning, 
Naveen (2006) finds that a firm’s propensity to promote an internal candidate to the post of CEO is 
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related to firm size, diversification, and industry structure. Further, succession planning is 
associated with a higher probability  of inside and voluntary succession, and a lower probability  of 
forced succession. Interestingly, Naveen (2006) reports that there is little evidence that succession 
planning leads to managerial entrenchment. In an examination of how succession planning affects 
shareholder wealth, Shen & Cannella, Jr., (2003) find that investors react positively  when the heir 
apparent is promoted to the CEO position and negatively  when the heir apparent  exits the firm 
before such promotion. In addition, Shen & Cannella, Jr., (2003) observe that there is a strong 
positive investor reaction to outside CEO promotion, and a negative investor reaction to non-heir 
inside CEO promotion. In alternative work on CEO succession, Agrawal et  al., (2006b) contend that 
outsiders are handicapped in the selection process. Using a data set of more than 1,000 observations 
on CEO succession in large US firms over the period 1974-1995, Agrawal et al., (2006b) find that a 
firm is more likely  to choose an insider to succeed to the CEO position where insiders are more 
comparable to each other, where outsiders are less comparable to insiders, and where there are more 
inside candidates. These results, the authors argue, are supportive of their handicapping hypothesis.  
In summary, the literature on the labour market for directors tends to suggest  directors can signal 
their quality  through firm performance and that membership of better performing firms enhances 
executive directors opportunities for promotion and future job prospects. Some evidence (e.g. 
Agrawal et  al., 2006b) suggests that inside directors especially benefit in terms of internal 
promotion. In addition, some empirical evidence suggests CEO-chair duality  can lead to managerial 
entrenchment when financial performance is poor (Goyal & Park, 2002). 
Market for Corporate Control
 Additional to the predictions and studies of internal governance monitoring and controls is 
the prediction from agency theory  that an alternative governance device can be found in a well-
developed external market for corporate control. According to Fama (1980) the market for 
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corporate control serves as a discipline of last resort, when internal control mechanisms fail. In this 
respect, external controls such as the market for corporate control are important as they  can help 
reduce the costs to shareholders of the failings of internal mechanisms (Walsh & Seward, 1990). In 
an interesting paper, Sinha (2006) compares two different sectors, of the UK economy, in terms of 
the level of regulation regarding a contested market for corporate control and examines how this 
affects the internal mechanisms of corporate governance. The two sectors Sinha uses are 
manufacturing, with little or no regulatory interference, and banking, with considerable supervisory 
oversight from the Bank of England. Sinha’s (2006) results suggest that top management turnover 
in banks as a disciplinary mechanism was not  related to share price performance. In addition, Sinha 
(2006) found that outside directors were less effective in disciplining top management in banks than 
in manufacturing firms. These findings suggest that regulation of the market for corporate control 
leads to higher levels of management entrenchment and that regulation of the market for corporate 
control can be viewed negatively from the shareholders’ perspective. 
 Gillan (2006) views the market for corporate control as the ultimate corporate governance 
mechanism. Where such a market exists, under-performing companies are liable to be taken over, 
thus placing incumbent management at risk of losing their position. As such, the market for 
corporate control is seen as imposing a necessary discipline on inefficient managers (Fama, 1980; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993; Gillan, 2006). Furthermore, Holmstrom & Kaplan (2001) 
contend that corporate governance in the United States changed dramatically in the 1980s and 
1990s due to a large wave of merger, takeover and restructuring activity. Alternative perspectives on 
the market for corporate control suggest that it may provide a means for inefficient managers to 
engage in ‘empire-building’ (Holmstrom & Kaplan, 2001), that it can lead to a reduction in effort by 
a manager as a potential takeover reduces the incentives to maximise effort in evaluating possible 
projects due to the possibility of being over-ruled (Haan & Riyanto, 2006). 
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 Moeller et al., (2005) suggests that mergers and acquisitions are well-suited events for a 
study of the valuation effects of corporate governance structures. Using a sample of 388 takeovers 
announced in the 1990s, Moeller et al., (2005) finds that target shareholder control, proxied by low 
CEO share ownership, low fractions of inside directors, and the presence of large block-holders, is 
positively correlated with takeover premiums. These findings contrast  with results for takeovers in 
the 1980s, where there is a negative relation between shareholder control and takeover premiums 
and enables Moeller et al., (2005) to conclude that shareholder control is beneficial in the market 
for corporate control. Rossi & Volpin (2004) provide a similar conclusion in a study of cross-
country  determinants of mergers and acquisitions in 49 countries. They  suggest that a more active 
market for mergers and acquisitions is the outcome of a corporate governance regime with stronger 
legal protection for investors, thus emphasising the importance of shareholder control. This 
contention is given further support by  Gompers et al., (2003) who, using a specially  constructed 
Governance Index (GI) to measure the strength of shareholders rights, find that firms with stronger 
shareholder rights had higher firm profits, higher sales growth, lower capital expenditures, and 
made fewer acquisitions. In addition, Gompers et al., (2003) find firms with more anti-takeover 
protections tend to be more acquisitive. 
 An alternative line of research examines the effect of mergers and acquisitions on CEO 
compensation and directors’ incentives. Hartzell et al., (2004) find that  CEOs of firms that are 
acquired receive compensation in line with what they would have received had they  remained in the 
CEO post. Harford (2003) reports that directors are rarely retained after a takeover and shows that 
for outside directors, the direct financial impact of a completed merger is negative. Harford (2003) 
finds that future directorships are related to pre-takeover bid performance, and thus argues that there 
is a clear cost to outside directors should they  fail as monitors, forcing the external market for 
corporate control to act for them. 
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 Whilst Harford (2003) examines the incentives for the monitoring for outside directors in 
takeover bids, Gaspar et al., (2005) assess the monitoring of institutional investors in company 
acquisition activity. In investigating how the impact of the investment horizon of a firm’s 
institutional shareholders influences the market for corporate control, Gaspar et al., (2005) find that 
target firms with short-term shareholders, whilst more likely to receive a takeover bid, obtain lower 
premiums. A second finding is that bidder firms with short-term shareholders attain worse abnormal 
returns at the time of the acquisition announcement, and poorer long-run performance (Gaspar et 
al., 2005). These results suggest that firms with short-term investors have a weaker bargaining 
position in takeover activity. Consequently, this enables Gaspar et al., (2005) to conclude that 
weaker monitoring from short-term shareholders is likely to allow managers to proceed with value-
reducing acquisitions, perhaps for personal benefit, at the expense of shareholder returns. In 
addition, they argue that long-term institutional investors prevent overbidding and value-reducing 
takeovers. 
 The market for corporate control is seen as protection for investors when internal control 
mechanisms fail (Jensen, 1993). Anti-takeover devices, such as poison pills and staggered boards, 
are thought of as being detrimental to shareholder interests (Grossman & Hart, 1988; Jensen, 1993). 
The majority of empirical work on anti-takeover measures supports the view that they are against 
shareholders’ interests (Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005; Field and Karpoff, 2002; Gompers et al., 2003). 
The results of these papers suggest that increased use of anti-takeover measures is associated with 
poor financial performance. Similarly, Core et al., (2006) find that firms with more anti-takeover 
provisions have poor future operating profit. Interestingly, Core et  al., (2006) contend that the 
findings suggest an association between governance and performance, though not necessarily 
causation. Whilst these results are all supportive of the entrenched management hypothesis of 
Morck et al., (1988), two papers provide contrary  results to the majority  of the evidence and these 
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suggest anti-takeover measures do not necessarily lead to poor performance (Danielson & Karpoff, 
2006; Rose, 2005). 
 In summary, the evidence is largely supportive of the negative effects of control-enhancing 
mechanisms which reduce the likelihood of takeovers taking place as a protection for shareholders 
when internal governance devices are seen as failing.
Summary and Critique of Agency Theory Research in Corporate Governance
 Whilst the vast majority of the corporate governance research takes an agency theoretic 
approach, the evidence supporting its prescriptions are mixed. Whilst  there is some support for 
agency theory  with a variety  of corporate governance mechanisms, there is increasing evidence 
casting doubt on the efficacy  of agency theory and its associated prescriptions with regard to the 
crucial governance role played by the board of directors (Dalton et al., 2003; Hermalin & Weisbach, 
2003). As emphasised by Roberts et al., (2005), the empirical testing of agency theory predictions 
discussed above show little convincing support for the theory  relating to the structural 
characteristics of boards, and their relationships to firm performance. One of the striking features of 
these findings is that, despite the widely differing approaches to corporate governance as previously 
demonstrated by the varying definitions from different disciplinary perspectives, they are broadly 
similar in their lack of unequivocal support for agency theory  predictions on the composition and 
structure of the board of directors regardless of the disciplinary perspective from which the research 
emerges.  In their review of the economic literature on boards of directors, Hermalin & Weisbach 
(2003) conclude that that there is limited evidence to link structural characteristics of boards to 
board outcomes and firm performance. Similarly, Daily et al., (2003) in a review of the 
management literature fail to find empirical support for a monitoring and control approach to 
governance from a shareholder value perspective. Overwhelmingly, it  appears that board 
composition is not related to firm profitability.
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 In addition to the lack of empirical support for agency theory predictions, there are other 
critiques of agency theory in corporate governance research. These critiques are various. Hermalin 
& Weisbach (2003) suggest that agency  theory insufficiently  models boards and their functions. 
This is for a number of reasons. Firstly, they suggest that there is an important dynamic element to 
the board-CEO relationship that is missing from principal-agent models. Various authors suggest 
the CEO-board relationship changes over time and therefore requires boards to focus on different 
aspects of the CEO role through the life cycle of the CEO (Lynall et al., 2003; Shen, 2003). In 
addition, as Hermalin & Weisbach (2003) point out, changes in the membership of the board is also 
likely to influence board behaviour. Secondly, according to Hermalin & Weisbach (2003), the agent 
(CEO) often has a say  over who the principals are (board members) and this they claim complicates 
agency models in a way as yet to be satisfactorily resolved. This is similar to the point raised by 
Huse (2007) with regard to the selection of board members.
 A further point along similar lines emerges from board theorists such as Forbes & Milliken 
(1999) and Pettigrew (1992). This criticism relates to the tendency of agency theorists to examine 
the impact of input variables, such as board composition, to output variables, such as board 
performance, without examining the processes and mechanisms that link the inputs to the outputs. 
Consequently, a recent trend in board studies has been to examine board behaviour directly (e.g., 
Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Roberts et al., 2005). 
 In one of the first attempts to model boards of directors, Forbes & Milliken (1999) suggest 
that both board characteristics and board processes influence board performance and firm 
performance. In developing their model, Forbes & Milliken (1999) suggest that board effectiveness 
is impacted by board task performance and board cohesiveness. In addition, they  proffer the view 
that board demography, the level of knowledge and skills of board members, the level of effort of 
board members, the level of cognitive conflict, and the use of the board’s knowledge and skills 
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influence board processes. This is discussed further in the Chapter 3: Literature Review: Board 
Characteristics and Board Processes.  
 A second critique of agency theory relates to the assumption of self-interest. There are three 
facets to this critique. The first  facet emerges from the advocates of stewardship theory  (Davis et 
al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991) and that is the assumption of managers as opportunistic agents 
motivated by  individual utility maximisation proposed by agency theory. Stewardship theorists 
argue that many managers are stewards whose objectives are largely aligned with the objectives of 
their principals. Stewardship  theory will be examined in more detail later (Donaldson & Davis, 
1991). Similar to this view, Hendry (2002) points out that agency  theory fails to consider 
managerial competence. Even if managers are honest, Hendry contends that they are limited in their 
competence to meet shareholders’ objectives. He goes on to say that in agency theory there is no 
recognition of this issue, merely a focus on managerial opportunism. To maximise principal 
interests rather than just  minimise agency costs, Hendry  (2002) puts forward the view that there are 
likely to be situations when it is more important for principals to invest resources in mentoring or 
training to improve managerial competence. 
 The second facet derives from the criticism of Hendry  (2002) who contends that the 
assumption of managers as self-serving and opportunistic is a rather simplistic view of human 
nature (Daily et al., 2003). This view of behaviour is one that  has dominated economics research 
ever since Smith (1776). As observed by Jensen & Meckling (1994) one of the primary advantages 
of the behavioural assumptions taken in economics is that it makes modelling simple. However, as 
recognised by Jensen & Meckling (1994) and by Hendry (2005) the behavioural assumptions do not 
adequately explain the way people behave.  Whilst Hendry (2002 & 2005) argues that  people are 
driven to some extent by self-interest, this he contends requires a comprehensive definition of self-
interest. Without such a definition, altruistic behaviour could not be explained in agency terms even 
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though such behaviour may also be self-interested. The problem with a more comprehensive 
definition of self-interest, as Hendry (2005) observes, is that it  makes modelling behaviour more 
difficult. To the contrary, a much more narrow definition of self-interest is easily  modelled, but is a 
somewhat simplistic view of human behaviour (Hendry, 2005).  
 The third facet is the claim that agency  theory  is a self-fulfilling theory (Ferraro et  al., 2005: 
Ghoshal, 2005). The behavioural assumption of self-interest leading to the expectation that 
managers cannot be trusted is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Whilst it may not initially represent the true 
situation, it becomes the truth. According to Ferraro et al., (2005) theories espousing behaviours 
where people act in their self interest and are not to be trusted lead to this behaviour becomes the 
norm when the original assumption may have been false. 
 A third critique of agency theory and its predictions for corporate governance again stems 
from Hendry (2005) and this is the logic of agency theory  predictions regarding the board of 
directors. Within agency theory, the principal legal mechanism for ensuring the agents (self-
interested and opportunistic managers) operate in the interest  of the principals (shareholders) is the 
board of directors. Yet, as Hendry (2005) notes, without exception the board includes the chief 
executive and often other executive members. Given that in agency theory the primary  role of the 
board of directors is to monitor the actions of management, there would appear to be a logical 
inconsistency arising from agency theory assumptions and its predictions. Executive directors are 
responsible for overseeing themselves, which Hendry (2005) maintains requires selfless oversight 
whilst at the same time they are assumed to be driven by self-interest. According to Hendry (2005), 
this would suggest that from an agency perspective, boards of directors should consist solely of 
non-executives. On the other hand, as Hendry (2005) observes, non-executive directors on unitary 
boards are expected to selflessly carry  out the shareholders’ wishes, but to do so without any 
instruction, monitoring or significant incentive.  
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 A fourth criticism of agency theory in corporate governance research is that agency theory 
takes a narrow view on the role of directors by  emphasising the monitoring of management and 
fails to consider the wider role of a director including their resource, service and strategy roles 
(Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton et al., 2003; Daily et al., 2003). This has led a number of theorists such 
as Dalton et al., 1999 to advocate the application of resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978) to the study  of boards of directors. Resource dependency  theorists argue that the 
provision of resources is a function of board capital (Pfeffer, 1972; Boyd, 1990). Whilst resource 
dependency theory will be explored in more detail later, Hillman & Dalziel (2003) argue that 
combining the two perspectives of agency and resource dependency will overcome the theoretical 
weaknesses in choosing one approach over another. Hillman & Dalziel (2003 suggest this weakness 
results from the concentration of agency theorists on the incentives to monitor whilst ignoring board 
capital, and resource dependency  theorists focus on board capital whilst ignoring incentives to 
monitor.  Hillman & Dalziel (2003) develop their argument contending that board capital affects 
both board monitoring and the provision of resources and that  board incentives moderate these 
relationships.
 A fifth critique of agency theory arises from the assumption that people make decisions that  
maximise their utility. Hendry (2002 & 2005) contends this is only possible where people are fully 
competent, “If they  were in any way incompetent, if they were for example apt to get confused or 
make mistakes that led to their taking decisions different from those that they rationally  should then 
their behaviour could not be predicted,” (Hendry, 2005: S58). Whilst as Hendry (2002 & 2005) 
suggests some decisions are simple to make and the level of competence required is limited, not all 
choices are so straightforward. Many decisions that have to be made are based on incomplete or 
confusing information. In addition, managers that make such decisions do not have equal levels of 
competence. Consequently, Hendry (2002 & 2005) questions whether managers can infallibly 
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achieve their objectives. This bounded rationality  whilst widely  recognised in management 
literature since Simon (1957) is according to Hendry  (2002 & 2005) largely ignored in agency 
theory, due to the complications involved in attempting to model limited knowledge and foresight. 
 These criticisms of agency  theory have led to many calls for alternative theories of corporate 
governance to be developed (Daily et al., 2003, Roberts et al., 2005). These alternatives include 
stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, and resource dependency theory and an examination of each 
of these will now follow.
2.3.2. Stewardship Theory
 Stewardship theory takes a somewhat contrasting view to agency theory in its approach to 
corporate governance. Whereas agency theory  has its roots in economics and finance, stewardship 
theory  has its roots in psychology and sociology. Here, managers are regarded as essentially 
trustworthy individuals who will look after the interests of the owners of the corporation 
(Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Davis et al., 1997). Stewardship theory  derives from a view of the 
model of man whose behaviour is ordered somewhat differently than that  which is viewed in 
agency theory. In stewardship theory, the model of man is based on a view that man is 
predominately pro-organizational and collective in his outlook whereas agency theory where man is 
portrayed as individualistic and self-serving.  Stewardship  theorists, furthermore, argue that senior 
executives will not  disadvantage shareholders for fear of jeopardising their reputation (Donaldson 
& Davis, 1994). The reputation of senior executives is key here as their own utility is lowered if 
they are seen as not acting in the interests of the organisation.
 Proponents of stewardship theory contend that superior corporate performance will be 
linked to a majority  of inside directors as they work to maximise profit for shareholders. This is 
based on a view that because inside directors understand the business they  can govern better than 
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outside directors and so can make superior decisions (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991; 
Donaldson, 1990). The principal rationale underlying this assertion is that since managers are 
naturally  trustworthy  there will be no major agency costs (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Therefore, 
stewardship theorists contend that the board of directors should have a significant proportion of 
inside directors to ensure more effective and efficient decision-making. This prediction is exactly 
the opposite of agency theory. 
  Proponents of stewardship theory see CEO-Chair duality as a positive force, because there 
is clear leadership for the company. There has been little empirical evidence specifically  examining 
this stewardship  theory prediction. However, the results of a study  by Brickley  et al., (1997) 
discussed in section 2.3.1 provide some support for the benefits of CEO-duality. 
 Similar to agency theory the empirical evidence in support of the predictions of stewardship 
theory  is mixed. Indeed Davis et al., (1997) in their development of stewardship  theory of 
management suggest their model requires managers to choose to behave as stewards or agents and 
that managers’ choice is dependent on their psychological motivations and perceptions of the 
situation.   
2.3.3. Stakeholder Theory
 Despite the differences in the “model of man” proposed by agency theory  and stewardship 
theory, they  share common ground as far as they  accept the primacy of shareholders. Stakeholder 
theory, however, does not accept the primacy of shareholders and has developed a high degree of 
recent prominence.
 Stakeholder theory  addresses the issue of corporate governance in a different way. Whereas 
agency theory  and stewardship theory are primarily based on the objective of the firm being to 
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maximise shareholder value, the stakeholder theory of the firm suggests that the corporation’s 
objective should be to maximise the interests of the stakeholders of the organisation.  Stakeholder 
theory  initially developed by Freeman (1984) suggests that managers should balance the 
shareholders’ financial interests against the interests of others stakeholders such as employees, 
customers and the local community even if it reduces shareholder returns.
 A useful framework for looking at the burgeoning literature in stakeholder theory is given by 
Donaldson & Preston (1995). They propose three stakeholder theory types: normative, instrumental 
and descriptive. Jones & Wicks (1999) explain the three-part typology  of Donaldson & Preston 
simply. Firms/managers should behave in certain ways (normative); certain outcomes are more 
likely if firms/managers behave in certain ways (instrumental) and firms/managers actually behave 
in certain ways (descriptive). Developing this typology in more detail, the normative form of 
stakeholder theory primarily  focuses on how organisations should manage corporate stakeholders. 
Phillips et al., (2003) suggest stakeholder theory is a theory  of organisational management and 
ethics, and therefore seeks to connect the economic and moral. Jawahar & McLaughlin (2001) 
suggest that the normative perspective literature prescribes how all stakeholders should be treated 
on the basis of some underlying moral or philosophical principles. The foundation of normative 
stakeholder theory  is usually given moral justification and drives the view that firms should pay 
attention to all their stakeholders and not just their shareholders. 
 Instrumental stakeholder theory addresses the issue between the practice of stakeholder 
management and the achievement of various corporate performance goals. Here the suggestion is 
that those corporations that effectively manage stakeholders will achieve superior levels of 
corporate performance. Jones (1995) through a synthesis of ethics and economics proposes that if 
firms contract with their stakeholders primarily through their managers on the basis of mutual trust 
and co-operation, they  will have a competitive advantage over firms that do not. The implicit 
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inference deriving from instrumental theory is that firms that take a stakeholder approach will 
outperform those that take a shareholder approach. 
 The third perspective deals with descriptive theory of stakeholders. Here the focus is on 
describing what the corporation is. According to Donaldson & Preston (1995), “It describes the 
corporation as a constellation of cooperative and competitive interests possessing intrinsic value”. 
(1995: 66). Stakeholder theory  could be seen as a development of behavioural theories of the firm 
(Simon, 1954; Cyert & March, 1963) where there was explicit recognition of the different 
participants and goals of the firm were determined through a bargaining process. Behavioural 
theorists contended their model of the firm was closer to descriptive reality than the neoclassical 
profit maximising model and thus could be described as a precursor to stakeholder theory. 
 Freeman & Evan (1990) were the first to advocate the use of stakeholder theory as a model 
in which to examine corporate governance. Utilising Williamson’s transaction cost framework for 
analysing firms, Freeman & Evan proposed incorporating contractual theory as an analytical 
framework in which to examine the multiplicity  of stakeholders within an organisation. According 
to Freeman & Evan (1990), Williamson (1984) places corporate governance centrally within the 
modern theory of the firm. Williamson suggested that the accordance of voting rights in a firm 
should be limited to those who share the residual risk of the firm and that this group consists of 
owners (shareholders), and only under special circumstances, managers, and suppliers. This 
conclusion derives from his view that the firm is seen as a governance mechanism for a set of 
contracts between interested parties who make economic gains through their participation in a these 
contractual relationships. According to Williamson, there are a variety of governance mechanisms 
to those parties who have a stake in the firm. The stakeholders identified by Williamson are 
customers, suppliers, owners, managers, employees and communities. Like stakeholder theory, 
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Williamson’s view implicitly draws upon some of the ideas in the behavioural theories of the firm 
of Simon (1954) and Cyert & March (1963). 
 Freeman & Evan (1990) suggest that the logical outcome from the Williamson approach is 
that stakeholders are accorded voting rights with respect to deciding how the corporation was 
managed. This interpretation derives from a view that the central feature of the contracts framework 
is the emphasis on the priority of bargaining by  parties to the contract. “Once this priority of 
bargaining is recognized, it becomes desirable to consider a framework for the firm as a series of 
multilateral contracts among stakeholders” (Freeman & Evan, 1990: 354).
 Stakeholder theory  adds some interesting dimensions to the corporate governance debate. 
Shareholder based theory approaches dominated by  agency theory  clearly identify that we should 
judge a firm by its success in enhancing shareholder value. Stakeholder theory advocates a different 
measure of success: maximising the balanced interests of the stakeholder groups of which 
shareholders are just one. This approach is recognised in the model commonly found in continental 
European governance, usually through the legal definition of the firm. Those that oppose 
stakeholder approaches contend such an approach lacks one clearly defined objective function that 
the success of the firm can be measured, (Jensen; 1998, 2002). The use of corporate social 
performance (CSP) measures may be a potentially  useful measure to overcome this problem 
(Clarkson, 1995). However, as yet there appears little usage of such measures and consequently 
little empirical support. Instrumental stakeholder researchers have suggested those companies that 
successfully  manage the company in interests of the stakeholders also achieve higher levels of 
financial success. The suggestion is that corporations benefit financially through taking a 
stakeholder perspective (Jones, 1995). However, the measures used are economic. Whilst critics of 
stakeholder theory would concur with the sentiments that  value maximisation can only be achieved 
by an organisation recognising the stakeholders, they suggest the lack of one determinate objective 
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function renders stakeholder theory  incompatible with value maximisation (Jensen, 1999, 2002). In 
a response to some of the criticisms of stakeholder theory, Phillips et al., (2003) contend that 
stakeholder theory is compatible with value maximisation. They suggest it is not value 
maximisation that is the issue, but to whom the rewards of the organisation’s profits are distributed. 
In this way, stakeholder theory is similar to agency theory in being about value distribution as 
opposed to value creation (Huse, 2007).
 This leads into further contention arising from stakeholder theory. A number of theorists 
have argued that measures of CSP and other similar concepts are dependent on a power game in 
terms of determining which stakeholders matter and who counts most (Trevino & Weaver, 1999). 
Indeed, a number of researchers have attempted to develop  stakeholder theory through an 
identification of who are the stakeholders and who or what really counts (Mitchell et  al., 1997; 
Rowley, 1997; Agle et al., 1999; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001). Using the Donaldson & Preston 
terminology  the first question addresses the normative theory, to explain why managers should 
consider certain groups as stakeholders. The second question requires a descriptive theory, to 
explain the conditions under which managers do consider certain groups as stakeholders.
 Whilst there is a considerable body of literature on stakeholder theory there is little 
specifically applying the theory to governance research. In an early attempt to examine the impact 
of stakeholder directors, Hillman et al., (2001) find some benefits of boards having board members 
representing different stakeholder groups. In a helpful attempt to place stakeholder theory in a 
corporate governance context, Hendry (2001) has criticized the normative stakeholder theory on 
grounds that where stakeholder theory is purported to be a theory of organisational management 
and ethics (Phillips et al., 2003) it  bases the normative theories on an economic model of the firm. 
He bases his contention on the grounds that  in order to be viewed as a theory of ethics, stakeholder 
theory  requires a social model of the firm in which to analyse the stakeholder relationships. 
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Hendry’s (2001) critique of stakeholder theorists using an economic model is analogous to a 
comparison between apples and pears. When you attempt to provide a theory that is moral you 
cannot use economic approaches to determining value. You are not comparing like with like. That 
stakeholder theory attempts to determine the rights of stakeholders based on a contractual aspect of 
economic relations is to Hendry no more than reducing stakeholders to merely economic entities. 
For Hendry, the consequences are such that, “the stakeholder problem then reduces to one of the 
division of the economic spoils of the business, and the claim that businesses should be managed 
for the benefit of all and their stakeholders gives rise to the obvious and apparently devastating 
riposte: how, then is the economic value to be divided between stakeholders?” (Hendry, 2001: 225). 
The problem here is that stakeholder theory cannot easily  provide an answer to such a question. 
Shareholder theory  addresses the answer; simply  allocate the residual profits to the owners 
(shareholders). Stakeholder theory requires either a workable structure of negotiation or an 
introduction of non-market criteria for stakeholder responsibility. Hendry claims the former 
compromises the more demanding versions of stakeholder theory, whilst the latter is ruled out by 
the adoption of the economic model of the firm. This critique about the outcome measure of 
stakeholder theory is one that is supported by  agency  theorists such as Jensen, and would suggest 
that stakeholder theory  is under attack from many directions. If Phillips et al., (2003) contend that 
stakeholder theory is about the distribution of profits the lack of measuring device to determine the 
apportionment of such rewards leaves questions over the validity of the stakeholder approach as a 
theory in the truest sense of the word.
 In developing a social model of the firm, Hendry (2001) justifies the need for a different 
approach to an ethic of business and corporate governance on the grounds that whereas businesses 
are social, economic and legal constructions ethics is not primarily  about economics and law, but 
about social relationships between moral actors. Hendry  bases his model on the basis of a system of 
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social relationships. He defines the social model as particular combination of relationships. For 
example, Hendry proposes that there are relationships within the board of directors, in which the 
CEO occupies a dual role as director and employee. He suggests that economic perspectives treat 
the board as shareholder-monitoring device, a view that conforms to the shareholder theory. He also 
adds that directors are not just monitors, but are central to the company  and legally  responsible for 
its conduct. This latter view is similar to stewardship  theorists such as Donaldson & Davis. Indeed 
one could view Hendry’s model of the firm as bringing together agency and stewardship 
perspectives on corporate governance and that it is primarily due to the assumptions Hendry  makes 
in developing his model. The importance of the assumptions, not least  the separation of legal, 
economic and social relations Hendry  makes in developing his model is an area that requires further 
research. 
 Aside from the issue of whether stakeholder theory is a theory or not, there has been little 
empirical research testing the contention that a balanced stakeholder approach enhances financial 
performance. In one of the few studies that examined whether a stakeholder approach did enhance 
financial performance, Berman et al., (1999) found some support for the strategic stakeholder 
model, though not for all the stakeholders identified, but no support for the intrinsic stakeholder 
commitment model. This result lends credence to the arguments espoused by Jensen (1998, 2002) 
that stakeholder theory is consistent with value maximisation, which implies that managers must 
pay attention to all stakeholders that can affect the firm, as long as the measure of performance is 
based on a shareholder approach. 
 In a similarly-related stream of literature examining the link between CSR and profitability, 
results have been mixed. Some purported to support the hypothesis that increasing CSR raises 
profitability (Waddock & Graves, 1997), others stated that it makes little difference (McWilliams & 
Siegal, 2000), and a further group finding a negative correlation (Wright & Ferris, 1997). Whilst 
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these results provide no clear answer as to the financial benefits of a CSR/stakeholder approach, 
there is increasing interest in firms and taking a a more socially responsible approach to a range of 
stakeholders (Kakabadse et al., 2006; McWilliams & Siegal, 2001; Prahalad & Hamel, 1994). This 
also has led to some interest in the contribution boards play in ensuring firms to take a more active 
approach to CSR and stakeholders (Kakabadse et al., 2006).
 In summary, stakeholder theory provides a different angle to corporate governance than 
either agency theory or stewardship theory. Stakeholder theory does not consider shareholders as 
having primacy with regards to the distribution of the rewards resulting from organisational 
success. Instead the theory argues the rewards should be distributed to range of stakeholders with 
interests in the firm. However, little progress has been made in the theory as to the way in which the 
allocation of rewards should be distributed. 
2.3.4. Resource Dependency Theory
 Resource dependency theory is an open systems perspective that views organisations as 
being linked with their external environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Whilst agency  theory 
emphasises the monitoring or control function of the board, researchers in the resource dependency 
tradition concentrate on a second important board function, the provision of resources (Hillman et 
al.,, 2000; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The theoretical underpinning of this board 
function is based on Pfeffer & Salancik’s (1978) work on resource dependency. According to 
Pfeffer & Salancik (1978), there are expectations from organisations of board members in terms of 
the resources they  provide. Wernerfelt  (1984) suggests these resources can be seen as anything that 
gives either a strength or weakness to any given firm. By linking the organisation to its external 
environment, corporate boards are seen as a means to manage external dependency (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978), reduce environmental uncertainty  (Pfeffer, 1972), lower transaction costs 
associated with environmental interdependency (Williamson, 1984), and aid in ensuring the 
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survival of the firm (Singh et al., 1986). The primary role of the board of directors from a resource 
dependence perspective, therefore, is to provide resources to the organisation, act  as a boundary 
spanner, and add legitimacy to the organisation. According to Gales & Kesner (1994), directors 
bring a variety  of resources to firms, such as information, skills, access to key stakeholders (e.g. 
buyers, social groups, suppliers) and legitimacy. Similarly, Hillman et al., (2000) provide a useful 
classification of director category, the areas of resources each category  might provide and the type 
of director in each category. They identify four categories: insiders, business experts, support 
specialists, and community influentials, each of who provides different areas of resource needs. For 
example, according to Hillman et al., (2000) insiders would provide expertise on the firm as well as 
general strategy  and direction, business experts would provide expertise on competition, decision 
making and problem solving for the firm and serve as sounding board for ideas, support specialists 
would provide specialised expertise on various matters such as law and banking, provide access to a 
variety of external resources such as financial capital, and community  influentials provide a non-
business perspective and help  legitimise the operations of the firm. Consequently, the logic of 
resource dependency is that a board’s provision of resources is directly related to firm performance. 
In turn, this suggests that as the firm’s external environment changes, the composition of the board 
should change to reflect the shift in resource requirements. Therefore, research dependency theory 
predicts a relationship between the degree of uncertainty or dependency  and the composition of the 
board of directors. Findings from Boyd (1990), Gales & Kestner (1994), and Hillman et al., (2000) 
provide support for the hypothesis as firms’ external environment changes, the size of the board and 
ratio of executive and non-executive directors on the board changes. 
 Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) advocate four primary benefits boards can provide to 
organisations: (1) advice and counsel, (2) legitimacy, (3) channels for communicating information 
between external organisations and the firm, and (4) obtaining preferential access to commitments 
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or support from important elements outside the firm. Pfeffer (1972) argues that the composition of 
the board of directors should be a reflection of the firm’s external environment. According to 
Dalziel & Hillman (2003), the antecedents of the board’s provision of resources can be classified as 
board capital, consisting of both human and relational capital. They contend that board capital is 
linked to the provision of the four benefits identified by  Pfeffer & Salancik (1978). This view is 
given credence by  a variety  of research examining the link between the four benefits (advice and 
counsel, legitimacy, channels of communication, and tangible resources) and firm performance. 
Research from the resource dependency tradition has shown boards to enhance the reputation and 
legitimacy  of the firm (Daily  & Schwenk, 1996) and be sources of advice and counsel to 
management (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Westphal, 1999). Similar to these findings, research on 
board interlocks have been found to play an important role in conveying information across firms 
(Burt, 1980), in securing access to critical resources (Mizruchi, 1996), and on the formation of joint 
ventures (Gulati & Westphal, 1999).
2.4. Summary of Chapter 2
 This chapter has reviewed four of the most influential theories in traditional corporate 
governance research. These theories whilst having some differences also have a number of 
important similarities. They largely examine the relationship  between the principal internal 
corporate governance mechanism, the board of directors and firm performance. In particular, all the 
theories primarily focus on how board structural characteristics impact on firm performance, for 
example. This concentration on board structure has been much criticised, especially given the 
limited empirical support for the relationship between board structure and firm performance (Daily 
et al., 2003; Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Huse, 2005; Johnson et al., 
1996; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005). Consequently, the traditional approach and 
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theories of corporate governance examining the relationship between board structure and 
performance have been regarded as providing a limited understanding of boards and what makes 
boards effective (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Huse, 2005; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999). The 
traditional input-output approach has not sufficiently  opened up the ‘black box’ to examine what 
actually takes place in boards (Pettigrew, 1992). This significant limitation has led to a new body of 
corporate governance research focusing on the board of directors as a small team and examining the 
board processes and behaviours affecting board performance. The next chapter will review the 
literature on board processes and behaviours. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
LITERATURE REVIEW: BOARD CHARACTERISTICS 
AND BOARD PROCESSES
3.1. Introduction
 The previous chapter reviewed the traditional structure-performance approach to corporate 
governance in general, and to boards of directors more specifically. This traditional input-output 
approach has been heavily criticised for three principal reasons. First, the reliance on an agency 
theoretic approach places heavy emphasis on the board control (and monitoring) role at the 
exclusion of other board roles such as service or strategy (Daily  et al., 2003; Huse, 2005; Pye & 
Pettigrew, 2005; McNulty  & Pettigrew, 1999). Second, the traditional approach neglects processes 
that link inputs and outputs and specifically how board processes influence board role/task 
performance (Daily  et al., 2003; Minichilli et al., 2009; Pettigrew, 1992; Roberts et al., 2005). 
Third, methodologically there has been a reliance on archival data which fails to provide sufficient 
understanding of what boards actually do (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003). These criticisms have led 
to an increasing body of theoretical and empirical literature exploring board processes and board 
behaviours over the past ten to fifteen years following Forbes & Milliken’s (1999) seminal 
conceptual paper treating the board of directors as a small cognitive decision-making team (e.g. 
Huse, 2005; Minichill et al., 2009; Van den Heuvel et al., 2006; Van Ees et al., 2008; Zona & 
Zattoni, 2007). This chapter will review the broader literature studying group processes and the 
narrower literature that examines board processes and how they affect board behaviours and board 
performance. Forbes & Milliken’s (1999) conceptual model drew upon the small teams literature 
and therefore this chapter will first review the small teams literature, before reviewing the 
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literatures of the specific processes viewed as impacting upon group behaviour, and ending by 
examining the more limited research that specifically focuses on board processes and their impact 
on board role performance. 
3.2. Small Groups
 Prior corporate governance literature viewed the board as a black box, where inputs 
(structure and composition) led to outputs (firm performance). Forbes & Milliken (1999) noted that 
boards are in fact teams whose output is cognitive and who meet only episodically, hence, there is a 
need to explore intervening processes that influence team and ultimately firm performance. This 
thesis follows the lead provided by  Forbes & Milliken (1999) by  examining board processes 
drawing on the small group  literature, hence this section reviews this body  of literature. A large 
number of organisational researchers have identified the ability to work in small groups or teams as 
being a critical factor in organisational success and therefore of vital concern in organisational 
success (Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Marks et al., 2001; Marrone et al., 2007; Oh et al., 2006; Stewart & 
Barrick, 2000).
Definition 
 There are multiple definitions of team or work group  in the literature. Table 3.1. illustrates a 
variety of the definitions of teams and/or work groups. It may be noted that the difference between 
a team and a work group is not always clear, although Katzenbach & Smith (1993) contended that 
teams are highly  interdependent, whereas work groups have low interdependence. Barrick et al., 
(2007) follow this approach in viewing teams with low interdependence as working groups and 
those with high interdependence as real teams. A number of authors do not make such distinctions 
between team and work group (Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Guzzo & Dickson, 1996). Indeed, Guzzo & 
Dickson (1996) are somewhat dismissive about the distinction between team and work group. They 
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argue that the difference is one of degree rather than one that is fundamental. Cohen & Bailey 
(1997) in their review of team work in organisations do, however, identify and define four different 
types of teams in organisations: work teams, parallel teams, project teams, and management teams. 
Firstly, work teams are defined as, “continuing work units responsible for producing goods or 
providing services”, (p. 242). Secondly, parallel teams are broadly  defined as people from different 
work units or jobs pulled together to perform functions that the regular organisation is not equipped 
to perform well. Thirdly, project teams are identified as being time-limited and producing one-time 
outputs. Finally, management teams are deemed as those that co-ordinate and provide direction to 
the sub-units under their control (Cohen & Bailey, 1997). There is a specific body of research that 
examines top management teams. According to upper echelons theory, organisational outcomes can 
be predicted from the characteristics of the top  management team (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). The 
following reviews will specifically cite studies from the top  management team (TMT) literature as 
these are very closely related to some of the later board studies.
Table 3-1. Definitions of Team or Work Groups
Author(s) Definition
Marks et al., (2001: 356) “Teamwork is people working together to achieve something beyond 
the capabilities of individuals working alone.”
Hackman (1990) “Workgroups are intact social systems that perform one or more 
tasks within an organisation.”
Cohen & Bailey (1997: 241) “A team is a collection of individuals, who share responsibility for 
outcomes, who see themselves and who are seen by others as an 
intact social entity embedded in one or more larger social systems, 
and who manage their relationships across organisational 
boundaries.”
Guzzo & Dickson (1996: 308-9) “A work group is made up of individuals who see themselves and 
who are seen by others as a social entity, who are interdependent 
because of the task they perform as members of a group, who are 
embedded in one or more social systems, and who perform tasks 
that affect others.”
57
Model of Teams/Groups
 The traditional view of teams has been one generally  observed as an inputs-process-outputs 
(I-P-O) framework (Barrick et al., 2007; Ilgen et al., 2005; LePine et al., 2008). In an early review 
of the literature on the role of groups in organisations, Gist et al., (1987) provided an I-P-O model 
in which to integrate their findings. Their model firstly identified inputs as consisting of group 
structure (size, ability, personality, gender, race), group  strategies, leadership, and reward allocation. 
Secondly, processes were identified as being made up of influence (facilitation, social impact, 
loafing), development (identification, team development), and decision-making (participation, 
alternative/information generation, alternative evaluation, consensus building, total process). 
Finally, outputs were seen as consisting of group performance (quantity, quality, timeliness), quality 
of work life of group members, and capability of working independently  in the future. Given that 
group performance is viewed as vital for organisational success, the I-P-O framework identifies that 
group inputs (or factors) indirectly via group processes create group effectiveness. Drawing from 
this I-P-O approach small group  research has taken place in three strands: (1) the impact of input (or 
structural) factors on performance. (e.g., Campion et al., 1993; Certo et al., 2006; Madjuka & 
Baldwin, 1991); (2) the impact of input (structural factors) on team processes (e.g., Amason & 
Sapienza, 1997; Smith et al., 1994); (3) the impact of team processes on performance (De Dreu & 
Weingart, 2003; Jehn, 1994; Marks et al., 2001). A more detailed examination of these three strands 
will now be provided in this section.
The Impact of Inputs on Team Performance
 Much of the early research on groups concentrated on examining the relationship between 
inputs (group structure, group strategies, leadership, and rewards) on group performance (or 
effectiveness). Research on the effect of group structure and composition on performance, largely 
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using Hambrick & Mason’s (1984) upper echelons theory, has concentrated upon the impact of 
group size, diversity, and team tenure on group effectiveness.
The Impact of Group Size on Effectiveness
	   The theoretical perspectives and empirical evidence on the impact of group size on 
performance provide no unequivocal result. A number of researchers have contended that  increased 
group size has various positive attributes. First, a larger group increases the information processes 
ability  of a team (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993). Second, a larger group  produces more cognitive 
(or task) conflict, which is largely accepted as being beneficial for group effectiveness (Amason & 
Sapienza, 1997). Third, larger groups are able to utilise a greater range of perspectives when 
evaluating problems (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993). Fourth, larger groups in organisations mean a 
lower number of total groups. It has been argued that this has a number of benefits: (i) a lower 
number of groups reduce the total amount  of co-ordination; and (ii) a lower number of groups 
require fewer leaders that need to be trained (Madjuka & Baldwin, 1991).
 These theoretical arguments have support  from a body of empirical evidence. In a study of 
72 employee involvement teams in two manufacturing firms, Madjuka & Baldwin (1991) found 
group size to be significantly positively related to group performance. Campion et al., (1993) found 
a positive relationship  between group size and a variety of performance measures including, 
productivity, employee satisfaction, and management judgement of effectiveness. Carpenter & 
Frederickson, (2001) examined the relationship  between top management team (TMT) size and firm 
performance and established that TMT size was a positive predictor of both accounting and stock 
market measures of performance. A number of other studies on TMTs have similarly shown that 
TMT size is positively associated to various firm performance measures (Hambrick & D’Aveni, 
1992; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Simons et al., 1999).
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 An alternative theoretical perspective on the relationship between group  size and 
performance suggests that there are disadvantages with larger groups. Specifically, larger groups 
have potential difficulties around areas such as communication, coordination and cohesiveness 
(Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993). Supporting this contention is a number of empirical studies that 
report no relationship  between group size and performance (e.g. Hambrick et  al., 1996; Iaquinto & 
Frederickson, 1997). A more recent meta-analysis by  Certo et al., (2006) provides evidence of a 
limited relationship between group  size and performance. They find no positive relationship 
between group  size and ROA/ROA, but do find a positive correlation between TMT size and sales 
growth. 
 In sum, the research examining the relationship between group size and performance is 
equivocal. A body of work has documented a positive relationship between team size and a variety 
of performance measures. Another body of work finds no significant relationship between team size 
and performance.
The Impact of Diversity on Effectiveness
 Research on the impact of diversity on group performance has been varied. There have been 
studies exploring the effects of: (i) diversity in knowledge and skills (Madjuka & Baldwin, 1991; 
Campion et al., 1993),  (ii) diversity in functional backgrounds (Carpenter, 2002; Hambrick et al., 
1996), (iii) educational background (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990), (iv) organisational tenure 
(Carpenter & Frederickson, 2001), (v) gender (Wood, 1987), (vi) race (Shuter, 1982), and (vii) 
demography (Smith et al., 1994).
 Similar theoretical arguments to those provided by the effects of size pertain to the 
advantages of group diversity/heterogeneity. Specifically, group  heterogeneity  provides teams with 
more resources than homogenous groups. This can take the form of providing groups with multiple 
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perspectives (Bantel and Jackson, 1989), increased levels of information (Williams & O’Reilly, 
1998), and a diverse set of knowledge and skills (Madjuka & Baldwin, (1991). Various researchers 
have provided empirical support for the benefits of team diversity/heterogeneity. Madjuka & 
Baldwin (1991), for example, found that teams with greater diversity  in job category in computer 
manufacturing evaluated their effectiveness higher than those teams with lower diversity. This, they 
argued, was partly down to higher skills diversity. Barsade et al., (2000) in a study of diversity in 
positive affect traits, in a sample of 62 top management teams in the United States, reported that 
there was a positive relationship between functional diversity and firm stock market returns. Smith 
et al., (1994), in a study of the impact of demographic heterogeneity  on firm performance, found 
that educational diversity positively influenced return on investment and sales growth. Hambrick et 
al., (1996) reported a similar finding on the beneficial effects of educational diversity in a study 
examining the impact of top management team heterogeneity on firm performance. 
 Whilst there is a significant volume of both theoretical and empirical research supporting the 
positive effects of diversity in teams on organisational performance, there is also a body of research 
advocating the benefits of homogeneous teams. This is, as identified by Certo et al., (2006), 
primarily  a result of the disadvantages of heterogeneous teams. A considerable proportion of this 
research examines the indirect effects of group diversity on performance by considering the 
negative consequences of diversity on a number of team processes, such as emotional (or 
relationship) conflict, communication, and group cohesiveness (Amason, 1996; Pelled et al., 1999; 
Smith et al., 1994; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). More details of this research will be provided in the 
section investigating the impact of inputs on team processes. However, there is a smaller body  of 
research that has found no relationship or, even, a negative relationship between group diversity and 
performance (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992; Michel and Hambrick, 1992). Various studies found no 
relationship  between differing measures of heterogeneity  and performance (Campion et al., 1993; 
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Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Michel & Hambrick, 1992). These results cast doubt on the benefits 
of group  heterogeneity and provide some support for the arguments in favour of homogenous 
groups. Michel & Hambrick (1992), for example, found no relationship between various measures 
of heterogeneity in top management teams and firm performance. Campion et al., (1993) found skill 
heterogeneity had no relationship with a number of group performance measures. Simons et al., 
(1999) reported a negative association between top management team heterogeneity and changes in 
both profitability and sales. Haleblian & Finkelstein (1993) in a study of the impact of top 
management team diversity on firm performance found negative relationships between both tenure 
and functional heterogeneity  and firm performance. Further evidence documenting a negative 
relationship  between top management team diversity  and firm performance is provided by the 
findings of Smith et al., (1994). They found that experience heterogeneity  was negatively related to 
return on investment for 53 high technology firms in the United States. 
 To sum up, there is no unequivocal evidence of the impact of group diversity on 
performance. There is a body of theory advancing the benefits of diversity and this is supported by 
various empirical studies. Interestingly, a study  by  Carter et al., (2003) on board diversity found a 
positive relationship between the fraction of women or minorities on boards and firm value. 
Conversely, there is theory in support of the benefits of homogeneous groups that is backed up by a 
number of studies. To further the difficulty in reaching a clear view of the impact of team 
heterogeneity on performance is the argument of Priem et al., (1999). They contended that much of 
the empirical research up  to that point traded off construct validity for measurement validity, 
explanation for prediction, and prescription for description. Two further reasons may explain the 
problems of assessing the impact of diversity. First, most studies use surface measures of diversity 
(Nielson, 2000). Second, diversity as a concept is diverse as noted by Harrison & Klien (2007). 
They  proposed that theoretically, diversity  can be defined as variety  (differences in gender or 
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functional background), separation (differences in attitudes and values), and disparity (differences 
in social-status and power). Diversity-as-variety, based on information processing theories, would 
predict that greater variety in knowledge and skills leads to superior performance outcomes. 
Diversity-as-separation, underpinned by psychological theories related to homophily and similarity-
attraction, would instead predict that heterogeneity in values would lead to conflicts and lack of 
cohesiveness which are deleterious to team performance. Finally, diversity-as-disparity, based on 
social theories of status and power, would similarly to diversity-as-separation predict sub-optimal 
team performance.
The Impact of Tenure on Effectiveness
 There have been several studies exploring the relationship between team tenure and 
performance (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1992; Michel & Hambrick, 1992; Smith et al., 1994). In a 
theoretical rationale for a direct relationship between tenure and performance, Pfeffer (1983) argued 
that performance would be highest after employees have been in position for a length of time long 
enough for them to fully understand the workings of the organisation. Applying this reasoning to 
groups, one can appreciate that groups work better after they have had time to work out how the 
group operates most effectively. Supporting this line of argument, Katz (1982) posited that 
increasing group tenure provides stability, and stability reduces goal conflict within groups. 
However, Katz (1982) found a curvilinear relationship  between group tenure and performance. Katz 
(1982) explained this result by  suggesting that groups go through three stages: (a) socialisation – 
where teams get to know each other and consequently at this stage the team tends to perform 
poorly; (b) innovation – where teams have got to know each other well enough to work together and 
maximise performance; and (c) stability  – where teams have been together a long time and tend to 
be committed to the status quo, thus lacking sufficient adaptability  and innovation to perform at its 
maximum level (Katz, 1982). 
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 Whilst a considerable body  of research points to a direct, or curvilinear, relationship 
between team tenure and performance, a study by  Smith et al., (1994) found that tenure did not 
affect performance at all. These mixed results thus suggests the relationship between tenure and 
performance is an ambiguous one at best.
The Impact of Group Strategies on Effectiveness
 There has been theoretical and empirical work examining the impact of group  strategies 
upon performance (or effectiveness). Strategies are often seen as the way groups have designed the 
degree of interdependence or independence involved in order to accomplish a task (Wageman, 
1995). Research in this area has principally focused on the degree to which group interdependence 
effects group effectiveness. In a study of interdependence on group effectiveness, Wageman (1995) 
found a u-form relationship between interdependence and group  research. Groups were found to 
perform best when they had very high levels of interdependence and when they had very low levels 
of interdependence. On the other hand, moderate levels of interdependence (a mixture of 
interdependent and independent work) were likely  to lead to low performance (Wageman, 1995). In 
an interesting finding, Wageman (1995) established that tasks influenced variables related to group 
co-operation, whilst rewards influenced variables related to effort. In particular, Wageman (1995) 
found that design of the work tasks had significant effects on co-operation, and strongly  influenced 
group members’ perceptions of their outcome interdependence. In addition, it was also found that 
reward outcomes heavily influenced group members’ motivation. Specifically, group rewards 
motivated interdependent teams to work well, whilst individual rewards were seen to energise 
independent groups.
 More recent  empirical research from Stewart & Barrick (2000) reinforced the findings of 
Wageman (1995). Using data from 45 production teams (626 individuals) and their supervisors, 
Stewart & Barrick (2000) tested a model of the relationship between team structure and 
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performance that also examined the extent to which the team strategies impacted upon group 
performance. Their results highlighted a significant difference between teams engaged primarily  in 
conceptual tasks as opposed to those teams engaged in behavioural tasks (Stewart & Barrick, 2000). 
Specifically, for teams engaged in conceptual tasks it was found that interdependence exhibited a U-
shaped relationship  with team performance, whereas for teams engaged in behavioural tasks 
interdependence exhibited an inverse u-shaped relationship with performance (Stewart & Barrick, 
2000). In addition, for the teams engaged in conceptual tasks, self-leadership  was positively  and 
linearly  related with performance. This compared to the negative, linear relationship established 
between self-leadership  and performance for groups engaged in behavioural tasks (Stewart & 
Barrick, 2000). The final finding was that intra-team process mediation was evident for 
relationships with interdependence, but not for relationships with team self-leadership (Stewart & 
Barrick, 2000).
The Impact of Leadership on Effectiveness
 An important  body of research on small groups has investigated leadership  and self-
leadership in groups. In a conceptualisation of group effectiveness, Hackman & Walton (1985) 
identify a leader’s role as consisting of five primary functions: setting directions, designing the 
group, tuning the context, coaching and assisting, and providing resources. According to Hackman 
& Walton (1985), in order to carry out these functions, leaders are required to monitor the group, to 
diagnose and forecast the performance of the group, and to action behaviours that are focussed on 
successful achievement of both group and firm performance. Recent research has, however, 
identified the importance of team leadership  originating from within teams rather than from 
traditional hierarchical elevation within the organisation (Carson et al., 2007; DeNisi et al., 2003; 
Tata & Prasad, 2004). Further, other research has identified the necessity for shared leadership 
within teams (Carson et al., 2007; Day et al., 2004). Specifically, using a sample of 59 consulting 
65
teams comprised of MBA students at a U.S. university, Carson et al (2007) found that  shared 
leadership was an important predictor for team performance as rated by clients. These results 
support some early leadership scholars who argued for the importance of leadership as a group 
quality (Gibb, 1958; Katz & Kahn, 1978). Advocates of shared leadership  contend that groups who 
have distributed leadership styles will perform better than those teams with one leader (Katz & 
Kahn, 1978). In a recent paper, Wu et al., (2010) found that differentiated leadership diminished 
group effectiveness through creating unclear leader identification and a weakening of self efficacy 
and group efficacy. 
 In a different angle to leadership, Cohen et al., (1996) compared encouraging supervisory  
behaviours among self-directed work teams and traditionally managed teams. They found that 
encouraging supervisory behaviour was a negative predictor of performance for self-directed work 
groups. In addition, encouraging behaviours had no significant relationship  to performance 
outcomes in traditionally  managed groups (Cohen et al., 1996). Whilst Cohen and 
colleagues’ (1996) findings for self-directed groups were contrary to Manz and Sims (1987) self-
leadership theory, it supported Beekun’s (1989) meta-analysis outcome that self-managing teams 
perform better without supervisors. This result  could also support  those researchers claiming that 
shared leadership can provide advantages over single leadership/supervisory styles (e.g., Carson et 
al., 2007; Katz & Kahn, 1978). 
 In a meta-analysis examining network structure’s effects on team performance, Balkundi 
and Harrison (2006) found teams with leaders who are central in the teams’ intra-group networks 
outperform those teams whose leaders are not. This suggests leaders with stronger networks are an 
important criteria to team effectiveness. However, Balkundi and Harrison (2006) also found that 
teams that are central in their inter-group network perform better than teams less central. Given that 
teams that are central to networks have stronger networks, it is also likely their leaders will have 
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stronger networks and thus, there is a question as to whether the network strength of the leader is a 
consequence of the leader or the group. 
The Impact of Rewards on Effectiveness
 An alternative body of research examining small groups has looked at the relationship 
between rewards and performance. The evidence on the effects of rewards is mixed. A larger body 
of research found no significant relationship  between rewards and a variety  of performance 
measures (Campion et al., 1993; Cohen et al., 1996; Magjuka & Baldwin, 1991; Wageman, 1995). 
However, a smaller number of studies found a positive relationship  between rewards and 
performance (Cohen et al., 1996; Wageman, 1995). It is especially  interesting that given the mixed 
set of results, studies by Cohen et al., (1996) and Wageman (1995) show both positive associations 
and no associations between rewards and different measures of performance. Wageman’s (1995) 
results showed that collective rewards motivated interdependent teams and individual rewards 
motivated independent groups with purely individual tasks. This is an interesting finding as a 
number of previous studies have looked at the impact of reward allocation on group performance 
(Ancok & Chertkoff, 1983; Elliott & Meeker, 1984 and 1986; Tindale & Davis, 1985). Most of the 
literature in this area has focussed on the determinants of reward allocations to groups. As identified 
by Gist et al., (1987) empirical research (e.g., Elliott & Meeker, 1984; Tindale & Davis, 1985) finds 
that three norms are used as a basis for reward allocation: (a) an equity norm – where group 
members are allocated rewards based on their input, (b) an equality norm – where group members 
receive equal rewards, and (c) a need norm – where group members need for a reward determines 
their individual allocation.
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Summary of Inputs on Performance Outcomes
 The majority  of input-performance studies have been motivated by  upper echelons theory 
(Mason & Hambrick, 1984). The research on direct effects have produced limited results and thus 
an increasingly important  body of research has examined the impact of inputs on team processes, 
which will be examined in the next section.
The Impact of Inputs on Team Processes
 With an increasing acceptance of an indirect relationship between group  inputs and 
performance, research has explored the relationship between inputs and team processes (conflict, 
communication, cohesiveness, group norms, trust) the intervening (or mediating) variable in the 
input-performance relationship. 
The Impact of Team Size on Processes
 Various researchers have examined the impact of team size on team processes (Hambrick & 
D’Aveni, 1992; Smith et al., 1994; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). The vast majority  of this research 
shows that larger groups adversely  affect team processes, for example cohesiveness (Wiersema & 
Bantel, 1992), communication (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1991), and conflict (Jehn, 1995). 
 In early research on team processes, Katz (1949) found larger teams to be less cohesive than 
small teams. Similarly, Hoffman & Maier (1961) found that large team size was negatively related 
to the team’s ability  to reach consensus, leaving them to suggest that smaller teams are more 
cohesive. Bantel & Finkelstein (1991) contended that increased team size leads to increased team 
differentiation and, as such, reduced levels of cohesiveness. Further confirmation of the negative 
relationship  between team size and group cohesiveness is provided by Wiersema & Bantel (1992). 
They argued that as the size of a team grows the level of cohesiveness decreases. 
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 Further research has examined how team size affects communication among team members. 
The vast majority of this research identifies an inverse relationship between team size and both, 
communication frequency and communication quality (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Wagner et al., 
1984; Zenger & Lawrence, 1989).
 Researchers have also examined the effects of team size on conflict and this literature is 
considered in Section 3.4. 
The Impact of Diversity (Heterogeneity) on Team Processes
 A number of researchers have studied the effects of team diversity/heterogeneity on team 
processes (cohesiveness, communication, conflict, and trust). Generally, researchers have contended 
that team heterogeneity  is negatively  related to both cohesiveness and communication (Katz, 1982; 
Murray, 1989; O’Reilly et al., 1989; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Wiersema & Bantel (1992) 
suggested teams with people of different  backgrounds, beliefs and values would have difficulties 
with communication. Murray (1989) observed that homogeneous groups would have fewer 
communication obstacles and thus communication would be of higher quality. Similar arguments 
regarding diversity and communication have been propounded for the relationship between 
diversity and cohesiveness. Specifically, according to similarity  attractions thesis homogeneous 
groups have more similarities and less differences and thus greater cohesiveness. Consequently, a 
significant body of research in social psychology suggests that  diversity/heterogeneity is negatively 
related to cohesiveness (Katz, 1982; O’Reilly et al., 1989; Smith et al., 1994). 
 Unsurprisingly, a few researchers have posited that team diversity/heterogeneity is directly  
associated with interpersonal conflict and more details pertaining to this body of research is 
provided later in this chapter in Section 3.4. 
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The Impact of Team Tenure on Team Processes
 There has been a variety of literature examining the relationship between team tenure and 
team processes (Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1992; Michel & Hambrick, 1992). Most this research argues 
that longer team tenure enhances cohesiveness and improves communication. For example, in a 
study of top  management team tenure and sales growth, Eisenhardt  & Schoonhoven (1990) noted 
that teams who have worked together for a longer time have got to know each other better, resulting 
in improved communication. Taking this argument further, Keck & Tushman (1993) observed that 
teams do not work well until they have been working together for a while. Thus, Keck and 
Tushman’s (1993) contention was that team tenure was directly related to both cohesiveness and 
communication. A number of other studies provided support for the contention that longer team 
tenure creates greater cohesiveness and improved levels of communication (Hambrick & D’Aveni, 
1992; Michel & Hambrick, 1992). 
 In an interesting study of the antecedents of top management team composition in Turkey, 
Yamak and Usdiken (2006) found that average age and tenure were related to export orientation 
during the early stages of economic liberalisation, but in latter stages of economic liberalisation, 
firm performance was a major predictor of the two team attributes (age and tenure). This study 
provides a helpful departure from purely input-performance studies by examining the antecendents 
of inputs and taking an approach similar to the IMOI (input-mediator-output-input) examined in the 
section on team processes and performance.
 In contrast to much of the supporting research arguing for a direct correlation between team 
tenure and both cohesiveness and communication, Smith et al., (1994) found that team tenure had 
no effect on either variable. This important result led Smith et al., (1994) to conclude that more 
detailed research on team history is required. 
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Summary of Input-Process Literature
 The research examining the impact of team structure and composition variables on 
processes have interesting results. Larger, more diverse teams and shorter tenured teams are 
generally  found to be less cohesive, have more communication problems and greater negative 
conflict than smaller, homogeneous, and longer tenured teams. These results are not very  surprising, 
since Keck & Tushamn (1993) and Mohr & Nevin (1990) observe, teams take time to develop 
‘teamwork’ and important  processes of cohesiveness, and communication do not simply  emerge 
immediately a work team is created.
The Impact of Team Processes on Performance
 A considerable amount of small groups research has concentrated on identifying the 
processes (cohesiveness, collaboration, communication, conflict, effort norms, trust, the use of 
knowledge & skills) critical to team effectiveness (Beal et al, 2003; Guzzo & Dickson, 1996; 
Kiffen-Peterson, 2004; LePine et al., 2008; Rau, 2008; Wageman, 1995). The importance of 
processes is given substantial emphasis by Marks et al., (2001) in their taxonomy of team processes. 
Marks et al., (2001) contend that to understand what makes teams effective, a detailed examination 
of team processes is required. They  further argue that one of the problems of the previous research 
on team process was a lack of specific definition of the construct (Marks et  al., 2001). Cohen & 
Bailey (1997) in their review of the effectiveness of teams defined team process as, “interactions 
such as communication and conflict  that occur among group  members and external others” (p. 244). 
This according to Marks et al., (2001) was too general a definition and they  thus provided a more 
specific definition of team process as:
 “Members interdependent acts that convert inputs to outcomes through cognitive, verbal, and 
behavioural activities directed toward organising task work to achieve collective goals” (p. 357).
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 In the development of their taxonomy of team processes, Marks et al., (2001) separate 
processes from “emergent states”, which are proposed to be “constructs that characterise properties 
of the team that are typically dynamic in nature and vary as a function of team context, inputs, 
processes, and outcomes (p. 357). According to Marks et al., (2001), emergent states describe 
cognitive, motivational, and affective states of teams, whereas processes relate to the nature of the 
team member interaction. Furthermore, they argue that team processes are dynamic following a 
recurring phase model whereby teams perform in temporal cycles of goal-directed activity, termed 
episodes (Marks et al., 2001). These episodes are defined as, “distinguishable periods of time over 
which performance accrues and feedback is available” (Marks et al., 2001: 359). This view of 
dynamic team processes leads to a contention that  team performance is best viewed as a series of I-
P-O episodes and, critically, that I-P-O models are attached to a series of episodes and sub-episodes, 
rather than over the life cycle of the team (Marks et al., 2001). Thus, Marks et al., (2001) suggest 
that the nature of team process alters as teams move back and forth between action and transition 
phases. It is therefore clear to Marks et al., (2001), that team process is a multidimensional 
construct. 
 Drawing on this multidimensional construct, Marks et al., (2001) developed a hierarchical 
taxonomy of team processes. Within a ten process dimension of team process, three separate phases 
are identified: (i) transition processes phase, (ii) action processes phase, and (iii) interpersonal 
processes phase. The third phase, interpersonal process is seen as occurring throughout the 
transition and action processes phases (Mark et al., 2001). In this taxonomy, firstly the transition 
processes phase has three dimensions: (1) mission analysis, formulation, and planning; (2) goal 
specification, and (3) strategy  formulation. Secondly, the action processes phase has four 
dimensions: (1) monitoring progress toward goals, (2) systems monitoring, (3) team monitoring and 
back up behaviour, and (4) co-ordination. Finally, the interpersonal processes stage has three 
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dimensions: (1) conflict management, (2) motivation and confidence building, and (3) affect 
management (Marks et  al., 2001). According to Marks et  al., (2001), this taxonomy moves the 
treatment of team away from its traditional consideration, as one that pursues one task at a time to 
achieve a single goal, to one where team is seen as working on multiple goals simultaneously and 
engaged in multi-task processing. 
 In an approach similar to Marks et al., (2001), LePine et al., (2008) in a meta-analytic study  
found that teamwork processes (interaction, cooperation, workload sharing, communication, 
conflict, mission, strategy, goal motivation, monitoring) were positively related to team 
effectiveness. Specifically, in a study examining the impact of interdependence on group outcomes, 
Wageman, identified group effort norms as helping to enhance the individual effort of group 
members and contributing to the performance of the group.
 Ilgen et al., (2005) identify the movement away from the traditional I-P-O framework as 
being in common with a significant body of more recent research into team effectiveness. Ilgen et  al 
(2005) identified three specific reasons why they view the I-P-O framework as insufficient for 
characterising teams. Firstly, they  argue that a number of mediators between inputs and outcomes 
are not processes but, borrowing on the ideas of Marks et  al., (2001), are emergent, cognitive or 
affective states. Secondly, they correctly suggest that the I-P-O framework implies a single-cycle 
linear path from inputs through processes to outcomes, and thus ignoring the potential for feedback 
loops. Finally, the I-P-O framework appears to suggest a linear progression of main effect 
influences from inputs to processes and lastly to outcomes. This approach would, according to Ilgen 
et al., (2005) ignore interactions between inputs and processes, between various processes, and 
between inputs or processes and emergent states (Ilgen et al., 2005). 
73
 This criticism of the I-P-O framework led Ilgen et al., (2005) to develop developed a new 
more comprehensive, conceptual model of teamwork. Their framework uses the term IMOI (input-
mediator-output-input). The use of mediator replacing process is argued to reflect the broader range 
of mediators explaining variability in team performance. The use of a second input in the model is 
thought to identify the possibility  of cyclical causal feedback (Ilgen et al., 2005). In removing the 
hyphens that appear in the I-P-O framework, Ilgen et al., (2005) contend this signals that the causal 
linkages may  be nonlinear or conditional, rather than linear and additive. Using their IMOI model 
and based on a review of existing literature, Ilgen et al., (2005) identified three stages of teamwork: 
(1) the Forming Stage – the early stages of team development, based around the input mediator 
phase, (2) the Functioning Stage – the team develops experience working together, based around the 
mediator output stage, and (3) the Finishing Stage – the team completes one episode in the 
development cycle and begins a new cycle, based around the output input stage. In further 
developing their framework, the three stages identified were examined under affective, behavioural 
and cognitive processes (Ilgen et al., 2005). 
 In an earlier departure from the traditional I-P-O framework, Cohen & Bailey (1997) 
developed a framework that  identifies input factors as having both indirect effects on outcomes via 
group processes and, what they  term, psychosocial traits, which are defined as, “shared 
understandings, beliefs or emotional tone” (p. 244), and direct effects on outcomes. In this 
framework, firstly, inputs are identified as environmental factors, task design, group composition, 
and organisational context. Secondly, processes identified are conflict, communication, and 
collaboration. Thirdly, group psychosocial traits are identified as cohesiveness, group norms, affect, 
problem-solving style, certainty, and attribution biases. Finally, outcomes or group effectiveness are 
divided into performance outcomes, attitudinal outcomes, and behavioural outcomes (Cohen & 
Bailey, 1997). 
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 In a more recent examination of the moderating effect of group interdependence on 
performance, Barrick et al., (2007) found that interdependence moderated the process-performance 
relationship  for top management teams. Specifically, data from 94 top management teams in the 
U.S. credit union industry showed that teams with higher team interdependence had higher team 
and subsequent firm performance when the team had more cohesiveness and more communication. 
It was also shown that teams with low interdependence had higher performance when cohesiveness 
and communication were lower (Barrick et al., 2007).
 The Barrick et al., (2007) research continues a long line of group research examining the 
impact of top management teams (TMTs) on organisational success. In a recent meta-analysis of 
TMT characteristics and firm performance, Certo et al., (2006) find a number of moderating 
influences limiting the direct relationship between demographic data and firm performance. Whilst 
the findings suggest support for three TMT demography/firm performance relationships, other 
results provide limited support for such an association (Certo et al., 2006). Interestingly, several 
TMT variables were significantly related to three strategic variables (diversification, research and 
development expenditure, and internationalisation). This outcome led Certo et  al., (2006) to observe 
that TMT demographic variables influence strategic choices. 
 The moderate support found by Certo et al., (2006) for direct association between TMT 
demographic factors and firm performance provides strong support for those researchers examining 
processes underlying TMT decision-making. Further support for this is found in the work of Rau 
(2008) who found that TMT demographics had no effect on strategy change over a 3 or 5 year time 
period. However, Rau’s (2008) findings also suggested a limited role of team processes in 
explaining changes in TMT strategy with only trust having a significant effect on strategy change, 
whilst neither task or relationship conflict were found to have any significant effects. In a valuable 
attempt to examine the impact of TMT process, Hambrick (1994) developed the concept of 
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behavioural integration. This was a meta-construct that purported to capture three key  inter-related 
elements of TMT process, including a team’s (1) level of collaborative behaviour, (2) quantity  and 
quality of information exchanged, and (3) emphasis on joint  decision-making. According to 
Hambrick (1994), behavioural integration is shaped by  CEO-, team-, and firm-level determinants. 
Using survey data from 402 firms, Simsek et al., (2005) tested a structural model to investigate 
behavioural integration by accounting for CEO-, team-, and firm-level determinants. Their results 
provide some revealing insights. First, at the CEO level, they found links between behavioural 
integration and CEO collectivist orientation and tenure. This, they  suggest emphasises the 
importance of the CEO in shaping TMT processes and also that tenure has a positive effect on these 
processes. Second, at the team level, they showed that goal preference diversity  is particularly 
significant for behavioural integration, and that whereas educational diversity is important for 
behavioural integration, tenure and functional diversity  are not.  In addition, it was shown that 
TMT size was negatively related to behavioural integration. Finally, at the firm-level, their results 
showed that behavioural integration was positively related to firm performance, negatively related 
to firm size, and unrelated with firm age.
 In summary, the traditional approach in examining the impact of team processes on 
performance outcomes has taken a linear approach contending that team inputs influence processes 
which, in turn, directly influence team performance outcomes. However, a more recent approach 
developed by Ilgen et al., (2005) suggests that it is necessary  to include a feedback loop whereby 
output variables may influence input variables and consequently processes. 
Group Cohesiveness and Group Performance
 With the increasing emphasis placed on the relationship between team processes and 
performance, an important stream of research has explored the impact of team cohesiveness on 
performance. Cohesiveness is generally  considered to consist of interpersonal attraction, group 
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pride, and task commitment (Beal et al., 2003). The general proposition is that, the more cohesive 
the group the better the performance. The logic of this argument is simple, yet powerful. When 
groups are more cohesive, they are motivated to work together and ensure their actions are well co-
ordinated to enable them attain higher levels of performance (Beal et  al., 2003). However, as 
observed by  Beal et al., (2003), inconsistent empirical evidence has created doubts about  the extent 
to which one can draw clear conclusions on the relationship between cohesiveness and team 
performance. 
 A significant reason for the ambiguity in the cohesiveness-performance relationship is the 
variety of conceptualisations of both constructs (Beal et al., 2003; Gully et al., 1995; Mullen & 
Copper, 1994). As correctly  noted by Beal et al., (2003) a very important issue is the level of 
analysis. A number of researchers have measured group cohesiveness at an individual level and 
related them to individual performance, whereas others have treated cohesiveness as a group 
construct (Beal et al., 2003; Gully  et al., 1995). Notably, Gully et al., (1995) found that the 
relationship  between cohesiveness and performance was stronger when both constructs were 
measured at the group level.
 The importance of the cohesiveness-performance relationship is underscored by the several 
meta-analyses that have attempted to examine the strength of the relations (Beal et al., 2003; Gully 
et al., 1995; Mullen & Copper, 1994). These studies have identified a number of moderators of the 
cohesiveness-performance relationship, including group size, level of analysis, and group 
interdependence. As previously noted, cohesiveness is usually described as being composed of three 
components: interpersonal attraction, group pride, and task commitment. However, in their meta-
analysis, Mullen & Copper (1994) concluded that only task commitment was separately related to 
performance. In the most recent meta-analysis, Beal et al., (2003) provided an excellent critique of 
Mullen & Copper’s (1994) findings. Their critique identified three specific problems with the 
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approach of Mullen & Copper (1994): (a) the use of mixed levels of analysis, (b) the use of 
stochastically dependent effects; and (c) the use of inappropriate regression weighting (Beal et al., 
2003). These three issues provide sufficient  reason to cast doubt on the findings of Mullen & 
Copper with regard to there being only one independent component of the cohesiveness-
performance relationship. 
 Using Raju et al’s (1991) meta-analytic procedures, with a random effects model, Beal et  al., 
(2003) found that all three components of cohesiveness (interpersonal attraction, group pride, and 
task commitment) were independently related to performance. There were differences in the 
magnitude between the mean effects of each component, but none of the differences were 
significant (Beal et al., 2003). 
 Whilst the results of the meta-analysis on the components of cohesiveness is important, the 
significant finding of Beal et al., (2003) was the stronger correlations between cohesiveness and 
performance when performance was defined as a behaviour, rather than as an outcome, and 
assessed with efficiency measures, rather than effectiveness measures.  
 To sum up, there have been mixed empirical results in the studies of the cohesiveness-
performance relationship. However, some of these results are due to a wide variety of 
conceptualisations of both the cohesiveness and performance constructs. Most important, there have 
been different level of analyses used across various studies. In general, cohesiveness has been 
accepted as a multi-dimensional concept, consisting of three components (interpersonal attraction, 
group pride, and task commitment). Finally, even acknowledging these methodological issues, most 
researchers accept the likelihood of there being some relationship between group cohesiveness and 
performance.
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Summary of Small Team Literature
 There has been a wide variety of literature examining small teams or groups. The majority 
of studies follow an input-processes-output (I-P-O) framework in which processes may be viewed 
as mediating the relationship between team structural characteristics (inputs) and performance 
(outputs). More recently, recognition of a feedback loop has moved the literature on into providing 
an alternative framework of analysis. The input-mediator-output-input (I-M-O-I) approach provides 
a more dynamic approach to studying teams and groups but is in its relative infancy in terms of 
empirical study. An important aspect of the small team literature that has relevance for studying 
boards of directors are team processes that affect team performance (or effectiveness). The small 
team literature identifies a variety  of such processes, including cohesiveness, communication, 
conflict, group norms (e.g., effort norms), trust, and the use of knowledge and skills of team 
members. Separate bodies of literature examine three processes important to the workings of the 
board: communications, conflict, and trust. These literatures will be explored in the following three 
sections.
3.3. Communication
 An important process in the workings of small groups and specifically boards of directors is 
communication (Huse, 2005). This is given support by  Johnson (1993), who contended that 
communication is a primary means by which personnel reduce ambiguity, process information, and 
co-ordinate activities. Given the important role that communication can play, there has been 
surprisingly little literature exploring the role of communication in the small groups literature. The 
majority  of the research on communication in business and management has been in marketing 
(Fisher et al., 1997; Massey & Dawes, 2007; Mohr & Nevin, 1990; Mohr et al., 1996). 
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 Communication is generally treated as a multidimensional concept (Fisher et al., 1997; 
Gupta et al., 1986; Jassawalla & Sashittal, 1998; Massey & Dawes, 2007; Mohr & Nevin, 1990). In 
developing a model of communications for marketing channels Mohr & Nevin (1990) identified 
four facets of communication: frequency, direction, modality, and content. Frequency is simply seen 
as the amount of communication between organisational members, direction is the vertical and 
horizontal flows of communication within the organisation, modality  is viewed as the medium of 
communication, and content is the detail of the message that is transmitted (Mohr & Nevin, 1990). 
In developing and testing a model of collaborative communications, Mohr et al., (1996) provided a 
very similar conceptualisation of communication facets: frequency, bi-directionality, formality, and 
non-coercive content of communication. Bi-directionality  referred to two-way  vertical flows of 
communication. Based on the modality of communication, formality referred to the formal or 
informal medium of communications. Non-coercive content was constructed as the use of influence 
strategies, in which compliance is not mediated (Mohr et al., 1996). Whilst Mohr et al., (1996) 
identified four dimensions of communication, Fisher et  al., (1997) suggested just three: frequency, 
bi-directionality, and coerciveness of influence attempts. They defined communication frequency as 
the number of times information is exchanged over a period of time, bi-directionality as the degree 
to which communication is a two-way  process, and coerciveness of influence attempts as “the 
degree to which communication references or mediates negative consequences for non-
compliance” (Fisher et al., 1997:55). In a recent model of the antecedents of functional and 
dysfunctional conflict between marketing managers and sales managers, Massey & Dawes (2007) 
use three dimensions of communication: frequency, bi-directionality, and quality. First, drawing on 
Morgan and Piercy (1998), Massey & Dawes (2007) defined communication frequency as “the 
intensity of one-way  information flow through media such as e-mail, memos, and face-to-face 
meetings” (p. 1120). Second, bi-directionality was conceptualised identically to Fisher et al., 
(1997). Finally, borrowing from Souder & Moenaert  (1992), communication quality was defined as 
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“how credible, understandable, relevant, and useful the information provided by  the Sales Manager 
was for the Marketing Manager’s task completion” (Massey & Dawes, 2007: 1120).
 The above illustrates the treatment of communication as a multi-dimensional construct. 
Specifically, Mohr et al., (1996) suggested that collaborative communication results from four 
facets of communication: frequency, bi-directionality, formality, and content  of influence. Further, 
Mohr et al., (1996) posit that collaborative communication relies on positive attitudes, which create 
an atmosphere of mutual support and respect. Thus, collaborative communication is seen as being 
positive. Building on this idea Lovelace et  al., (2001) suggest that communication in teams can take 
two forms: collaborative, and contentious. According to Lovelace et al., (2001) collaborative 
communications primarily consist of communications where there is an, “explicit desire to find 
mutually  beneficial solutions to whatever problems are being discussed, or negotiated” (p. 781). 
Alternatively, contentious communications are seen as being pessimistic, and thus less likely to lead 
to a positive outcome (Lovelace et al., 2001). Given the predictive positive outcomes for 
collaborative communications and the negative outcomes for contentious communications, there is 
a clear emphasis on the quality  of communication. As concluded by  Lovelace et al., (2001), an 
important dimension of team task performance is the quality  of communication, and not  solely the 
frequency. This finding reinforces the view of Mohr et al., (1996), who posited that collaborative 
communication is more than simply frequent communication or bi-directionality.
Dimensions of Communication
 As identified above, the communications literature suggests there are different dimensions 
of communications. The principal dimensions are seen as communication frequency, bi-directional 
communication, and communication quality. An overview of these dimensions will be examined in 
this section.
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Communication Frequency
 According to theory and evidence, frequent communication can have either positive or 
negative effects (Massey & Dawes, 2005). Various theorists have suggested that frequent 
communication is beneficial, as it can reduce uncertainty, facilitate improved performance, lead to 
better understanding, and improve rapport within teams (Maltz, 1996, Menon et  al., 1999). Some 
empirical evidence supports these arguments, as frequent communication has been shown to lead to 
project success, improve co-ordination, increase understanding, and enhance relationship 
effectiveness (Dougherty, 1992; Ruekert & Walker, 1987). 
 Whilst these studies suggest frequent communication leads to positive outcomes, some 
theorists contend that  frequent communication can have dysfunctional effects. Various studies 
provide empirical support  for this contention. For example, in a recent examination of the 
antecedents of conflict between marketing and sales managers, Dawes & Massey (2005) found that 
frequent communication was positively associated with dysfunctional conflict. This followed 
similar findings from Maltz & Kohl (1996), who found that beyond a certain level, communications 
were seen as low quality and of negative effect. This latter result  suggests frequent communications 
has a curvilinear relationship with performance outcomes. A more recent study by Massey  & Dawes 
(2007) found a similar inverse u-shaped relationship  between frequency of communications and 
performance outcomes.
Bi-Directional Communication
 In Mohr and colleagues’ (1996) conceptualisation of collaborative communication, bi-
directionality is treated as one dimension of a constellation of communication behaviours they term 
collaborative communication. Using the personal computer industry  as the context for their study of 
collaborative communication in inter-firm relationships, Mohr et al., (1996) found that collaborative 
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communication had a positive effect on relationship satisfaction. Similarly, Jablin (1979) found a 
positive association between bi-directional communication and relationship effectiveness. 
 A number of studies show that there is a direct relationship between levels of bi-directional 
communication and beneficial team outcomes, such as reducing ambiguity, facilitating dialogue, 
increasing functional conflict, decreasing dysfunctional conflict, and enhancing relationship 
effectiveness  (Dawes & Massey, 2005; Fisher et al., 1997; Johlke et al., 2000; Massey & Dawes, 
2007). Reinforcing this direct relationship have been various studies that suggest low levels of bi-
directional communication have negative outcomes, such as creating confusion, and causing 
misunderstanding (Menon & Varadarajan, 1992; Menon et al., 1996). 
 To sum up, there is a consensus in the literature that increasing the level of bi-directional 
communication has positive effects. Commenting on their findings, Dawes & Massey (2005) argued 
that bi-directionality is an important dimension of collaborative communication, in that two-way 
dialogue can lower confusion and enhance levels of understanding.  
Communication Quality
 Unsurprisingly, both theory  and evidence suggest that higher communication quality  leads 
to positive team outcomes. The conflict literature suggests that good quality information can 
promote positive dialogue and thus enhance functional conflict (Eisenhardt et al., 1997; Jehn, 
1995). Conversely, poor quality information can create difficulties in relationships and lead to 
higher dysfunctional conflict. Various studies provide support  for the benefits of good quality 
communications and the difficulties arising from poor quality communications (Maltz & Kohli, 
1996; Massey & Dawes, 2007; Menon et al., 1999).
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Summary of Communications
 In summary, there is a consensus in the literature that communications is a multidimensional 
concept. Importantly, collaborative communication is seen as having beneficial outcomes whilst 
contentious communications is viewed negatively. Usefully, Mohr et al., (1996) identify  four facets 
of communication that they posit make up collaborative communication: frequency, bi-
directionality, formality, and non-coercive content of communication. However, it is important  to 
note that considerable evidence suggests that the quality  of communication is key to positive team 
results (Eisenhardt et al., 1997; Jehn, 1995; Maltz & Kohli, 1996; Massey & Dawes, 2007). 
3.4. Conflict
Introduction
 Organisational conflict has been a topic of increasing interest from organisational 
researchers over the last thirty years.  A considerable amount of this research has explored conflict 
in, and between, organisational groups at all levels (Amason, 1996; De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; 
Jehn, 1995; Jehn, 1997; Jehn & Bendersky, 2003). According to Jehn (1995), neither the theoretical 
perspective, nor the empirical evidence, on conflict is clear. More recent literature (Dawes & 
Massey, 2005; De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; Langfred, 2007; Li & Hambrick, 2005; Massey & 
Dawes, 2007a and 2007b; Peterson & Behfar, 2003) has further confirmed the ambiguous nature of 
conflict and its effect upon organisational performance. This chapter will review this theoretical and 
empirical work, first by looking at the various definitions of conflict, and second by examining the 
theoretical models and empirical results of conflict.
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Definitions of Conflict
 Most of the research on conflict draws on Boulding’s (1963) broad definition of conflict  as 
awareness on the part of the parties involved of discrepancies, incompatible wishes, or 
irreconcilable desires. From hitherto existing research, Pondy  (1967) identified four definitions for 
conflict. Conflict had been used to describe: (1) antecedent conditions, (2) affective states, (3) 
cognitive states, and (4) conflictual behaviour. From this categorisation, Pondy (1967) developed a 
definition of conflict based on a history  of conflict episodes consisting of antecedent conditions, 
individual awareness, certain affective states, overt  manifestations (conflictual behaviour), and 
residues of feeling, precedent, or structure. Further, Pondy (1967) stressed that  conflict was a 
dynamic process underlying a wide variety of organisational behaviours. More narrowly, Schwenk 
(1990) defined conflict as conflictual behaviour in the context of a particular decision. Whilst 
conflict is broadly  seen as a behavioural state of disagreement, research has largely shown conflict 
to be multidimensional (Amason, 1996; Dawes & Massey, 2005; De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; Jehn, 
1995). Consequently, conflict is generally divided into two types, task and relationship. Jehn & 
Mannix (2001: 238) define task conflict  as “an awareness of differences in viewpoints an opinions 
pertaining to a group  task”. Langfred (2007) defines task conflict as, “disagreement among group 
members about decisions, viewpoints, ideas, and opinions” (p. 885). Alternatively, relationship 
conflict is defined as “an awareness of interpersonal incompatibilities, including affective 
components such as feeling tension and friction” (Jehn & Mannix, 2001: 238). Similarly, Langfred 
(2007) defines relationship conflict as, “the perception of interpersonal incompatibility” (p. 885). 
Task conflict is similar to Amason’s (1996) cognitive conflict, which he defines as “task oriented 
and focused on judgemental differences about how best to achieve common differences” (p. 127). 
Pelled (1996) referred to task related conflict as substantive conflict and relationship conflict as 
affective conflict. In a similar vein, relationship conflict is analogous to what Amason & Schweiger 
(1994) term affective conflict, defined as “emotional and focused on incompatibilities or 
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disputes” (Amason, 1996: 129).  Li & Hambrick (2005) refer to relationship  conflict as emotional 
conflict which they describe as involving “interpersonal incompatibilities, including annoyance, 
mistrust, and animosity”, (p. 798). A third type of conflict was proposed by  Jehn (1997), namely, 
process conflict. Jehn & Mannix (2001) defined process conflict  as, “an awareness of controversies 
about aspects of how task accomplishment will proceed” (p. 239). Whilst Jehn has identified 
process conflict  as a separate construct in much of her more recent work there is little evidence that 
it has been more widely used. Indeed, it is debatable as to whether process conflict  can be separated 
from both task and relationship  conflict. This is because process conflict is likely to consist of both 
task and relationship conflict (Langfred, 2007).
 An alternative typology of conflict sees conflict as either functional or dysfunctional 
(Amason, 1996; Dawes & Massey, 2005; Pondy, 1967). As Pondy (1967) observed treating conflict 
as functional or dysfunctional involves a consideration of the outcome of a conflict  episode. 
Functional conflict can be defined as a state of conflict that facilitates the organisation’s 
performance, whilst dysfunctional conflict  can be defined as a state of conflict  that inhibits the 
organisation’s performance (Amason, 1996; Pondy, 1967).
Theoretical Models and Empirical Studies of Conflict
 In an early  theoretical model of organisational conflict, Pondy  (1967) identified three types 
of conflict  within what he termed subunits of formal organisations. First, bargaining conflict, which 
is viewed as horizontal conflict within an organisation, for example, conflict between members of a 
work group. Second, bureaucratic conflict, which is treated as vertical conflict  within an 
organisation, for instance, conflict between superior-subordinate relationships. Finally, systems 
conflict, which is portrayed as lateral conflict within an organisation, for example, conflict among 
parties to a functional relationship, such as between a marketing manager and a finance manager. In 
each of the three cases, Pondy  (1967) treats conflict as a series of episodes, consisting of five 
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stages: (1) latent conflict, (2) felt  conflict, (3) perceived conflict (4) manifest conflict, and (5) 
conflict aftermath. Using the Barnard-Simon (1960) model of inducements-contributions balance 
theory, Pondy (1967) analyses the three cases and concludes that conflict is best  understood as a 
dynamic process, that is not necessarily good or bad. He argues that conflict needs to be evaluated 
on the basis of the individual and organisational functions and dysfunctions that emerge through 
conflict (Pondy, 1967).
 In a study of 105 work groups and management teams, Jehn (1995) examined the effects of 
both task and relationship conflict on individual- and group-level variables. Using multiple methods 
to examine the effects, Jehn (1995) found variable results for the impact of conflict. Measuring 
conflict using an 8-item Likert-type scale, task conflict was found to be beneficial to team 
performance in groups performing non-routine tasks (Jehn, 1995). However, the remainder of her 
findings showed that conflict was largely  detrimental. Firstly, in groups performing routine tasks, 
task conflict had deleterious effects on group functioning. Secondly, both task and relationship 
conflicts were negatively  associated with individuals’ satisfaction, liking of other group  members, 
and intention to remain in the group. Thirdly, norms encouraging open discussion of conflict failed 
to help group members deal with conflict constructively (Jehn, 1995). 
 Similarly  to Jehn (1995), in a study on conflict using data from top  management teams in 
two industries, food processing and furniture manufacturing, Amason (1996) found the effects to be 
different dependent on the type of conflict experienced. Cognitive conflict, measured using a three-
item Likert-type scale, was found to have beneficial effects on decision quality, understanding the 
rationale for the decision, and affective acceptance of the decision (Amason, 1996). On the other 
hand, affective conflict, measured using a four-item Likert-type scale was found to have negative 
effects on decision quality, and the affective acceptance of the decision (Amason, 1996). These 
results allowed Amason (1996) to suggest that cognitive conflict in top  management teams should 
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be encouraged, whilst affective conflict needs to be restrained. Supporting this view that conflict  in 
top management teams can improve performance is the results from Eisenhardt and Bourgeois 
(1988) who found that unchallenged ideas in executive teams were associated with decreased 
performance.
 In a qualitative study, Jehn (1997) adds to the strength of those arguing that conflict can be 
good or bad. Dividing conflict into three types, relationship, task, and process, Jehn (1997) finds 
that relationship  and process conflict are negatively  related to group performance and satisfaction, 
whereas under certain circumstances task conflict is positively  related to performance. Specifically, 
task conflict was found to be beneficial when groups had acceptability norms and where there was 
resolution potential (Jehn, 1997). These findings led Jehn (1997) to argue that groups with norms 
that accept task, but not relationship conflict are most effective. 
 In a longitudinal study utilising 51 three-person groups at three U.S. business schools, Jehn 
& Mannix (2001) investigated the relationship between different types of conflict and group 
performance. Using confirmatory  factor analysis and hierarchical regression analysis, Jehn & 
Mannix (2001) suggested that the middle period of the group interaction was the key to group 
performance. They found that high performing groups had moderate, but rising levels of task 
conflict during the mid-point of group  interaction and low levels of both relationship and process 
conflict, although the latter rose slightly over time Jehn & Mannix, 2001). The findings for low 
performing groups were the exact opposite with rising levels of relationship conflict and falls in 
task conflict over the middle period of the group interaction (Jehn & Mannix, 2001). Interestingly, 
Jehn & Mannix (2001) found that the members of the high performing teams had similar pre-
established value systems, high levels of trust and respects, and open discussion norms around 
conflict during the middle stages of their group interaction. These results suggest conflict is a 
dynamic process and that the timing of conflict types is crucial to the level of group performance. 
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 In another longitudinal study, Peterson & Behfar (2003) investigate the relationship between 
performance feedback, trust and conflict  in groups. Using a sample of 67 teams from a first term 
MBA class in a U.S. business school, Peterson & Behfar (2003) drew on two surveys at different 
points of time, and found that  initial performance feedback to groups had a significant impact on 
future team performance. Specifically, they find that negative initial performance feedback results 
in later increases in task and relationship conflict, although high early  levels of group  trust moderate 
this effect (Peterson & Behfar, 2003). Further findings include the following: (i) relationship 
conflict in time period two is significantly predicted by both relationship conflict and grades at time 
period one, (ii) continued relationship  conflict  in time period two has a negative effect on grade at 
the end of period two, (iii) relationship  conflict in period two does not predict task conflict in period 
two, (iv) task conflict and grade in period one predict later task conflict, and (v) task conflict in 
period two is marginally  and negatively related to the change in grade from period one to two 
(Peterson & Behfar, 2003). This latter finding leads Peterson & Behfar (2003) to suggest that task 
conflict may be a consequence of variables not considered in their model. 
 Using a longitudinal, experimental laboratory setting of upper and middle-level managers, 
Schweiger et al., (1989) discovered that higher quality decisions were made when conflicting views 
were presented, and thus reinforcing the notion that conflict can be beneficial. This confirmed the 
findings of Bourgeois’ (1985) study of top management teams, where it  was shown that a lack of 
disagreement had negative effects on strategic decisions. Eisenhardt et al., (1997) presented similar 
results in their study of conflict in 12 top management teams. They found that high conflict was 
associated with high performance, whereas low conflict teams had low performance. Drawing on 
the results of their empirical study, Eisenhardt et  al., (1997) provided suggestions as to how 
managers can create high conflict teams. 
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 Providing partly  contrary  evidence to the beneficial results from conflict, Schwenk (1990) 
found contradictory  outcomes for profit  and not-for-profit organisations. In an exploratory study, 
not-for-profit managers associated high conflict  with high quality decision-making, whilst 
executives in profit oriented organisations associated high conflict with low quality decisions. 
 Through the testing of an integrative model of the relationships among diversity, conflict 
and performance with a sample of 45 teams, Pelled et al., (1999) found that  task conflict is 
positively associated with cognitive task performance. Somewhat surprisingly, and in contrast to 
nearly all the other empirical evidence, they failed to find a negative relationship  between emotional 
conflict and performance (Pelled et al., 1999).
 In an empirical examination of the antecedents of conflict  in marketing’s cross-functional 
relationship  with sales, Dawes & Massey  (2005) find that  communication frequency is strongly 
negatively  related to, and communication bi-directionality strongly positively related to, 
interpersonal conflict. This is a particularly significant result, as it outlines the importance of two-
way communication in helping to lower group conflict. They also find that  conflict is positively 
related to psychological distance and negatively related to the level of the sales manager’s formal 
education (Dawes & Massey, 2005). 
 In a further study investigating the antecedents and consequence of functional and 
dysfunctional conflict between marketing and sales managers, Massey & Dawes (2007a) finds that 
functional conflict is strongly  positively related to communication quality and bidirectional 
communication. They also find strong support  for their hypothesis that increases in functional 
conflict improves perceived relationship effectiveness (Massey & Dawes, 2007a). Whilst their 
model had high explanatory power for factors explaining functional conflict, there was less 
explanatory  power for factors affecting dysfunctional conflict. However, they did find that 
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bidirectional communication and communication quality were negatively associated with conflict. 
Unsurprisingly, they found that higher levels of dysfunctional conflict led to lower levels of 
perceived relationship effectiveness. These results further demonstrate that certain types of conflict 
have beneficial performance effects, whilst other types of conflict have negative performance 
effects.   
 Resulting from a thorough review of conflict literature across nine academic disciplines, 
Jehn & Bendersky (2003) develop  a theoretical model of conflict  that they term the conflict-
outcome-moderated (COM) model. The model identifies four broad categories of the moderators of 
the conflict-outcome relationship: (1) amplifiers that strengthen both the positive and negative 
effects of conflict, (2) suppressors that weaken both the positive and negative effects of conflict, (3) 
ameliorators that decrease negative effects, and increase positive effects, of conflict, and (4) 
exacerbators that  increase negative effects, and decrease positive effects, of conflict (Jehn & 
Bendersky, 2003). The amplifier moderators identified are task interdependence, group diversity, 
acceptability norms, and collaborative conflict management processes. The suppressor moderators 
are suggested to be routine tasks and rights-based conflict resolution. The ameliorator moderators 
are given as positive emotions, and interest-based third parties. Finally, the exacerbator moderator is 
identified as being negative emotions (Jehn & Bendersky, 2003)
 In a meta-analysis of research on the associations between relationship, task conflict, team 
performance, and team member satisfaction, De Dreu & Weingart (2003) find that both relationship 
and task conflict are strongly, negatively  related to team performance and team member 
satisfaction. Whilst  the findings for relationship conflict was consistent with previous theory and 
empirical results, the findings for task conflict were in contrast to most of the previous theory and 
empirical results. Furthermore, contradicting previous results from Jehn (1995), De Dreu & 
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Weingart (2003) found that conflict had stronger negative relations with team performance in more 
complex rather than in less complex tasks. 
 The results from De Dreu & Weingart (2003) indicating that conflict has a negative impact 
have similarities with much of the early research on conflict. Whilst Pondy (1967) identified that 
conflict could be good or bad, he followed the view of March and Simon (1958) and suggested that 
conflict was the negative outcome of a breakdown in the co-operative organisational system, which 
affects the equilibrium of a high-performing organisation. Following a similar line that conflict is 
negative, Deutsch (1969) contends that conflicts decrease goodwill and mutual understanding. A 
considerable body of early empirical research is supportive of the negative outcomes of conflict. 
Evan (1965) studied conflict in research and development teams, and showed that interpersonal 
conflicts were correlated with low group-level and individual performance. However, Evan’s 
conclusions have been questioned because he failed to undertake the necessary statistical tests to 
check for direction of causality (Jehn and Benderky, 2003). It could be his data shows that  low 
group-level and individual performance create conditions for the occurrence of conflict. In a mixed 
method study  of sales teams, Gladstein (1984) found that higher conflict within teams was 
associated with lower levels of group performance and individual satisfaction. Wall and Nolan 
(1986) in a study of conflict using a sample of 375 undergraduate students found that satisfaction 
with a task decreases as conflict related to equity  issues, task-related goals, and personality 
differences within a group increases.  More recently, Schwenk & Cosier (1993) in an investigation 
of the effect of consensus versus conflict on group performance found teams with low levels of 
conflict and high levels of consensus were better performers than teams with high levels of conflict 
and low levels of consensus. Furthermore, teams with low levels of conflict expressed greater 
willingness to work together in the future (Schwenk & Cosier, 1993).  
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 Reinforcement for the negative view of conflict  is also provided by  a more recent 
longitudinal study  by Langfred (2007), on the effects of conflict on trust, autonomy, and task 
interdependence in self-managing teams. Using longitudinal data from 35 self-managing teams in a 
class of MBA students at a U.S. university and undertaking a lagged multiple regression, Langfred 
(2007) finds that higher levels of conflict are associated with lower levels of group  trust and 
subsequently  correlated with lower task interdependence and individual autonomy resulting in 
decreased performance. Whilst these findings were particularly  significant for relationship conflict, 
they are also significant for task conflict (Langfred, 2007). 
 Li & Hambrick provided further recent support  for the negative portrayal of conflict. Using 
71 international joint venture management groups in China, and through factor analysis and 
hierarchical regression analysis, to test their model of the effects of demographic faultlines, conflict 
and disintegration in work teams, they found that large demographic faultlines cause increases in 
both task and emotional (or relationship) conflict. These, in turn, lead to worsening performance (Li 
& Hambrick, 2005).
Summary of Conflict
 To summarise, the majority of the literature on conflict  draws a distinction between 
beneficial aspects of conflict, such as task conflict, cognitive conflict, and functional conflict, and 
negative features of conflict, such as affective conflict, relationship  conflict, and dysfunctional 
conflict (Amason, 1996, Dawes & Massey, 2005; De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; Jehn, 1995; Jehn, 
1997). Although there is a distinction between positive attributes of conflict (e.g. task conflict, 
cognitive conflict) and negative attributes of conflict (e.g. affective conflict, relationship conflict), 
most studies show high levels of correlation between the variables. This may explain the equivocal 
empirical results. Many researchers find that conflict has both functional and dysfunctional effects 
upon organisational performance (Amason, 1996; Dawes & Massey, 2005, Jehn, 1995, Pelled et al., 
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1999), however a small number of studies suggest that conflict is solely  negative (De Dreu & 
Weingart, 2003; Langfred, 2007).
3.5. Trust
Introduction
 The recognition that trust is critical to the effective functioning of teams has led to a 
proliferation of  theoretical and empirical research in organisational trust in management and 
organisation studies over the past twenty  or so years (Bijlsma & Van de Bunt, 2003; De Jong & 
Elfring, 2010; Langfred, 2004; Mollering et al., 2004; Schoorman et al., 2007). Prior to this, much 
of the research on trust came from within the separate disciplines of economics, political science, 
psychology and sociology (Bigley & Pearce, 1998; Lewicki et al., 1998; Sheppard & Sherman, 
1998). A number of authors have observed that the result  of trust having been studied in many 
social science disciplines is a huge diversity  in background, methods, and goals of trust scholars, 
and had left trust without  a solid, unifying framework (Beccerra & Gupta, 1999; Bhattacharya et  al., 
1998; Mayer et al., 1995). Furthermore, the diversity has been supplemented in the variability in the 
unit of analysis in which trust  has been examined (Beccerra & Gupta, 1999; Rousseau et al., 1998). 
In an important paper for the study of trust  in organisations, Mayer et al., (1995) developed a model 
of trust  that attempted to integrate the differing disciplinary perspectives. They contended that 
whilst there had hitherto been a great interest in trust, its study in organisations had been highly 
problematic for several reasons: problems with the definition of trust; lack of clarity  in the 
relationship  between risk and trust; confusion between trust and its antecedents and outcomes; 
confusion in levels of analysis; and a failure to consider both the trusting party and the party  to be 
trusted. A similar approach was advanced by Rousseau et  al., (1998) who identified that they 
wished to move research on trust forward through the adoption of a multidisciplinary perspective 
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which attempted to overcome traditional disciplinary differences. Prior to, and subsequent to, the 
contributions of Mayer et al., (1995) and Rousseau et al., (1998), there has been a considerable 
body of theoretical and empirical research examining the impact of trust in organisational teams (De 
Jong & Elfring, 2010; Schoorman et al., 2007). The following sections will review this trust 
literature. 
Definition of Trust
 There are various definitions of trust in the literature. A number of these definitions are 
shown in the table below.
Table 3-2. Definitions of Trust
Author(s) Definition
Mayer et al., (1995: 712) “Trust is the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the 
actions of another party based on the expectation that the other 
will perform a particular action important to the trustor, 
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other 
party.”
Sitkin & Roth (1993: 373) “Trust is the belief in a person’s competence to perform a 
specific task under specific circumstances.”
Whitener et al., (1998: 513) “Trust can be viewed as a positive attitude towards others and 
thus involves a willingness to be vulnerable and risk that the 
other party may not fulfill that expectation.”
Bhattacharya et., (1998: 462) “Trust is an expectancy of positive outcomes that one can 
receive based on the expected action of another party in an 
interaction characterised by uncertainty.”
Rousseau et al., (1998: 395) “Trust is a psychological state comprising the willingness to be 
vulnerable under conditions of risk and uncertainty.”
Costa (2003: 608) “Trust is a psychological state based on expectations and on 
perceived motives and intentions of others, but also a 
manifestation of behaviour towards others.”
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 Although there is no universal definition of trust, there is considerable agreement that trust is 
a psychological state with a number of key characteristics, including positive expectations and 
suspension of uncertainty during a period where individuals recognize their vulnerability  (De Jong 
& Elfring, 2010; Rousseau et al., 1998). In addition, there is wide recognition of trust as a multi-
dimensional construct (Connell et al., 2003; Costa, 2003; Ferres et al., 2004; Gillespie & Mann, 
2004). Various researchers suggest that trust has moral, cognitive, affective or emotional, and 
behavioural bases (Clark & Payne, 1987; Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995). Cognitive trust 
refers to one’s beliefs about another’s trustworthiness, affective trust  refers to the role of emotions 
in the trust process, whilst according to Gillespie & Mann (2004), behavioural trust has two forms: 
relying on another and disclosure of sensitive information to another. 
 These definitions are ones of interpersonal trust, trust as an individual-level concept. Trust, 
however, can be viewed as a team-level concept. In particular, intra-team trust is viewed as a team-
level concept, which refers to generalised expectations for all team members (De Jong & Elfring, 
2010; Langfred, 2004; Simons & Peterson, 2000). As helpfully observed by De Jong & Elfring 
(2010), whilst perceptions of trust are held at the individual level, the meaning of trust as a team-
level construct derives from the shared quality  of the individual-level perceptions. Whilst  it is 
necessary  to distinguish between interpersonal trust (trust as an individual-level construct) and 
intra-team trust (trust as a team-level construct), there are a few authors who suggest that there are 
considerable similarities between the individual-level and the team-level concepts (McKnight et al., 
1998; Schoorman et al., 2007). Also and perhaps, more importantly the way they affect outcomes 
are largely similar at different levels of analysis (McKnight et al., 1998; Schoorman et al., 2007). 
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Theoretical Models and Empirical Studies of Trust
 The realisation of the importance of trust  at an individual-level and team-level within 
organisations has generated a considerable amount of theoretical and empirical research. This 
section will review this literature. 
 The literature of trust in organisations can be divided into three broad categories. The first is 
research examining the antecedents of trust (Bijlsma & Van de Bunt, 2003; Costa, 2003; Kerkhof et 
al, 2003; Korsgaard et al., 1995; McKnight et al., 1998; Whitener et al., 1998), the second is 
research examining the outcomes of trust (De Jong & Elfring, 2010; Mach et al., 2010; Stewart and 
Barrick, 2000), and the third combines the first two by examining both the antecedents and the 
outcomes of trust (Costa et al., 2001; Gillespie & Mann, 2004; Mayer et al, 1995; McAllister, 
1995). Much of this research in trust in organisations is predominately  an interest in trust in teams, 
whether it be in ongoing teams, or short-term teams (De Jong & Elfring, 2010). 
Antecedents of Trust
 In a highly  regarded attempt to develop an integrated model of trust, Mayer et  al., (1995) 
identified perceived trustworthiness, ability, benevolence, integrity, and the propensity to trust as 
the key antecedents of trust. A body of subsequent research has followed similar lines in their 
approach to antecedents of trust. For example, Costa et al., (2001) identified both perceived 
trustworthiness and the propensity to trust as key antecedents, alongside cooperative and monitoring 
behaviours of trust.  An alternative, but not  entirely  dissimilar approach was provided by  McAllister 
(1995), who identified the level of citizenship behaviour and the frequency  of interaction as 
antecedents of affect-based trust, whilst previous history of reliability, cultural and ethnic similarity 
and professional credentials were viewed as antecedents of cognitive trust. Whilst the approach of 
McAllister (1995) has distinct differences to that of Mayer et al., (1995) they still have trusting 
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behaviours as an important element of the antecedents of trust. The separation of trust into affect-
based trust and cognitive-based trust  is also used by Gillespie & Mann (2004) who provided an 
additional concept, behavioural trust. They found that consultation between team members, 
communication, and shared values were important antecedents of trust towards team leaders. The 
importance of consultation in the development of trust in teams was also found by  a number of 
other researchers (Bijlsma & Van de Bunt, 2003; Kerkhof et al., 2003; Korsgaard et al., 1995). In 
addition to the importance of consultation, Bijlsma & Van de Bunt (2003) found that a 
“combination of monitoring, guidance, and support is a necessary condition for trust  in 
managers” (p. 658). In examining the formation of trust, McKnight et al., (1998) modelled trusting 
intention as a function of disposition to trust, institution-based trust, and trusting beliefs and of the 
cognitive processes, categorisation processes and illusions of control process. Rather broadly, Jones 
and George (1998) suggest trust as an experience is influenced by people’s values, attitudes, moods 
and emotions. Usefully, Jones and George (1998) categorise trust into three distinct states: distrust, 
conditional trust, and unconditional trust, and contend that people’s values, attitudes, moods and 
emotions are key antecedents of the trusting state in teams. 
In summary, there are various antecedents of trust identified in the literature. The most often 
identified are perceived trustworthiness, propensity  to trust, ability, benevolence and integrity. In 
addition, similar to conflict  a number of authors divide trust  and its antecedents into cognitive and 
affective trust (e.g., Gillespie & Mann, 2004;  McAllister, 1995; McKnight et al., 1998).
Outcomes of Trust
 There has been much research interest in the outcomes of trust in organisations since the 
conceptual model of Mayer et al., (1995). A particularly  important strand of this research is the role 
of trust in organisational teams and how trust affects performance (Costa, 2003; De Jong & Elfring, 
2010; Dirks, 1999; Dirks and Ferrin, 2001; Langfred, 2004). Trust is regarded as a key part of 
98
teamwork because team tasks can require a high level of interdependence between team members 
(Mach et al., 2010; Mullen & Copper, 1994). Trust is generally seen as being highly beneficial to 
the functioning of an organisation (Costa et al., 2003; Gillespie & Mann, 2004; Lewicki et al, 1998; 
Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998). Research has suggested that trust enhances employee 
performance (Dirks and Skarlicki, 2009), employee attitudes (Brower et  al., 2009; Dirks, 1999), 
employee satisfaction (Costa, 2003; LePine et al., 2008), continuous improvement efforts (Lee, 
2004), increased coordination and cooperation (McAllister, 1995) and motivation (Heavey et al, 
2011). However, as pointed out by De Jong & Elfring (2010), the outcomes of the studies focusing 
on short-term teams differ from those looking at ongoing teams. Specifically, studies on the effect 
of trust on performance outcomes in short-term teams suggest trust has a negligible impact on 
performance (Dirks, 1999; Langfred, 2004 & 2007). Alternatively, studies looking at the impact of 
trust on performance in on-going teams have consistently shown evidence of a positive effect on 
performance outcomes, such as task performance, team member satisfaction, or team performance 
(Costa et al., 2001; Costa, 2003; De Jong & Elfring, 2010; Lee, 2004; Mach et al., 2010). 
Summary of Trust
 Theoretical and empirical evidence points to the importance of trust within organisations and 
specifically to teams within organisations. Various researchers have identified a number of 
antecedents of trust (Bijlsma & Van de Bunt, 2003; Costa, 2003; Kerkhof et  al, 2003; Korsgaard et 
al., 1995; McKnight et al., 1998; Whitener et al., 1998). In addition, there has been considerable 
research interest in the outcomes of trust (De Jong & Elfring, 2010; Mach et  al., 2010; Stewart & 
Barrick, 2000). Whilst some evidence suggests the benefits of trust in short-term teams is negligible 
(Dirks, 1999; Langfred, 2004 & 2007), a considerable body of evidence points to the beneficial 
outcomes of trust in on-going teams (Costa et al., 2001; Costa, 2003; De Jong & Elfring, 2010; 
Gillespie & Mann, 2004; Lee, 2004; Mach et al., 2010). Given that boards of directors are regarded 
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as a cognitive decision-making team (Forbes & Milliken, 1999), the importance of trust as a process 
to explaining board performance is one that requires exploration. The next section will review the 
board process literature, including the limited treatment of trust on boards.
3.6. Board Processes
 This chapter has thus far reviewed the literature examining team processes contributing to 
team effectiveness. Linked to this literature is an increasing body of corporate governance research 
examining board processes and behaviours that impact upon board performance. In their seminal 
paper, Forbes & Milliken (1999) contended that a board of directors could be viewed as large, elite 
and episodic decision-making groups, whose output is entirely cognitive. They developed a 
conceptual model to explain board effectiveness, defined by the board’s ability to perform its 
control and service tasks effectively  and the cohesiveness (the ability of the board to continue 
working together) of the board.   Board task performance was viewed as impacting directly on form 
performance, whilst board cohesiveness affected firm performance indirectly  by influencing present 
and future levels of board task performance (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Drawing on the small teams 
literature, the primary  factors influencing board effectiveness were divided into board 
characteristics (demography, and the presence of knowledge and skills on the board) and board 
processes (cognitive conflict, effort norms, and the use of knowledge and skills) (Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999). Following the seminal contribution of Forbes & Milliken (1999) and the 
contention of various other researchers that to understand boards performance, there was a need to 
examine how boards actually behave (Pettigrew, 1992; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999), there has been 
the development of a stream of research investigating the relationship  between board processes and 
performance (Cornforth, 2001; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000; Huse, 
2005 & 2007; Minichilli et  al., 2009; Pugliesi et  al., 2009; Ruigrok et al., 2006; Van Ees et al., 
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2008; Wan & Ong, 2005; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). This section will provide an overview of this 
relatively recent body of literature.
 As discussed in the previous chapter, Literature Review: Corporate Governance Theories on 
Boards of Directors, traditional approaches to corporate governance concentrated on examining the 
relationship  between board structure and firm performance. This has been criticised heavily  for 
ignoring the processes that link structure and performance (e.g., Pettigrew, 1992). Consequently, the 
research in corporate governance has seen a change in emphasis in recent years. This change is 
principally in three areas. First, there has been a move towards the use of multi-theoretic 
perspectives. Second, there has been a conceptual shift towards studying the intervening processes 
that link board inputs to board outputs. Third, there has been a methodological development away 
from the use of archival studies to survey based studies and a variety of qualitative type studies, 
including the use of participate and non-participative observation to gain greater insights into board 
activities and behaviours. 
 At the core of this emergent research stream has been the investigation of the effect of board 
processes on board outcomes, specifically board effectiveness. Within this body  of literature, board 
effectiveness has been defined as the board’s ability to successfully carry out their roles (or tasks) 
(Aguilera, 2005; Huse, 2005; Johnson et  al., 1996; Minichilli et  al., 2010; Stiles & Taylor, 2001; 
Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). Drawing on existing theories of corporate 
governance, researchers in this tradition have suggested that boards carry  out various roles 
(Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer, 1972; 
Ruigrok et al., 2006; Stiles, 2001). In an early identification of board roles, Zahra & Pearce (1989) 
provided an important contribution by proposing boards have three primary roles: control, strategy, 
and service. In their seminal work, Forbes & Milliken defined board task performance as, “the 
board’s ability to perform its control and service tasks effectively” (1999: 492). These two examples 
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illustrate a problem endemic in board role research and that is an ambiguity in terminology  and 
scope of definition (Nicholson & Kiel, 2004; Van den Heuvel et al., 2006). Various authors (e.g., 
Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Zona & Zattoni, 2007) use board tasks in a similar way to others use of 
board roles (e.g., Van Ees et al., 2008) and highlights the lack of conceptual clarity referred to by 
Van den Heuvel et al., (2006). In addition, a wide variety of roles (or tasks) have been 
conceptualised in the literature, including control (or monitoring), service, resource dependency, 
strategy, advice, and networking (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Huse, 2005; Minichilli, et al., 2009, 
2010; Ruigrok et al., 2006; Van den Heuvel et al., 2006; Van Ees et al., 2008; Wan & Ong, 2005; 
Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). Whilst definitions of control and monitoring are 
largely consistent in the literature, the treatment of the other roles is inconsistent. As partly  noted by 
Van den Heuvel et al., (2006), service roles are sometimes located in the literature within strategy, 
resource dependency or networking roles (Hillman et al., 2000; Hillman et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 
1996; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). 
 Issues of definitional ambiguity and lack of conceptual clarity over the roles (or tasks) 
performed by boards notwithstanding, the board process tradition has provided a useful contribution 
to the understanding of factors contributing to board effectiveness. Most notable is the consistent 
finding that board processes have stronger explanatory power of board role (or task) performance 
than board structures (Minichilli et al., 2009, 2010; Van den Heuvel et al., 2006; Van Ees et al., 
2008; Wan & Ong, 2005; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). The processes that have been studied are a subset 
of the small groups (or teams) processes identified in Section 3.2. in this chapter. The main 
processes that have been the focus of empirical study have been those identified by Forbes & 
Milliken (1999): cognitive conflict, effort  norms, and the use of knowledge and skills (Minichilli et 
al., 2010; Van Ees et al., 2008; Wan & Ong, 2005; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). Effort norms are a group-
level construct  that can be expected to enhance the effort of individual group members and thus 
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contribute to improving the performance of groups (Wageman, 1995). The use of knowledge and 
skills refers to group’s ability  to utilise the knowledge and skills available to it and to apply them to 
different tasks (Hackman and Morris, 1975). According to Cohen & Bailey (1997), the use of 
knowledge and skills is related to the behavioural dimension of social integration, thus affecting a 
group’s ability to co-operate. A number of other board processes have been subject to less attention 
(e.g., affective conflict, trust) (Van Ees et al., 2008) and some processes (e.g. communication 
quality) have to my knowledge not been the focus of any study to this point. 
 Whilst this body of research has led to a better understanding of the factors influencing 
board effectiveness, very few studies have actually  measured board effectiveness itself. The tend to 
measure the extent to which boards are involved in the roles, rather than the effectiveness of the role 
performance. A very recent study by Payne et  al., (2009) used a self-rating scale for directors to 
judge the board’s effectiveness and found that board attributes (knowledge, information, power, 
opportunity/time) contributed to board effectiveness, which was positively related to corporate 
performance. 
3.7. Summary of the Chapter and Identification of Research Gaps
 This chapter has reviewed the literature in various small groups (or teams) processes that has 
been the subject to recent board process research examining the actual behaviour of boards of 
directors and how this contributes to board effectiveness. The review of the corporate governance 
literature and the board process literature has identified a number of gaps in the research. First, 
despite some impressive improvements in the knowledge about boards and what they  actually  do in 
recent years, many researchers still contend there is much to learn (Hillman et al., 2008; Minichilli 
et al., 2009; Van Ees et al., 2008). Given that only a sub-set of board processes have been subject to 
empirical study, there are a number of processes which are not yet understood. This suggests a study 
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that investigates a more comprehensive set of board processes is required. Second, much of the 
focus of empirical work examining board processes and board role performance has been limited to 
Continental Europe and South East Asia with little attention paid to UK boards. This lack of large 
empirical studies in the UK examining board processes and their potential contribution to board role 
performance and board effectiveness is a gap in the research requiring attention. Third, the lack of 
research specifically  measuring board effectiveness is a noteworthy absence in the literature. 
Fourth, the many calls for the development of new theories in corporate governance (e.g., Aguilera, 
2005; Huse, 2005; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005) and especially the need for a multi-
theoretic approach is also a gap identified through the review of the literature. 
 These gaps in the literature have helped identify the need for the development of a new 
model to investigate the factors influencing board effectiveness with a specific focus in the UK. The 
next chapter will develop  this model and a number of hypotheses that  will be tested through a 
survey of the boards of UK listed companies.
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CHAPTER 4: 
MODEL AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
4.1 Introduction
 As identified by Petrovic (2008), one of the most important questions in corporate 
governance is what makes an effective board of directors. In a recent paper, Zona & Zattoni (2007) 
observed that despite a vast body of corporate governance literature there is still little evidence on 
what determines board effectiveness. Recently, board researchers have argued that far greater 
attention needs to be given to the behaviour of the board of directors to establish a deeper 
understanding of the workings of boards (Huse, 1998, 2005 & 2007; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005; 
Roberts et al., 2005). In particular, there have been many calls to examine the processes that lie 
behind the operation of the board of directors. In one of the first attempts to examine board 
processes, Forbes & Milliken (1999) developed a conceptual model to illuminate the complexity of 
board dynamics. However, thus far there has been no empirical testing of their model, although a 
few studies (e.g., van Ees et al., 2008 and Zona & Zattoni, 2007) have attempted to test 
modifications of the original Forbes & Milliken (1999) model. This thesis follows the approach of 
Forbes & Milliken (1999) by viewing the board of directors as a small group, and the theoretical 
model follows the classical input-processes (or mediators)-output approach taken in conventional 
small groups research (Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Gist et al., 1987; Ilgen et  al., 2005; Marks et al., 
2001).
 In this model the output, board effectiveness, is the dependent variable. The inputs or 
independent variables are board governance orientation and board governance processes. The 
former is a new concept that draws upon four existing theories in corporate governance: agency, 
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resource dependency, stakeholder, and stewardship. The latter is a concept partly drawn from 
Forbes & Milliken (1999), but further developed from the board literature (Huse, 2005; Sherwin, 
2003). Drawing on the small groups literature and the literature of top  management teams, six 
important board governance processes are identified: conflict (cognitive and affective), 
cohesiveness, communication quality, effort norms, trust, and the use of knowledge and skills. The 
mediating variables in the model are derived from board role theories and are identified as the 
control, service, and strategy roles of the board (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
 The following sections develop the conceptual model (see Figure 4-1) which follows the 
approach of recent research on boards by examining the impact of board processes on board role 
performance. In addition, the model contributes to existing literature in a number of ways. First, the 
model introduces a new concept, board governance orientation. Second the model encapsulates a 
more comprehensive set of board processes than any previous research. Third, the model proposes 
board effectiveness as the dependent variable. This is a departure from previous studies which have 
either used firm performance or the board’s involvement in task performance as the dependent 
variables. In the sections that follow, each component of the theoretical model is discussed in detail 
and hypotheses developed. 
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Board Control 
Variables
Insider-outside ratio
CEO-Chair Duality
Board Size
Board Shareholdings
Firm Size
Board Governance 
Orientation
Agency, 
Stewardship, 
Stakeholder, 
Resource Dependency
Board Governance 
Processes
Cohesiveness, 
Communication, 
Conflict, 
Effort Norms, 
The Use of Knowledge 
& Skills,
Trust
Control Role
Service Role
Strategy Role
Board Effectiveness
Figure 4-1. Hypothesised Model of Board Governance Orientation and Board Governance 
Processes on Board Roles and Board Effectiveness
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4.2. Board Effectiveness
 Traditional perspectives on corporate governance, largely  drawn from an agency theory  
perspective suggest the principal role of a board of directors is to monitor and control the 
management to ensure they are acting in the interest of shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). Thus, taking an agency  theoretic view, an effective board would be one that 
ensured returns to shareholders are maximised. Much of the early corporate governance literature 
focussed its attention on board structure and how an independent board would improve firm 
performance. In many of these early corporate governance studies, firm performance was used a 
proxy for board effectiveness (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Daily et al., 2003). However, two 
important issues emerged from this stream of literature. First, what exactly  does an independent 
board mean? Second, empirical evidence was equivocal about the exact  nature of the relationship 
between board structural characteristics and firm performance. Whilst agency theory recommended 
a board of directors should have a separate CEO-chair and a majority of non-executive directors, 
there is inconclusive evidence that this is beneficial for firm performance (Dalton et al., 2003; 
Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Johnson et al., 1996). 
 The dissatisfaction with the results emanating from agency  theory based studies of corporate 
governance has led to many  calls for a change in direction in corporate governance and, more 
narrowly, board research. Recently, board researchers have identified the importance of both, a 
multi-theoretic approach and a closer examination of board processes in order to better understand 
what makes a board of directors more effective (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Forbes & Milliken, 
1999; Huse, 2005; Kroll et al., 2008; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005). Much of this 
more recent literature refers to board effectiveness as the board’s ability to perform its roles or tasks 
in order to add value to the organisation or to improve company performance in order to satisfy  the 
interests of shareholders/stakeholders (Aguilera, 2005; Denis & McConnell, 2003; Huse, 2005; 
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Langevoort, 2001; Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005). However, as noted by 
Nicholson & Kiel (2004) and highlighted by Petrovic (2008) the literature has little to say  on how to 
measure board effectiveness. In general, research has continued to use measures of organisational 
performance as a proxy measure of board effectiveness (Nicholson & Kiel, 2004; Petrovic, 2008). 
 Following Pearce and Zahra’s (1991) lead, a small body of research, examining boards in 
the non-profit  sector, has attempted to measure board performance (or effectiveness) based on 
subjective measures, of how satisfied board members were with board performance and/or their 
satisfaction levels with how the board performed in a variety of tasks/functions (Bradshaw et al., 
1992; Green & Griesinger, 1996; Cornforth, 2001). This research follows this approach by 
measuring board effectiveness based on how satisfied the board is with the way they undertake their 
various roles. 
 Whilst there remains a problem in measuring board effectiveness, there is increasing 
agreement among a body of board researchers that a clear understanding of board roles is key to 
creating board effectiveness (Aguilera, 2005 & 2008; Hillman et al., 2008; Huse, 2005 & 2007). 
Drawing on this literature, this research proposes that board effectiveness is determined by the 
board’s ability to successfully carry out their control, service and strategy roles. 
4.3. Board Roles
 Scholars in the field of corporate governance have identified various roles directors play  in 
contributing to board effectiveness or performance (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer, 1972; Ruigrok et al., 2006; Stiles, 2001). Van den Heuvel 
et al., (2006) suggest board role research is primarily characterised by the conceptual development 
of board roles, based on a variety of organisation theories, including agency, resource dependency, 
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stewardship, social network and institutional theory. In an early identification of board roles, Zahra 
& Pearce (1989) provided an important contribution by proposing boards have three primary roles: 
control, strategy, and service. The control role relates to the board evaluating company  and CEO 
performance to ensure company growth and protect shareholders’ interests. The service role 
involves enhancing company reputation, establishing contacts with the external environment and 
giving advice and counsel to executives. The strategy role relates to the board’s involvement in and 
contribution to the development of the firm’s mission, and he development of the firm’s strategy 
(Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Forbes & Milliken defined board task performance as, “the board’s ability 
to perform its control and service tasks effectively” (1999: 492). As identified in the previous 
chapter, these two examples illustrate a problem endemic in board role research which is the 
ambiguity  in terminology (Nicholson & Kiel, 2004; Van den Heuvel et al., 2006). Various authors 
(e.g., Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Zona & Zattoni, 2007) use board tasks in a similar way to how 
others use board roles which highlights the lack of conceptual clarity  referred to by  Van den Heuvel 
et al., (2006). As Petrovic (2008) correctly states, “corporate governance research offers different 
interpretations of the concept of board roles” (p. 3). Helpfully, Petrovic (2008) divides board role 
research into two separate, yet linked, streams. 
 The first stream of the literature considers that board roles are control (monitoring the 
management) and direction (strategic direction of the company) to ensure the attainment of 
shareholder/stakeholder objectives (Petrovic, 2008). Interestingly, this treatment of board roles 
excludes the service role identified by many  board researchers in addition to that of control and 
strategy (e.g. Aguilera, 2005; Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Van den Heuvel et al., 2006; Zona & 
Zattoni, 2007). Linked to the service role, Petrovic (2008) does not consider alternative board roles 
such as resource provision and networking that are identified in some of the board literature 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Nicholson & Kiel, 2004; Zona & Zattoni, 2007).
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 The second stream of the literature (e.g. Huse, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005) suggests that 
board roles are created by individual board directors (Petrovic, 2008). According to Petrovic (2008), 
“an extensive stream of CG research examined and tried to conceptualise roles that board directors 
perform” (p. 4). This stream of literature highlights the methodological issue between individual 
and board levels of analysis, in addition to the lack of conceptual clarity in the use of the term board 
roles/tasks (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000; Huse, 2005; Van den Heuvel 
et al., 2006; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). Van den Heuvel et  al., (2006) provide a helpful solution to the 
latter problem. They define board roles as aggregated board tasks, whilst board tasks are the 
different sub-activities boards fulfil in practice. This research uses the Van den Heuvel et al., (2006) 
definition of board roles as aggregated board tasks and adopts the Zahra & Pearce (1989) separation 
of board roles into control, service, and strategy. Thus, in order to undertake their control, service 
and strategy roles, boards undertake a variety of tasks such as evaluating the CEO’s performance, 
analysing budget performance, advising on a range of accounting, financial and general 
management issues, and assisting in making proposals on company strategy. The following sections 
examine each of the three roles in more detail.
Control Role
 Agency theorists suggest that the board of directors is at the “apex of the decision control 
system”, (Fama & Jensen, 1983: 311) whose primary role is to monitor or control management 
(agents) in the interests of the owner shareholders (principals). Thus, from an agency theory 
perspective the principal role that the board has to play is a control and monitoring one (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Forbes & Milliken (1999) suggest the control role include 
decisions regarding the hiring, evaluation, compensation, and replacement of senior management, 
as well as approval of major strategic decisions made by the firm’s executive. The following table 
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partly based on Van den Heuval et al., (2006) illustrates that the Forbes & Milliken (1999) 
conceptualisation is similar to many other definitions of the board’s control role.
Table 4-1. Definitions of Board Control Role
Pearce & Zahra (1992: 412-413) Johnson et al., (1996: 410) Hillman et al., (2000: 236)
Control 
Role
“The selection of senior executives, 
monitoring, evaluating and 
rewarding executive performance; 
and using board power to protect 
shareholders’ interests.”
“Entailing directors 
monitoring managers as 
fiduciaries of 
stockholders”, which 
includes “hiring and firing 
the CEO, determining 
executive pay, and 
monitoring managers.”
“Serve shareholders by 
ratifying the decisions of 
managers and monitoring the 
implementation of those 
decisions.”
Hillman & Dalziel (2003: 384-388)
Hillman et al., (2008: 444)
Zona & Zattoni (2007: 
853-854)
Huse (2007)
Control 
Role
“Monitoring the CEO, monitoring 
strategy implementation, planning 
CEO succession, and evaluating and 
rewarding the CEO/top managers.”
“Control of firm 
performance, the 
monitoring of firm’s 
activities, the assessment of 
CEO behaviours and so 
on.” 
Output control: external 
measure of performance
Behavioural Control: internal 
measure
Strategic control: decision 
ratification and evaluation
 As shown in Table 4-1, there is general consensus in the literature that the control role of the 
board consists of tasks such as, the monitoring of the CEO and senior management, monitoring 
strategy implementation, evaluating and rewarding executive performance, and hiring and replacing 
the CEO (van Heuvel et  al., 2006). Whilst  many  researchers have identified the importance of the 
board’s control role, the majority of this research has examined the impact of board structural 
characteristics on the fulfilment of the board’s control role (Dalton & Kesner, 1987; Kesner et al., 
1986; Mace, 1971; Molz, 1988). There have only  been a small number of empirical studies that 
have attempted to measure the extent to which board processes have influenced the fulfilment of the 
board’s control role (Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000; van Heuvel et al., 2006; Wan & Ong, 2005; 
Zona & Zattoni, 2007).  This study proposes to further this research by  examining the extent to 
which firms’ governance orientation and board governance processes impact upon the extent to 
which boards’ fulfil their control role. 
112
Service Role
 As an alternative to the agency theory perspective, resource dependency  theory  suggests the 
service task is the primary role undertaken by  the board of directors (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Hillman, 2005; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). According to resource dependency theorists, the board of 
directors provide important resources for a firm by providing a link to the external environment and 
helping the firm manage its’ uncertainties (Boyd, 1990; Hillman, 2005; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Literature from both resource dependency theory  and stewardship  theory  identifies a variety of 
service tasks played by  the board: helping the firm acquire key resources, provision of advice and 
counsel to management, legitimising the firm in the environment, networking, and mentoring 
(Boyd, 1990; Davis et al., 1997; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Hillman, 2005; Huse, 2007; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). 
 A major issue with the service role of the board, unlike that of the control role, is the lack of 
a generally accepted definition (Van den Heuvel et al., 2006). As partly noted by Van den Heuvel et 
al., (2006), service roles are sometimes co-located in the literature within strategy, resource 
dependency or networking roles (Hillman et al., 2000; Hillman et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 1996; 
Zona & Zattoni, 2007). Definitions of the service, resource dependency and networking roles 
provided in Table 4.2 illustrate the ambiguous nature of service role definitions. Zahra & Pearce’s 
(1989) original definition of the service role includes tasks other authors include within what they 
term the resource provision (or dependency) role, or networking role (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Hillman et al., 2008; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). For the purposes of this research the service role of the 
board is defined below, using a combination of tasks identified variously in the literature as part of 
the board’s service, resource provision, and networking roles.
Helping the firm acquire key resources, provision of advice and counsel to management, 
legitimising the firm in the environment, networking, and mentoring
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Table 4-2. Definitions of Board Service, Resource Dependency, and Networking Roles
Pearce & Zahra(1992: 
412-413)
Johnson et al., (1996: 
410)
Forbes & Milliken (1999: 
492)
Zona & Zattoni (2007: 
853-854)
Service Role “Representing the 
firms’ interest in the 
community, linking the 
firm with its external 
environment and 
performing ceremonial 
functions in the life of 
the firm.”
“Advising the CEO 
and top managers…
initiating and 
formulating strategy.”
“Providing expert and 
detailed insight during major 
events, such as an 
acquisition or restructuring, 
as well as more informal and 
ongoing activities, such as 
generating and analysing 
strategic alternatives during 
board meetings.”
“A set of related activities, 
such as evaluating and 
selecting strategic 
alternatives that have been 
developed by top managers, 
providing advice to 
improve the quality of 
strategic decisions, and so 
on.”
Johnson et al., (1996: 
410)
Hillman & Dalziel(2003: 
384-388)
Resource 
Dependency 
Role
“Facilitating	  the	  acquisition	  of	  resources	  critical	  to	  the	  3irm’s	  success…a	  legitimising	  function”.
“Providing legitimacy/
bolstering the public image 
of the firm…administering 
advice and counsel, linking 
the firm to important 
stakeholders or other 
important entities, 
facilitation of access to 
resources, building external 
relationships, and aiding in 
the formulation of strategy 
or other important firm 
decisions”.
Zona & Zattoni (2007: 
853-854)
Networking 
Role
“Facilitate access to 
resources critical to firm 
success or survival, play an 
important role spanning 
boundaries, making timely 
information available to 
managers, to increase the 
legitimisation of the firm 
within its environment, and 
facilitate the firm’s access 
to critical resources”.
  Similarly  to the control role, a small number of empirical studies have attempted to measure 
the extent to which board processes have affected the fulfilment of the board’s service role 
(Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000; Van den Heuvel et al., 2006; Wan & Ong, 2005). This study 
proposes to further this research by  examining the extent to which firms’ governance orientation 
and board governance processes impact upon the extent to which boards’ fulfil their service role.
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Strategy Role
 The strategic role of the board is widely recognised in corporate governance literature as one 
of the major tasks of the board (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Golden & Zajac, 2001; McNulty  & 
Pettigrew, 1999: Purliese et al., 2009; Ruigrok et al., 2006; Stiles, 2001). Theoretical support for the 
strategic role of the board is provided by agency theory, stewardship theory, and stakeholder theory. 
However, the exact nature of boards’ strategic involvement differs between the various theories. In 
the agency theory literature, strategy is commonly separated into strategic management and 
strategic control (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Agency  theorists advocate that, whereas management have 
strategic management responsibilities, the task of the board is primarily one of strategic control, 
consisting of decision ratification and evaluation (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Huse, 2007). From an 
agency theory perspective, the strategic control role is an important one for the board in order to 
look after the interests of shareholders, by  ensuring that strategies result in shareholder wealth 
maximisation.
 In contrast to agency theory, stewardship theory sees the role of the board as a collaborative 
one as opposed to one of control (Sundaramurthy  & Lewis, 2003). Thus, stewardship  theorists 
suggest that  the board should collaborate with management in order to develop strategic 
formulation and implementation. Stewardship theory also provides a theoretical rationale for the 
mentoring role of the board. According to Shen (2003), the board’s mentoring role is part of its 
strategic role in that it  helps the coaching of management in strategic decision-making. Therefore, 
mentoring similar to collaboration is suggestive of the board being involved in strategic formulation 
and implementation  (Huse, 2007). 
 Stakeholder theory similarly to stewardship  theory suggests the board should be involved in 
the formulation of strategy, but as with agency theory stakeholder theorists also recommend that the 
board should be involved in strategic control (Freeman & Evan, 1990). However, whereas agency 
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theory  prioritises shareholders in terms of decision control, stakeholder theory contends that the 
board should look after the interests of all-important stakeholders, not solely shareholders 
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Jones & Wicks, 1999; Phillips et al., 2003). 
 Similarly  to the service role, the identification of what constitutes the strategy role of the 
board is ambiguous (Van den Heuvel et al., 2006). The Forbes & Milliken (1999) definition of the 
service role of the board in Table 4-2 is particularly  useful in highlighting the tendency of some 
researchers to include tasks others would identify  as part  of the board’s strategy role (Pearce and 
Zahra, 1992; Pettigrew, 1992; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Given the importance that many scholars 
assign to the strategy role of the board (e.g., Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Golden & Zajac, 2001; 
McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999: Ruigrok et al., 2006; Stiles, 2001) this research proposes to separate 
out the strategy role from the service role of the board similarly to Pearce & Zahra (1992), by 
defining the board’s strategy role as:
Helping the firm define its business concept, developing a company’s mission, and selecting and 
implementing a company strategy
 Whilst many  researchers have articulated the importance of the board’s strategy role, there 
have been few attempts to examine the extent to which board processes impact upon the 
effectiveness with which boards’ carry out their strategy  role (Van den Heuvel et al., 2006). The 
definition issues identified above have, however, played a part in the limited number of studies. For 
example, in Zona & Zattoni’s (2007) study, the service role construct employed uses questions that 
are found in the strategy  role construct employed by Wan & Ong (2005). For this study, following 
Wan & Ong (2005), the strategy role is separated from the service role, and proposes to further this 
research by examining the extent to which firms’ governance orientation and board governance 
processes impact upon the extent to which boards’ fulfil their strategy role.
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4.4 Board Governance Orientation
 The extant review of corporate governance literature identified the use of four principal 
theories: agency, stewardship, stakeholder, and resource dependency. These four theories suggest 
alternative approaches to corporate governance, primarily as a result of differing assumptions. 
These different approaches are what I term Board Governance Orientation. Different orientations 
derive from the different theories in corporate governance an outline of the differences for each 
orientation is provided in the following section..
Agency Board Governance Orientation
 Agency theory  is based on assumptions derived from many years of research in economics. 
The model of human underlying agency theory is that of a rational utility maximising individual 
operating in their self-interest  (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, the two actors in agency  theory, 
the principal and the agent, both attempt to maximise their own utility. 
 Large, modern corporations have a separation between ownership and control of wealth 
(Berle and Means, 1932). Typically, public limited companies in Anglo-Saxon countries have a 
large number of dispersed owners (principals), no one of which has sufficient shares to control the 
company. Owners become principals when they contract with executives (agents) to manage the 
firm on their behalf. As an agent, executives are often seen as having a moral responsibility  of 
looking after the interests of the principals, through the maximisation of shareholder utility. Given 
the assumption that all actors are self-interested utility maximisers, then there is no problem in 
agency theory  when the principals and agents have identical utility functions (Davis et al., 1997). 
However, when the interests of principals and agents diverge, then agents motivated by  self-interest 
are likely to enhance their own wealth at the expense of the principals (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
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Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, the key problem that agency theory  attempts to deal with is how 
principals try to ensure that agents act in their interest.
 Agency theory  is, therefore, primarily  concerned with two problems occurring in the 
principal-agent relationship. The first is the expense involved in the principal monitoring the agent’s 
behaviour. The second problem arises from the different attitudes of the principal and agent toward 
risk (Eisenhardt, 1989). In agency theory, the principal is assumed to be risk neutral, whereas the 
agent is risk averse (Eisenhardt, 1989). These problems lead to what  Jensen & Meckling (1976) 
refer to as agency costs, incurred as principals/owners attempt to ensure that agents/managers act in 
the principals’ interest. “Agency costs are therefore defined as the sum of the costs of structuring, 
bonding, and monitoring contracts between agents.” (Jensen, 1983: 331). Agency theory then 
focuses on attempting to solve the above problems using a contractual approach to the firm.
 In the contractual approach to the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Williamson, 1984; Grossman & Hart, 1986), the firm is viewed as a legal fiction created by a nexus 
of contracts, written and unwritten, among owners of factors of production and customers. 
According to Alchian & Demsetz (1972), the firm is just like an ordinary market contracting 
between two people. Within this framework, managers and financiers sign a contract that  specifies 
what the manager does with the funds provided by  the financiers. In addition, the contract also 
specifies how the returns on the financiers’ investment are divided between the manager and the 
financiers. The contract is therefore written to try and align the interests of both the principal and 
the agent. The key  issue is the adoption of an optimal incentive scheme to align the behaviour of the 
managers/agents with the interest of owners/principals. According to Eisenhardt (1989), the critical 
issue is whether an outcome-oriented contract (e.g., stock options, transfer of property rights, 
market governance) is superior to a behavioural-based contract (e.g. salaries, and hierarchical 
governance).  The determination of the optimal contract is based on the availability  of complete 
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information. If the behaviour of the agent is fully  observable, a behaviour-based contract is optimal 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Alternatively, when the agent’s behaviour is not fully observable, an outcome-
oriented outcome is superior (Eisenhardt, 1989).
 To protect principals’ interests agency theorists prescribe various governance mechanisms. 
As identified by Dalton et al., (2003) the primary mechanisms recommended by agency  theorists 
are alignment and control. The alignment view is broadly concerned with the achievement of 
congruence in the interests of owners and managers (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Fama, 1980; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976. The solution to the problem of managerial self-interest is to align the interests of 
owners and management through financial incentive schemes, whereby executives receive rewards 
for successfully fulfilling principals’ objectives. In particular, agency theorists advocate equity-
based compensation schemes in order to motivate executives to behave in a manner consistent with 
the attainment of shareholders’ (principals’) interests. This solution would help  ensure managers 
and owners’ interests were more closely aligned and that by achieving this it is presumed firm 
performance will be improved (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). 
 A second mechanism to ensure principals’ interests are controlled is governance structure. 
Boards of directors are put in place in order to monitor and control the actions of self-serving 
managers. According to agency  theory, boards that consist of a majority  of non-executives (or 
outside directors) and a separate CEO-chairperson are best positioned to ensure management 
oversight (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Controlling governance mechanisms are preferred in order to 
reduce the opportunity  for agents from maximising their utility  at the expense of the principals 
(Davis et al., 1997). 
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 Given the emphasis in agency theory on self-interested parties attempting to maximise their 
utility, and the necessity of board independence in order to reduce managerial opportunism, then a 
board with an agency governance orientation would be one that consists of the following: 
Boards’ with an agency governance orientation will consist of a board of directors in which executives 
and non-executives have diverging goals with each attempting to maximise their own utility, a low 
trust environment, a separate CEO-chair, and a majority of non-executive directors
Stewardship Board Governance Orientation
 Whilst agency theory is based on assumptions from economics, stewardship theory  draws its 
assumptions from psychology and sociology (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991). The 
model of man underlying stewardship  theory is one that is a self-actualising (Argyris, 1973), 
trustworthy, pro-organisational and collectivist. According to stewardship theorists, higher utility is 
attained through organisational, collective behaviours than through the individualistic, self-
interested behaviours advocated in agency  theory (Davis et al., 1997). In stewardship  theory, 
executives are seen as stewards as opposed to agents. The important difference being that stewards 
are trustworthy  individuals who are pro-organisational in their outlook and prefer group rewards to 
individual ones (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis 1991). 
 According to stewardship  theory, the steward aims to attain the objectives of the 
organisation, and thus, in general the steward acts in the interest  of the principals (Donaldson & 
Davis, 1997). Consequently, where a steward-principal relationship arises empowering governance 
structures and mechanisms are appropriate (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Thus, 
many stewardship theorists argue that stewards’ autonomy should be maximised in order to provide 
the best possible outcome for both the steward and the organisation (Davis et al., 1997). 
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Furthermore, control is seen as potentially counter-productive as it may undermine the collectivist 
orientation of the steward and lower their motivation (Davis et al., 1997). 
 Given that stewards’ interests are perceived to align with that  of the principals, stewardship  
theorists contend that corporate governance structures do not require the same degree of monitoring 
and control to that required by agency theorists. Specifically, boards with a majority of executives 
and dual CEO-chair are preferable. This is for two main reasons. First, executives are thought to be 
more knowledgeable about the firm and thus better able to assist with strategic decision-making. 
Second, executives are seen as stewards whose utility is maximised by the achievement of 
organisational, as opposed to individual, goals. 
 Given the emphasis in stewardship theory  on empowerment, then firms that  have 
empowering governance structures and mechanisms are boards that can be termed as being of 
stewardship governance orientation. These arguments lead to the following research construct:
Boards with a stewardship governance orientation will consist of a board of directors with a 
common goal, a high trust environment, CEO-chair duality, and a majority of executive directors
Stakeholder Board Governance Orientation
 In both agency theory and stewardship theory, the firm is assumed to maximise shareholder 
wealth. Thus, both theories advocate the development of structures and mechanisms of corporate 
governance to ensure shareholders’ interests are prioritised. In contrast to agency and stewardship 
theories, stakeholder theory views the firm more broadly than one simply  owned by the 
shareholders. Many  stakeholder theorists suggest a firm consists of a broad coalition of various 
interested parties (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; 
Jones & Wicks, 1999; Phillips et al., 2003). Freeman (1984) highlighted the more limited attention 
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executives should pay to shareholders by  suggesting that managers should balance the financial 
interests of shareholders with the interests of other stakeholders, including employees, customers, 
and the local community. In stakeholder theory, shareholders are just one group and whose interests 
are not necessarily  treated as paramount (Phillips et al., 2003). Of particular interest with regard to 
corporate governance of firms is the suggestion by Freeman & Evan (1990) that all stakeholders are 
accorded voting rights and not just shareholders. Whilst  this may not be easy to achieve, recognition 
of stakeholder groups could be achieved through membership of the board of directors.
 Given that  stakeholder theorists do not accept the primacy of shareholders, stakeholder 
theory  advocates an alternative measure of firm success to both agency theory and stewardship 
theory. Whilst the latter two judge a firm’s success by shareholder value, stakeholder theorists 
suggest that maximising the balanced interests of the stakeholder groups is a more appropriate 
measure of firm success. One significant issue here is the, hitherto, lack of a clear single measure 
upon which to make judgement of success (Jensen, 2002). However, there has been increasing 
attention paid, in recent years, to firms’ corporate social responsibility  and more use of CSR and 
corporate social performance (CSP) measures. Thus, firms who have stakeholder representation on 
the board, and pay as much attention to CSR and CSP as to financial measures may be defined as 
boards with a stakeholder governance orientation. This leads to the following research construct:
Boards with a stakeholder governance orientation will consist of a board of directors that is made 
up of the differing stakeholder groups, and will attempt to balance the interest of all appropriate 
stakeholder groups.
Resource Dependency Board Governance Orientation
 According to resource dependency theory, board members provide resources, such as 
information skills, advice and counsel to management, access to key  stakeholders, and legitimacy, 
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to a firm (Gales & Kesner, 1994; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In their helpful categorisation of 
director types, Hillman et al., (2000) suggest that each different director group  is able to provide a 
variety of resources to firms, and that a firm’s performance is directly related to the quality  and 
quantity of resources by the board of directors. Furthermore, empirical evidence provides some 
support for the resource dependency  theorists’ contention that the structure of the board varies as 
firms’ external environment changes (Boyd, 1990; Gales & Kesner, 1994; Hillman et al., 2000).
 Drawing on the logic of resource dependency theory, firms whose boards provide a variety  
of resources to management in order to manage the external environment and in particular to deal 
with uncertainties may be termed boards with a resource dependency governance orientation. This 
contention leads to the following research construct:
Boards with a resource dependency governance orientation will consist of a board of directors that 
reflects the firm’s external environment and that provides a variety of resources in order to manage 
the external environment 
The above arguments lead to the first hypothesis
H1: Firms have boards with different board governance orientations.
4.5. Board Governance Orientation and Board Roles
 Corporate governance theories suggest that boards may have differing board governance 
orientations. From the extant review of the literature four board governance orientations have been 
identified: agency, stewardship, stakeholder, and resource dependency. Evidence from a study of 
seven cases by  Nicholson & Kiel (2007) suggests agency theory, stewardship theory  and resource 
dependency theory  can explain the results in different cases. This finding suggests that different 
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boards have different orientations and these will have a differential impact upon board role 
performance. The following sections will examine each of these orientations and their hypothesised 
impact in detail. However, the above argument leads to the following hypothesis:  
H2: Boards with different board governance orientations will have a differential impact upon board 
role performance.
Agency Board Governance Orientation and Board Role Performance
 According to agency theorists, the primary  role of the board of directors is to control the 
actions of self-interested agents (managers) to ensure they are acting in the interests of the 
principals (shareholders) (Dalton et al., 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983). This control 
takes three forms: output control, behavioural control, and strategic control (Huse, 2007). As 
Eisenhardt (1989) notes, behavioural control is favoured when the principals can fully observe the 
actions of the agents, however given the agency theorists emphasis on information asymmetries 
then output control is often preferred (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
 The third and final aspect  of control considered within agency theory is that of strategic 
control (Huse, 2007). Agency theorists separate out strategy  into decision management and decision 
control. The former is considered a task to be undertaken by  the management, whereas the latter is 
seen as a major task of the board (Fama & Jensen, 1983). According to agency theorists, such as 
Fama & Jensen (1983), strategic control should include the ratification of decisions taken by 
management, and the monitoring of the impact of these decisions. 
 An important result from the separation of strategic management and strategic control is the 
limit agency theorists place on the role of the board in advising management on strategy. As Zahra 
& Pearce (1989) note, whilst agency theorists suggest that the strategy role is important, especially 
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when critical decisions are required, such as during acquisitions or restructuring, there is a limited 
outline in the agency theory  literature of the content of the strategic contribution. Thus, agency 
theory  provides a more limited rationale for the board’s strategic role than it does for its control 
role. Whilst Zahra & Pearce (1989) propose that agency theorists adopt a broad definition of board 
roles and also include the service role, there is little theoretical rationale in the agency  literature for 
the service role. In addition, there is little attention in the agency based empirical literature to the 
board’s service role.  One could go so far to suggest that the separation between decision control 
and decision management suggests no theoretical rationale for the third board role, that of service. 
These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:
H3: Firms with an agency governance orientation will have high levels of board control role, 
moderate levels of board strategy role, and low levels of board service role.
Stewardship Board Governance Orientation and Board Role Performance
 In agency theory, there is a great emphasis on managerial opportunism. Stewardship theory, 
on the other hand, is at the opposite end of the trust spectrum. Stewardship theorists suggest that 
managers are trustworthy individuals who will look after the interests of the owners of the 
organisation (Davis et al., 1997). Logically, following the behavioural assumption of managers as 
trustworthy and altruistic stewards of the organisation, the board has a very limited control role in 
stewardship theory. Illustrating this is the stewardship theory  emphasis on boards collaborating with 
management (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Davis et al., 1997). Further highlighting this is the 
recommendation by stewardship theorists that there should be CEO-chair duality, and a board 
dominated by executive directors in order to provide clear direction and control (Davis et al., 1997). 
 Thus, as identified by Huse (2007), the primary roles of the board in stewardship  theory are 
that of strategy and service. Given the collaborative role of the board (Sundaramarthy  & Lewis, 
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2003), then stewardship theory clearly advocates an important  role for the board in helping 
management in developing strategy  to achieve the objectives of the firm (Huse, 2007). In addition, 
according to stewardship theorists an insider-dominated board would have greater knowledge of the 
firm and thus be better placed to contribute to strategic decision-making (Davis et al., 1997). 
 Whilst stewardship theory  places emphasis on some of the service tasks of the board, 
specifically mentoring management, the internal perspective suggests a more limited service role 
for the board than some other theoretical perspectives, particularly  resource dependency  theory. 
These arguments lead to the development of the following hypothesis:
H4: Firms with a stewardship board governance orientation will have high levels of board strategy 
role, moderate levels of board service role, and low levels of board control role.
Resource Dependency Board Governance Orientation and Board Role Performance
 According to resource dependency theorists, the primary role of the board is a service one 
linking the organisation with its external environment (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). The board is 
considered to be a ‘boundary spanner’, that is able to help the firm acquire important external 
resources, and thus reduce the environmental uncertainty facing the organisation (Hillman et al., 
2000; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In fulfilling their service task, resource dependency theorists 
suggest board members provide resources, such as information skills, advice and counsel to 
management, access to key stakeholders, networking, and legitimacy, to a firm (Carpenter & 
Westphal, 2001; Gales & Kesner, 1994; Hillman et al., 2000; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
 It is clear from a resource dependency perspective that the primary tasks of the board are to 
provide service to the management. The seminal work from Pfeffer (1972) and Pfeffer & Salancik 
(1978) suggests that board directors are resources of the firm’s management and use their resources 
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for the benefit of the organisation. The helpful categorisation of director types by Hillman et al., 
(2000) also suggests different directors provide alternative resources to the organisation. Inside 
directors are seen as those most knowledgeable about the firm and thus best placed to contribute to 
strategic decision-making, whereas other directors provide an external focus to help the 
development of strategy  (Hillman et al., 2000; Huse, 2007). Thus, while the service task of the 
board is heavily emphasised, there is implicit  recognition of the strategy  task, though as identified 
by McNulty  & Pettigrew (1999) whilst there is considerable emphasis on how boards attain 
resources, there is little explicit attention to the boards’ use of such resources. Thus, theoretically 
from a resource dependency perspective, the strategic task of the board is given a more limited 
rationale. 
The third board role, control, is largely ignored by resource dependency theorists. Thus, these 
arguments lead to the following hypothesis:
H5: Firms with a resource dependency board governance orientation will have high levels of board 
service role, moderate levels of board strategy role, and low levels of board control role.
Stakeholder Board Governance Orientation and Board Task Performance
 The stakeholder model of the firm suggests that the firm should serve the interests of a 
wider constituency than the shareholder model. According to stakeholder theorists, stakeholders 
such as employees, customers, creditors, suppliers, and the local community have long-term 
relationships with the firm and affect its long-term success (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 
1984; Jones & Wicks, 1999; Mitchell et al., 1997). Stakeholder theorists place emphasis on a 
balance between the various stakeholder groups and thus stakeholder theory also suggests a balance 
in the differing board roles (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 
2001; Jones, 1995; Jones and Wicks, 1997; Mitchell et al., 1997; Reynolds et al., 2006). 
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 In providing a stakeholder interpretation of corporate governance, Freeman & Evan (1990) 
propose that a firm consists of a series of multilateral contracts among differing stakeholder groups. 
Drawing on this notion, Freeman & Evan (1990) propose that differing stakeholder groups should 
be represented on the board and accorded voting rights. Specifically, Mitchell et al., (1997) 
suggested that including stakeholder representation on the corporate board provides a formal 
mechanism that recognises their importance to the success of the firm. This notion has much in 
common with that of instrumental stakeholder theory, which argues that firms should take into 
account multiple interests of stakeholders in order to enhance the economic performance of the 
corporation (Jones, 1995). According to Blair (1995), corporate governance systems and contractual 
arrangements should be devised in such a way  to ensure appropriate stakeholder groups are 
assigned control rights, rewards, and responsibilities. From these arguments, it is clear that 
stakeholder directors have an important control role, one that monitors the management in order to 
look after the interests of the various stakeholder groups. In addition, stakeholder theorists have 
often recognised the importance of managerial decisions balancing the interests of different 
stakeholder groups (Reynolds et al., 2006).  Thus, stakeholder theorists (e.g., Mitchell et al., 1997) 
suggest that a board representing the different stakeholder groups would be better placed to control 
management. 
 Whilst it is clear that stakeholder theorists advocate a control role of the board, there is an 
issue over the performance measures appropriate for determining the extent to which the control 
role has been performed successfully. Jensen (2002) whilst accepting the arguments of instrumental 
stakeholder theory strongly supports the notion of a single measure of performance and decision 
taking being based on a single criterion: maximising shareholder value. According to Jensen and 
other financial economists, decisions that are based on multiple performance measures give the 
opportunity for managers to trade off one group  of stakeholders against another and ultimately 
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benefit the managers themselves (Jensen, 2002). In addition, different stakeholder groups are liable 
to ‘look-after’ their particular interest without paying similar attention to other areas. Consequently, 
whilst a board with a firm stakeholder orientation would have a significant control role, it  is likely 
to be lower than an agency oriented board. 
 This discussion highlights how a contractual approach to corporate governance recognises 
the different stakeholder interests through board membership and thus suggests an important control 
role for the board. A second important role for the board highlighted by stakeholder theory is a 
service role. Various authors have argued that by including stakeholder groups on the board, firms’ 
are signalling their commitment to stakeholders in a visible manner, such that this may  increase 
legitimacy  for the firm and increasing a firm’s linkages to the external environment (Hillman et al., 
2001; Mitchell et al., 1997). As highlighted by Hillman & Keim (2001), the resource-based view of 
the firm (Barney, 1991 & 2001; Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984) argues that a firm’s ability  to 
perform better than its rivals is a result of obtaining and deploying superior resources. A number of 
researchers have suggested that different stakeholders can bring important resources to the 
corporation, including reputation, long-term relationships with suppliers and customers that help 
reduce external uncertainties, and knowledge (Barney & Hansen, 1994; Hillman & Keim, 2001; 
Rao, 1994; Ring & Van den Ven, 1992). Such argument is suggestive that stakeholder directors are 
providing an important service role for the corporation. 
 The final role often cited in the board literature that of strategy is also given prominence in 
stakeholder theory. In his seminal contribution, Freeman (1984) identified the importance of 
stakeholder management to strategic management. Similar to the arguments propounded by the 
resource-based view of the firm, Freeman (1984) suggested different stakeholder groups bring 
important resources to organisations that enable them to develop better long-term strategies. 
Principally, stakeholders bring specific knowledge and expertise about the needs and wishes of the 
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different stakeholders that enable boards to develop better strategies to attain corporate goals 
(Freeman, 1984). By giving managers a better understanding of stakeholders it enables the 
organisation to develop appropriate strategies to outperform competitors. Stakeholder and other 
theorists have observed that developing better relationships with important stakeholders is 
important to enhancing economic and financial performance (Hill & Jones, 1992; Hillman & Keim, 
2001; Jensen, 2002; Jones, 1995; Prahalad, 1997). In addition, whilst there have been few studies in 
the area, a number support the contention that stakeholder management improves financial 
performance  (Berman et al., 1999). 
 These arguments highlight the balanced approached oft advocated by  stakeholder theorists 
(Reynolds et al., 2006), that the board should actively engage in balancing the interests of all 
relevant stakeholders. In light of this balanced approach the following hypothesis is offered:
H6: Firms with a stakeholder board governance orientation will have moderate levels of board 
service role, moderate levels of board strategy role, and moderate levels of board control role.
4.6. Board Role Performance and Board Effectiveness
 The Forbes & Milliken (1999) model suggested two criteria of board effectiveness: (1) 
board task performance, defined as, “the board’s ability to perform its control and service tasks 
effectively” (1999: 492), and (2) the board’s cohesiveness. In their model, cohesiveness is viewed 
as a board-level outcome (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Small teams literature suggests cohesiveness 
is a team process that will impact upon the way teams are able to work together (Beal et al., 2003; 
Gully et al., 1995; Mullen & Copper, 1994). Thus, in this model cohesiveness is not treated as a 
board outcome, but as a board process that influences the way the board of directors carry out their 
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control, service, and strategy roles. Further, this research proposes that board effectiveness is 
defined as the board’s ability to successfully carry out their control, service and strategy roles. 
 Recently, a relatively  small number of researchers have attempted to measure how 
effectively boards have been able to carry out a variety of roles/tasks (Gabrielsson & Winlund, 
2000; Van den Heuvel et al., 2006; Wan & Ong, 2005; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). However, none of 
these studies have used their results to provide an aggregated measure of board effectiveness. This 
research provides a fuller contribution to board studies by using an aggregated measure of board 
effectiveness. Thus, board effectiveness is proposed to be the value-added created by the board. 
Many researchers have contended that the board’s performance or effectiveness is enhanced when it 
is able to carry  out their different roles successfully it  is proposed that board role performance leads 
to board effectiveness (Huse, 2005; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005). Drawing on these arguments and 
empirical studies, it is proposed that board control, service, and strategy role performance directly 
influences board effectiveness, thus leading to the following set of hypotheses.
H7a: Board control role performance is positively related to board effectiveness.
H7b: Board service role performance is positively related to board effectiveness. 
H7c: Board strategy role performance is positively related to board effectiveness.
4.7 Board Governance Processes and Board Role Performance
 In arguing that board effectiveness can be measured by the the value added by the board and 
that board role performance leads too board effectiveness, the next step is to examine the board 
processes that are likely to affect the ability  of the board to perform these roles and subsequently 
impact on board effectiveness. In this model, these board processes are termed board governance 
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processes. Drawing on both the board and the small groups literature six processes are proposed: 
cohesiveness, communication, conflict, effort norms, the use of knowledge and skills, and trust. 
This section will discuss these processes in more detail and develop hypothesis of each process’s 
effect upon board performance.
Cohesiveness
 Identically to Forbes & Milliken (1999), board cohesiveness is defined as “the degree to 
which board members are attracted to one another and are motivated to stay  on the board” (p. 496). 
In order to work together successfully board members are likely to have to have a certain degree of 
interpersonal attraction (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998).  For this reason 
then, board cohesiveness is proposed to influence the effectiveness with which board members 
perform their control, service, and strategy tasks. Some level of cohesiveness is necessary for 
boards to be willing to work together and have any degree of effectiveness (Beal et al., 2003; Gully 
et al., 1995; Mullen & Copper, 1994). However, it is unlikely  that the relationship between board 
cohesiveness and board role performance would be a simple direct one. Many small group 
researchers suggest high levels of cohesiveness are an antecedent of groupthink – a dysfunctional 
mode of group decision-making characterised by  a lack of independent thinking and a tendency  to 
accept decisions without critical questioning (Janis, 1983; Mullen & Copper 1994). Groupthink is 
likely to lead to decisions being accepted unanimously without any dissension and thus very high 
levels of cohesiveness are likely to prove detrimental to the quality of board decision-making 
(Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Consequently, in agreement with Forbes & Milliken (1999), the 
relationship  between board cohesiveness and board effectiveness is proposed to be curvilinear 
mediated by the board control role, service role and strategy role. This leads to the following 
hypotheses:
H8a: Board cohesiveness has a curvilinear relationship with board effectiveness.
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H8b: This relationship is mediated by the board control role, service role and strategy role.
Communication Quality
 Research in organisational communication suggests that communication is an important 
medium through which work groups can reduce ambiguity, process information, and coordinate 
activities (Johnson, 1993). Given the importance of these activities for decision-making, 
communication is an important process that is likely to influence the operational effectiveness of 
the board of directors. Huse (2007) points to the importance of both formal and informal 
communication in aiding the effectiveness of boards.
 The literature generally treats communication as a multi-dimensional construct consisting of 
three to five dimensions: frequency, bi-directionality, quality, formality, and co-erciveness of 
content (Fisher et al., 1997; Mohr et al., 1996; Massey & Dawes, 2007). For all small groups, 
including the board of directors, the critical factor is the quality  of communication (Johnson, 1993). 
This research is therefore primarily concerned with the quality of communication, defined as the 
credibility, ease of understanding, relevance, and usefulness of the information provided for the 
board. Thus, this research draws on the recent conceptualisation of communication quality  of 
Massey  & Dawes (2007). Empirical evidence views communication quality as an indicator of 
positive outcomes (Maltz & Kohli, 1996; Massey  & Dawes, 2007; Menon et al., 1999; Smith et al., 
1994). Various studies suggest that good quality  information is necessary  to promote positive 
dialogue, improve relationships, and improve decision-making (Smith et al., 1994). Conversely, 
these studies show that poor quality information and communication have negative effects (Maltz & 
Kohli, 1996; Massey  & Dawes, 2007; Menon et  al., 1999). A number of board researchers have also 
pointed to the importance of the quality of communication and information for the board to be able 
to successfully  carry out their roles (Huse, 2005 & 2007; Sherwin, 2003). This empirical evidence 
leads to the proposal that communication quality has a direct positive effect upon board 
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effectiveness, mediated by the board’s control, service and strategy roles and leads to the following 
hypotheses
H9a: Communication quality is positively related to board effectiveness.
H9b: This relationship is mediated by the board’s control role, service role and strategy role.
Cognitive Conflict
 In Forbes & Milliken’s (1999) seminal paper, cognitive conflict was identified as one of 
three board processes affecting board task performance. A very small number of studies have 
followed Forbes & Milliken’s lead by examining the impact of cognitive conflict on board role (or 
task) performance (e.g., Zona & Zattoni, 2007). This study proposes to further our understanding of 
the impact of conflict on board role performance by following the study of Wan & Ong (2005) and 
drawing upon Jehn’s (1995) separation of conflict into cognitive conflict and affective conflict. 
 A significant body  of research in both the small groups and the conflict literature views 
cognitive conflict as having beneficial outcomes. Cognitive conflict is generally seen as task-
oriented conflict that allows greater cognitive understanding of the issues being considered by 
groups (Amason, 1996; Dawes & Massey, 2005; Jehn, 1997; Simons & Peterson, 2000). A number 
of empirical studies, including studies of top management teams suggest that cognitive conflict 
allows groups to make better decisions when conflicting views are presented leading to superior 
outcomes (Amason, 1996; Bourgeois, 1985; Eisenhardt et al., 1997; Pelled et al., 1999; Schweiger 
et al., 1989). 
 Evidence on boards shows wide variations in the extent to which they experience cognitive 
conflict (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1971; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). Some boards are seen as 
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‘rubber stampers’, where there is little discussion and no disagreement, whereas others promote 
open debate and active disagreement (Huse, 2005; Mace, 1971; Roberts et al., 2005). Importantly, 
Finkelstein & Mooney (2003) contend that engaging in constructive conflict  is a key process in 
improving board effectiveness. A number of recent studies also suggest that boards where CEOs 
actively seek out alternative viewpoints outperform those firms where CEOs prefer a lack of 
cognitive conflict (MacDonald & Westphal, 2003; MacDonald et al., 2008). In addition, findings 
from a study  of boards in Singapore by Wan & Ong (2005) suggest that cognitive conflict is 
strongly related to strategy role performance. Surprisingly, Zona & Zattoni (2007) found no 
significant relationship between cognitive conflict and their measures of control task and service 
task performance. The latter construct draws primarily on tasks this research identifies as part of the 
boards’ strategy role. Their results, however, find cognitive conflict as being significantly related to 
networking role performance, a construct utilising tasks this research defines as part of the board’s 
service role. Whilst recognising there are a small number of empirical studies that suggest that 
cognitive conflict does not always have beneficial results, the majority  of theory and evidence 
suggests that cognitive conflict is beneficial to group outcomes. Thus, it is expected that where 
there is cognitive conflict among the board of directors this will have positive effects on board 
effectiveness mediated by the board control role, service role and strategy role, thus leading to the 
following hypotheses:
H10a: Board cognitive conflict is positively related to board effectiveness.
H10b: This relationship is mediated by the board control role, service role and strategy role.
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Affective Conflict
 Conversely, research from the conflict and small groups literature suggests affective conflict 
as having dilatory effects on group  performance. Affective conflict  occurs principally as a result of 
relationship  or behavioural conflict, whereby the information processing capabilities and decision-
making abilities of a group are adversely affected by relationship difficulties (Amason, 1996; De 
Dreu & Weingart, 2003; Simons and Peterson, 2000). Empirical evidence largely supports the 
notion that affective conflict has a negative effect on performance outcomes (De Dreu & Weingart, 
2003; Gladstein, 1984; Langfred, 2007; Li & Hambrick, 2005; Wall and Nolan, 1986). In addition, 
Finkelstein & Mooney (2003) argue that to enhance board effectiveness it is imperative that 
destructive conflict that occurs through personal animosities is avoided in the boardroom. The study 
by Wan & Ong (2005) on board structure, processes and role performance for public-listed 
companies in Singapore suggests affective conflict has a negative effect on strategy role 
performance. Consequently, both theory and evidence suggest  that where there is affective conflict 
among the board of directors this would have a negative effect on board effectiveness mediated by 
the control role, service role, and strategy role of the board.
H10c: Board affective conflict is negatively related to board effectiveness.
H10d: This relationship is mediated by the board control role, service role and strategy role.
Effort Norms
 According to Wageman (1995), “Effort  norms are a group-level construct that refers to the 
group’s shared beliefs regarding the level of effort each individual is expected to put toward a 
task” (Forbes & Milliken, 1999: 493). Drawing on Zona & Zattoni (2007), effort norms in this 
research refer to “the board’s shared beliefs on the level of effort each director is expected to put 
towards a task”. Various researchers have suggested that group norms often exert  a strong influence 
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on members’ behaviour (Feldman, 1984; Wageman, 1995). According to Forbes & Milliken (1999) 
group effort  norms can enhance the effort of individual group members, and consequently improve 
the performance of the group. 
 Early board researchers attributed one cause of poorly performing board of directors to a 
lack of effort (Lorsch, 1989; Mace, 1970, 1986). Whilst more recent board researchers suggest 
boards are more active than in earlier periods, there is still evidence of differing effort norms 
(Roberts et al., 2005). In more active boards, directors actively participate in discussions, aid the 
execution of specific board tasks, and utilise their skills for the best benefit of the board 
(Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005; Shen 2005). Consistent 
evidence suggests boards with standards promoting high-effort behaviours are more likely to 
enhance board effectiveness mediated by  the control role, service role, and strategy role of the 
board (Gabrielson and Winlund, 2000; Huse, 2005; Roberts et  al., 2005; Wan & Ong, 2005; Zona & 
Zattoni, 2007), thus leading to the following hypotheses:
H11a: Boards effort norms are positively related to board effectiveness.
H11b: This relationship is mediated by the board control role, service role, and strategy role.
The Use of Knowledge and Skills
 Psychological literature examining small groups suggests that the mere presence of 
knowledge and skills does not guarantee its use or application (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Jackson, 
1992). With regard to board governance processes, the use of knowledge and skills refers to the 
board’s ability  to utilise the knowledge and skills available to it  and then to apply  such knowledge 
and skills to required board tasks (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). The use of knowledge and skills was 
introduced as a construct by  Hackman & Morris (1975), and relates to “collective learning” among 
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group members (Hackman, 1987: 327). According to Cohen & Bailey (1997), the use of knowledge 
and skills is related to the behavioural dimension of social integration, thus affecting a group’s 
ability to co-operate. 
 As highlighted by Forbes & Milliken (1999) for boards to perform their tasks effectively, 
they  must combine and apply  their knowledge. Empirical studies support the notion that the use of 
knowledge and skills is important in determining group effectiveness (Eisenhardt, 1989; Wageman, 
1995). As such it would be expected that boards of directors that make better use of their knowledge 
and skills would perform their control, service and strategy roles to a higher standard. Findings 
from a number of recent studies (e.g., Wan & Ong, 2005; Zona & Zattoni (2007) support the 
contention that boards’ effectiveness is enhanced when boards make greater use of their knowledge 
and skills. These arguments lead to the following hypotheses:
H12a: Board use of knowledge and skills is positively related to board effectiveness.
H12b: This relationship is mediated by the board control role, service role and strategy role.
Trust
 This model draws partly  on Gillespie & Mann’s (2004) study of trust. Using a 21-item 
global trust scale, comprising dimensions of three types of trust – cognitive, affective, and 
behavioural – Gillespie & Mann (2004) found that developing trust is a key  to developing and 
sustaining team effectiveness. In a further finding, trust towards leaders was created through team 
consultation, clear communication, and a shared vision amongst team members (Gillespie & Mann, 
2004). 
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 Similarly  to Gillespie & Mann (2004), a number of theoretical models and empirical results 
have shown interpersonal trust to be an important determinant of team effectiveness (Costa, 2003; 
Lee, 2004). Given that the board of directors is treated as a small team in this model, and the 
importance that various researchers have found for trust in improving team effectiveness, it is 
reasonable to assume that interpersonal trust  within the board is an important predictor of board 
success. Very  few studies have attempted to examine the impact of trust on board role performance. 
In one of the few studies examining trust  on boards, Van Ees et al., (2008) investigated trust as a 
moderator of the relationships between three board processes and the boards’ monitoring 
performance in a study on board effectiveness in the Netherlands. Their results showed trust to 
negatively moderate the relationship between the use of knowledge and monitoring performance, 
but they found no other significant results. This study  identifies the need for further study of the 
effect of trust on board effectiveness (Van Ees et al., 2008). Studies of the effect of trust in ongoing 
teams have consistently  shown that trust is beneficial towards team effectiveness (Costa et al., 
2001; Costa, 2003; De Jong & Elfring, 2010; Gillespie & Mann, 2004; Lee, 2004; Mach et al., 
Schippers, 2003). However, the effect of trust on the ability of the board to carry out their different 
roles may have more in common with the the studies of trust in short-term teams where trust has 
been found to have both positive and negative effects (Dirks, 1999; Langfred, 2004 & 2007).
 In performing their service role, board members require a considerable amount of trust. For 
example, according to Westphal (1999) there is a positive correlation between levels of trust 
between the CEO and the board and various measures of firm profitability. In order to accept advice 
and counsel from non-executive board members, executive board members would be likely to have 
to trust their fellow board members (Gulati & Westphal, 1999). In addition, to help  with making 
strategic decisions, board members have to place trust in the information and advice being provided 
within the board (Gulati & Westphal, 1999; Westphal, 1999; Westphal & Khanna, 2003; Westphal et 
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al., 2006). Higher levels of trust in the boardroom are likely  to lead to greater involvement from all 
the board members in strategic decision-making (Sherwin, 2003). Thus, trust in the boardroom is 
likely to enhance the board’s service and strategy role performance. 
 In contrast to the benefits of higher trust for the performing of the board’s service and 
strategy tasks, higher levels of trust  are likely to mean the board is less likely  to engage in its’ 
control task. A higher disposition to trust is likely  to mean the board feels it  is less necessary to 
monitor the behaviour of the management. Thus, where there are higher levels of trust  the board is 
likely to accept that the actions of the management are consistent with the interests of shareholders. 
Consequently, the board will not  feel the need to engage in close monitoring of the management. 
Alternatively, where there are low levels of trust in the boardroom the board is likely  to be more 
involved in their control role. Low trust is likely to lead board members to doubt that the actions of 
managers are in shareholders’ interests and thus become more active in their control and monitoring 
task.  These arguments lead to the following hypotheses:
H13a: Board trust is positively related to board effectiveness
H13b: This relationship is mediated by the board control role, service role and strategy role.
4.8 Discussion and Summary
 This chapter started by highlighting the concerns of many researchers that despite over 30 
years of extensive research in the field of corporate governance there is much we still do not know 
about the factors that contribute to board effectiveness. Whilst there have been a few recent studies 
examining board processes and how they affect the way boards undertake a variety  of roles, there 
have been numerous calls for more research studying board behaviour. This chapter provides a 
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contribution to this board process research with the development of a new model from which a 
variety of hypotheses are developed. 
 The model introduces a new concept, board governance orientation derived from four 
existing theories in corporate governance. This follows the calls from researchers for a multi-
theoretic approach (e.g., Lynall et al., 2003) to corporate governance in general and, specifically to, 
the board of directors (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). The argument here is that boards have alternative 
approaches to corporate governance.  These different approaches can help explain the extent to 
which boards may vary in the emphasis placed on the different roles they undertake. 
 The model follows the lead of Forbes & Milliken (1999) by treating the board of directors as 
a small group and in order to understand what makes a board effective it is necessary to understand 
the factors influencing board behaviour. This model provides a valuable contribution to this 
research by identifying a more comprehensive list of board processes than hitherto has been 
considered in the board process literature. 
 The model is similar to empirical studies (e.g. Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000; Wan & Ong, 
2005; Zona & Zattoni, 2007) examining the affect of board processes on board effectiveness or 
performance by  contending that these processes influence the way boards carry  out  their differing 
roles discussed in board literature. This model adopts the board roles suggested by Zahra & Pearce 
(1989) and highlighted by Ruigrok et al., (2006) as the three interrelated roles facing boards, viz., 
control, service and strategy. 
 The next chapter will outline the methodology and methods used to test the model and the 
hypotheses outlined in this chapter. 
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Chapter 5:
 Research Design and Methodology
5.1. Introduction
 This chapter reviews choices of research design and methodology and their strengths and 
weaknesses respectively. Considering the nature of this research, which aims to identify causal 
relationships between variables, the research design and methodology employed in this research is 
primarily  quantitative. Data analysis is conducted using SPSS. As quantitative research is theory-
driven and conducted in a deductive manner, it is important that the research constructs, models and 
hypotheses are based on strong theoretical and conceptual foundations. For this requirement, an 
extensive literature review on all theoretical dimensions in relation to this particular research has 
been conducted and this is reported in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. This chapter will be structured as 
follows. First, there is a discussion of alternative research designs and research paradigms. Second, 
the chosen research method and design in which this research will be conducted are outlined. Third, 
this research uses a quantitative approach with data collected via a postal survey. Details pertaining 
to the data collection, including sampling frame, sample response rate, and non response bias are 
detailed. The final part of this chapter will report on the tests to ensure validity and reliability  of the 
measurement model. 
5.2. Research Design
 Saunders et al., (2009, p. 136) provide a basic definition of research design, “will be the 
general plan of how you will go about answering your research question.” Alternatively, Royer & 
Zarlowski  (2001, p. 111) define research design as “the framework through which the various 
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components of a research project are brought together: research question, literature review, data, 
analysis and results.” Kerlinger (1986, p. 279) in Blumberg et al., (2008) provides a more detailed 
definition,
“Research design is the plan and structure of investigation so conceived as to obtain answers to 
research questions. The plan is the overall scheme or program of the research. It includes an 
outline of what the investigator will do from writing hypotheses and their operational implications 
to the final analysis of data. A structure is the framework, organisation, or configuration of ... the 
relations among variables of a study. A research design expresses both the structure of the research 
problem and the plan of investigation used to obtain empirical evidence on relations of the 
problem.”
 Whilst definitions differ what is common in these is a clear view that research design is core 
to the entire research activity. “The research design constitutes the blueprint for the collection, 
measurement and analysis of data” (Phillips, 1971, p. 93). It is a framework for specifying the 
relationships among the study’s variables (Blumberg et al., 2008). It  outlines the overall structure 
and orientation of the concerned study, presenting a logical proof to draw inferences regarding 
causal relations among variables under investigation (Bryman & Bell, 2007; Blumberg et al., 2008). 
Research design involves selection of research methods, sampling, data collection, analysis and 
interpretation (Blumberg et al., 2008; Bryman & Bell, 2007). It also outlines how resources are best 
utilised in terms of cost  and time (Blumberg et al., 2008). According to Blumberg et al, (2008, p. 
195), an effective research design is one with the following features: 
• an activity- and time-based plan, 
• is based on the research question, 
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• guides the selection of sources and types of information 
• is a framework for specifying the relationships among the study variables
• outlines procedures for every research activity.
 The most prominent challenge to research design is its validity and reliability  (Dainty in 
Smith & Dainty, 1991). Validity refers to the extent to which a test measures what we actually  wish 
to measure or how accurately the research has been conducted (Blumberg et al., 2008; Podsakoff & 
Dalton, 1987). Yin (2009) discusses four basic tests to evaluate the quality of research design, 
namely construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability. Construct validity  is 
about identifying the correct operational measures for the concepts being studied. Internal validity 
is seeking to establish a causal relationship, where certain conditions lead to other conditions, as 
distinguished from spurious relationships. External validity defines the domain to which a study’s 
findings can be generalised. Reliability demonstrates that the operations of a study can be repeated 
with the same results. Various authors suggest four types of validity: face validity, content validity, 
construct validity, and nomological validity  (Behling, 1980; Berelson & Steiner, 1964; Podsakoff & 
Dalton, 1987). Alternatively, Blumberg et al., (2008) suggest a three form classification: content 
validity, criterion-related validity, and construct validity. Reliability is about the replicability of a 
study and thus has to do with the accuracy and precision of a measurement procedure (Blumberg et 
al., 2008; Podsakoff & Dalton, 1987). 
 The most widely used research design in the field of social sciences are non-experimental 
research, where the researcher is not in a position to interfere with or manipulate the natural setting 
of the organisation (Bennett in Smith & Dainty, 1991). There are generally  three main categories of 
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non-experimental research design, namely  survey research, qualitative research, and case study 
research. 
 Before discussion of the research design of this thesis, there are two concepts to be clarified: 
research paradigms, and research methods. Research paradigms include the qualitative paradigm, 
where the researcher uses an inductive, emerging qualitative stance in a study, and the quantitative 
paradigm, where the researcher conducts a deductive, theory-driven study (Bennett in Smith & 
Dainty, 1991). Research methods refer to data collection techniques. Qualitative methods use such 
data collection techniques as observations and interviews, whilst quantitative methods use such data 
collection techniques as surveys and experiments. 
Research Paradigms
 The quantitative paradigm is alternatively  termed the traditional, the positivist, functionalist, 
or the empiricist paradigm following the philosophical traditions of various writers including, 
Bentham, Comte, Descartes, Hume, Locke, and JS Mill (Cottingham in Monk & Raphael, 2000; 
Quinton in Monk & Raphael, 2001; Russell, 1946; Scruton, 2001; Stumpf & Fieser, 2003). The 
positivist approach whilst having a long history in philosophical writings is generally seen to have 
been founded by Auguste Comte in the nineteenth century. Positivists support ontological realism, 
the possibility and desirability of objective truth, and the use of experimental methodology. The 
qualitative paradigm is referred to as the interpretative approach, constructivist approach, 
naturalistic or postmodern perspective. This gained popularity  in the 19th century as a counter to 
positivism initially through the writings of philosophers such as Hegel, Kant, Kiergkegaard and 
Schopenhauer  (Russell, 1946; Scruton, 2001; Stumpf & Fieser, 2003) and further developed in the 
twentieth century through the works of authors including, Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre (Stumpf & 
Fieser, 2003). 
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Quantitative Research Paradigm
 The traditional research paradigm is widely recognised as taking a scientific (or quantitative) 
approach to explore a specific research problem. Quantitative research takes a statistical and 
mathematical approach to measure and analyse causal relationships (correlations or difference) 
between variables (Blumberg et al., 2008). There is a general understanding that  quantitative 
research does contribute to more validated, reliable and generalisable research findings subject to 
effective sampling, testing, and validating processes. Berelson & Steiner (in Behling, 1980) suggest 
that research should follow the natural science model of research and be based on sound scientific 
principles. In this regard, according to Berelson & Steiner (in Behling, 1980), the following features 
of research should be ensured: procedures should be public, definitions precise, the data collection 
objective, the findings replicable, the approach systematic and cumulative, and the purposes 
explanation, understanding, and prediction. Further reinforcing this perspective, Behling (1980), 
suggests that many researchers from a traditionalist perspective hold the view that good research is 
characterised by careful sampling, precise measurement, and rigorous design and analysis in the test 
of hypotheses deductively derived from tentative general laws. This approach follows the deductive 
method of reasoning from the general to the specific (Popper, 1959). 
The following propound the benefits of quantitative research, such that it has several strengths over 
qualitative research:-
• Quantitative research is often concerned with establishing the causal relationships between 
concepts. Popper (1959, p. 3) observes that, “A scientist, whether theorist  or experimenter, 
puts forward statements, or systems of statements, and tests them step by step.” In the field 
of the empirical sciences, more particularly, he constructs hypotheses, or systems of 
theories, and tests them against experience by observation and experiment.
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• In quantitative research, researchers are concerned to establish that the results of a particular 
investigation can be generalised beyond the confines of the research location (Podsakoff & 
Dalton, 1987). By verifying generality, the quantitative researcher draws nearer to the law-
like findings of the sciences. For this reason, qualitative research, which is frequently based 
on the study of one or two single cases, is often disparaged for the cases may be 
unrepresentative and therefore of unknown generality (Bryman & Bell, 2007). 
• Following a similar argument, philosophers such as Hume and Popper (1959) were strong 
advocates of a deductive approach to research and critics of an inductive approach. A 
quantitative approach follows the deductive approach drawing from the general to the 
specific as opposed to the inductive approach, which draws from the specific to the general. 
• The replication of established findings is often taken to be a characteristic of quantitative 
research. Replication can provide a means of checking the extent to which findings are 
applicable to other contexts (Podsakoff & Dalton, 1987). 
 Survey research is the most widely used quantitative approach in the social science field 
(Alreck & Settle, 2004; Bennett in Smith & Dainty, 1991; Blumberg et al., 2008; Bryman & Bell, 
2007; Jobber in Smith & Dainty, 1991). A survey has the capacity for generating quantifiable data 
on large numbers of people who are known to be representative of a wider population in order to 
test theories or hypotheses has been viewed by  many as a means of capturing many  of the 
ingredients of a science (Alreck & Settle, 2004; Bryman & Bell, 2007). There are some other 
approaches, such as experiment, analysis of previously collected data, structured observation, and 
content analysis (Blumberg et al., 2008; Bryman & Bell, 2007).
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• Experimental design involves at least two groups to which subjects have been randomly 
allocated: an experimental and a control group. The experimental group is exposed to an 
experimental stimulus (the independent variable) while the control group  is not. Observed 
differences are reported between the two groups.
• Analysis of previously  collected data involves usage of official statistics, such as crime, 
suicide, unemployment, health, economy, etc.
• Structured observation is the method whereby the researcher records observations in 
accordance with a pre-determined schedule and quantifies the resulting data, displays many 
of the characteristics of quantitative research. 
• Content analysis is the quantitative analysis of the communication content of media such a 
newspaper (Blumberg et al., 2008). 
Qualitative Research Paradigm
 According to Denzin & Lincoln (2005), any  definition of qualitative research must recognise 
that the history behind qualitative research and the fact that it crosses a wide range of differing 
philosophical approaches and encompasses a wide range of methods. Thus, Denzin & Lincoln 
(2005, p. 3) define qualitative research as:
“A situated activity that locates the observer in the real world. It consists of a set of interpretive, 
material practices that make the world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the 
world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, 
recordings, and memos to the self. At this level of qualitative research involves an interpretive, 
naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their 
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natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings 
people bring to them.”
 This definition clearly places qualitative research as emphasising the social and cultural 
contexts of the study. Further, it places the researcher close to the objects or persons being studied. 
This also  clearly identifies qualitative research in terms of the socially  constructed nature of reality 
where there is an intimate relationship between the researcher and the object of study (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005). Drawing on Becker (1986), Denzin & Lincoln (2005, p. 12) suggest that, 
“Qualitative researchers use ethnographic prose, historical narratives, first person accounts, still 
photographs, life histories, fictionalised facts, and biographical and autobiographical materials, 
among others.” Alternatively, Marshall & Rossman (1989) cite a greater variety  of qualitative 
techniques for collecting data which includes in-depth interviewing, participant observation, 
projective techniques and psychological testing, case studies, street  ethnography, elite or expert 
interviewing, document analysis, and proxemics and kinesics. 
 Thus, qualitative data consists of capturing the individual’s point of view, examining the 
constraints of everyday life, and securing rich descriptions (Becker 1996). Such rich qualitative data 
has strong potential for revealing complexity and theory development through rigorous coding and 
interpretative procedures (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
 Miles & Huberman (1994, p. 10) identify various strengths of qualitative data over 
quantitative data:-
• They focus on natural occurring, ordinary events in natural setting, so that one can have a 
strong handle on the everyday life of individuals, groups, societies or organisations.
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• The data have local groundedness, the fact that the data were collected in close proximity to 
a specific situation, rather than through the mail or over the phone. This emphasis is on a 
specific case, a focused and bounded phenomenon embedded in its context. The possibility 
for understanding latent, underlying, or non-obvious issues is strong.
• Qualitative data are rich and holistic, with strong potential for revealing complexity.
• The data are typically collected over a sustained period and, as such, enable them to be used 
for studying any process; they can even be used to assess causality  as it  actually plays out in 
a particular setting.
• Qualitative data have often been advocated as the best strategy for developing and testing 
hypotheses, and they are especially useful when one needs to supplement, validate, explain, 
illuminate, or reinterpret quantitative data gathered from the setting.
 Whilst with quantitative analysis there is principally one approach (that is one of deduction 
where statistical analysis is used to test  general theory or concepts), with qualitative analysis there 
is no single approach. Flick (2006) identifies six schools of qualitative research: Grounded theory; 
ethnomethodology, conversation, discourse and genre analysis; narrative analysis and biographical 
search, ethnography, cultural studies, and gender studies. Miles & Huberman (1994) suggest an 
alternative classification identifying three broad approaches to qualitative data analysis with the six 
schools of Flick (2006) included within aspects of part of the three categories: Interpretivism, Social 
Anthropology, and Collaborative Social Research. Interpretivists use textual analysis viewing text 
as conveying layers of meaning. They also perceive researchers as being part of the research, with 
their own convictions and conceptual orientations. Social anthropologists use ethnography, staying 
close to the naturalist  profile. Here, observation is important and social anthropologists are 
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interested in behaviours in everyday situations. In collaborative social research, researchers join 
closely with the participants throughout the research. (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Denzin & 
Lincoln (2005) offer four general philosophical paradigms utilising qualitative research: positivist 
and postpositivist, constructivist-interpretive, critical (e.g., Marxist), and feminist-poststructural. 
They go further by  sub-dividing the four paradigms into seven: positivist/postpositivist, 
constructivist, feminist, ethnic, marxist, cultural studies, and queer theory. The characteristics of the 
interpretive paradigms presented by Denzin & Lincoln are shown in table 5-1 below:
Table 5-1. Interpretive Paradigms 
Paradigm Ontology Epistemology
Methodological 
Procedures and 
Theoretical form
Positivist/postpositivist Realist and critical realist Objective
Experimental, quasi-
experimental, survey, 
rigorously defined 
qualitative 
methodologies
Constuctivist Relativist (multiple realities) Subjective
Naturalistic using 
grounded theory or 
pattern theories 
Poststructural, feminist, 
ethnic, Marxist, cultural 
studies, queer studies
Materialist-realist (real 
world makes a material 
difference in terms of 
race, class, gender)
Subjective
Naturalistic, especially 
ethnographies using  
critical theory 
Source: Based on Denzin & Lincoln (2005)
 Despite its strength, qualitative research does have its weaknesses. Some of the difficulties 
in the practice of qualitative research include: access problem of interpretation (Bryman & Bell, 
2007), and the problem of data analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Qualitative data are symbolic 
in nature, and in need of a meaningful interpretation and response (Denzin & Lincoln (2005). Lack 
of appropriate data analysis and interpretation is likely to support  the generic suspicion about the 
legitimation of qualitative research, in terms of its validity, reliability and generalisability. This, 
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combined with the other issue of its representational crisis (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005), leads to a 
serious re-evaluation of its effectiveness. Nevertheless, there is no doubt  that qualitative research 
takes the researcher into a specific context to investigate a deeper perspective of the study, and 
produces insights about a specific case or issue, which cannot be revealed by quantitative analysis.
Table 5-2. Quantitative Versus Qualitative Research Paradigms
Dimensions Quantitative Paradigm Qualitative Paradigm
Nature of reality Reality is objective and singular, apart from the researcher.
Reality is subjective and multiple, as 
seen by participants in a study.
Relationship of 
researcher to 
that researched?
Researcher is independent from that being researched. 
Researcher is an outsider – reality is what quantifiable 
data indicate it to be.
Researcher interacts with that being 
researched. Researcher is an insider 
– reality is what people perceive it to 
be.
Role of values Value-free and unbiased Value-laden and biased
Language of 
research
Formal
Non-human
Based on the set definitions
Impersonal voice
Use of numbers
Informal
Human
Evolving decisions
Personal advice
Use of words
Process of 
research
Deductive process
Controlled conditions
Cause and effect
Static design – categories isolated before study
Context-free
Generalisations leading to prediction, explanation, and 
understanding
Accurate and reliable through validity and reliability 
tests
Inductive process
Naturalistic conditions
Mutual simultaneous shaping of 
factors
Emerging design – categories 
identified during research process 
Context-bound
Patterns, theories developed from 
understanding
Accurate and reliable through 
verification by gaining real, rich and 
deep data
Nature of the 
problem
Previously studied by other researchers so that body of 
literature exists; known variables; existing theories
Exploratory research; variables 
unknown; context important; may 
lack theory base for study
Researcher’s 
psychological 
attributes
Comfort with rules and guidelines for conducting 
research; low tolerance for ambiguity; time for a study 
of short duration
Comfort with lack of specific rules 
and procedures for conducting 
research; high tolerance for 
ambiguity; time for lengthy study.
Research 
approaches
Experiment
Survey and survey research
Analysis of collected data
Structured observation
Content analysis
Biography 
Phenomenological study
Grounded theory study
Ethnography 
Case study
Sources: Based on Blumberg et al, (2008), Bryman & Bell, (2007), Smith & Dainty, (1991)
152
 In summary, as shown in Table 5-2 both the quantitative approach and the qualitative 
approach have their advantages and disadvantages. Various researchers have suggested that 
differences in qualitative and quantitative research do not necessarily  imply  the superiority of one 
methodology compared to the other as a research strategy. Rather, these differences may make one 
methodology more useful than the other depending on the research question (Hassard, 1991; 
Ticehurst & Veal, 2000). 
Triangulation
 A review of both quantitative and qualitative research reveals that each approach has its own 
strengths and weaknesses, and there is not a single best way to conduct research. This raises the 
issue of linking paradigms with methods and using multiple methods in research (Hassard in Smith 
& Dainty, 1991). According to Burrell & Morgan (1979), there are four paradigm models of social 
theory: radical humanist, interpretative, radical structuralist, and functionalist. According to Hassard 
(in Smith & Dainty, 1991), these four paradigms are exclusive entities and this creates  a problem as 
to how inter-paradigm understanding can be achieved. There are three schools of thinking regarding 
this ‘paradigm debates’. They are purists, situationalists, and pragmatists (Hassard, 1991). 
According to purists, paradigms and methods should not be mixed together. On the other hand, the 
situationalists assert that certain methods are appropriate for specific situations, and the pragmatists 
intend to integrate multiple methods in a single study, arguing that researchers should take 
advantage of different paradigms in understanding social phenomena (Hassard in Smith & Dainty, 
1991). These latter two thoughts on methods are best  described by Ticehurst & Veal (2000) as 
“horses for courses”. Denzin (1978) first  borrowed the term ‘triangulation’ from navigation and 
military strategy to formalise the concept of employing combined methodologies to enrich data by 
formal measuring instruments, such as questionnaires and standardised interview schedules, or 
using them as checks on one another (Denzin, 1989). Hassard (in Smith & Dainty, 1991) suggest 
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that taking a multiple paradigm approach to research allows the researcher to utilise a richness of 
data not available using a single approach. A further contention of Hazzard (in Smith & Dainty 
1991) is that multiple paradigm research realises greater epistemological variety and a more 
pluralistic approach leads to greater methodological democracy. In advocating a mixed 
methodological approach, Tashakkori & Teddlie (2003) propose that it would incorporate multiple 
of approaches in all stages of a study (i.e., problem identification, data collection, data analysis, and 
final inferences), and would include a transformation of the data and their analysis through another 
approach. Thus it depicts a more complete picture of a phenomenon, utilising the respective 
strength of each approach (Blumberg et al., 2008; Bryman & Bell, 2007; Flick, 2006; Hassard in 
Smith & Dainty, 1991). 
 Bryman (1992, p. 59-61) identifies multiple ways of integrating quantitative and qualitative 
methods, what is termed “the logic of triangulation”. 
• Qualitative research can support quantitative research, and vice versa;
• Both methods combined can provide a more general picture of the issue being studied;
• Structural features are analysed with quantitative methods and processual approaches with 
qualitative approaches;
• Whilst the perspective of the researcher(s) drives quantitative approaches, qualitative 
research emphasises the viewpoints of the subjective;
• The problem of generality  can be solved for qualitative research by adding quantitative 
findings;
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• Qualitative findings helps facilitate the interpretation of relationships between variables in 
quantitative data
• The relationship  between micro and macro levels in a substantial area can be clarified by 
combining qualitative and quantitative research, which can be appropriate in different stages 
of the research process;
• There are hybrid forms that use qualitative research in quasi-experimental designs.
 Denzin (1989) argues that triangulation is actually a combined methodology to study a 
specific phenomenon. This can be either a ‘between-method’, providing cross-validation of 
outcomes, or a ‘within method’, using a variety of techniques within a stated method to gather 
information about an aspect of the research that will confirm the outcome. 
 Jick (1983) describes triangulation as the integration and blending of data and methods on a 
continuum of simple to complex designs. Simple combination designs are identified as the 
“quantification of qualitative measures and the use of field observations to strengthen statistical 
data”. On the complexity side, triangulation can “capture a more complete, holistic, and contextual 
portrayal of the unit(s) under study” (Jick, 1983; p138).
 Flick (2006) sees triangulation as combining several qualitative methods and as a means to 
combine both qualitative and quantitative methods. Further, Flick (2006) contends that by 
combining differing complementary methodological perspectives the claims for using a mixed 
methodology are very strong. 
 Nevertheless, various researchers agree that there is no single theory or research text that 
explains how to integrate the two methods into a single research study (Creswell, 2009; Flick, 2006; 
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Jick, 1983; Simon, 1994). Jick (1983, p135) gives the notion that qualitative and quantitative 
methods should be “viewed as complementary rather than as rival camps”, but makes it clear that 
those who support “mixing methods” fail to provide adequate guidelines on how this should be 
accomplished. Simon (1994), capitalising on this gap, presents a generative strategy, which argues 
for combining content analysis, depth interviews, participant observation and a review of the 
literature with open-ended, non-standardised schedule interviews prior to the use of questionnaires. 
 A more recent advancement of triangulation is made by Creswell (2009). Based on previous 
work, he proposes six models of combined designs: sequential explanatory strategy, sequential 
exploratory  strategy, sequential transformative strategy, concurrent triangulation strategy, 
concurrent embedded strategy, and concurrent transformative strategy. 
• The sequential explanatory  strategy follows a two-phase research design where the 
quantitative data is collected and analysed prior to collection and analysis of qualitative 
data. According to Creswell (2009), a sequential explanatory design uses the collection and 
analysis of qualitative data to explain and interpret quantitative results.  
• The sequential exploratory strategy uses a similar two-phase approach to the research design 
as the sequential explanatory  strategy, except the phases are reversed. In this instance, the 
qualitative data and analysis preceded the quantitative data and analysis. Here, the 
quantitative analysis assists the interpretation of qualitative findings, and is best suited to 
explore a phenomenon (Creswell, 2009).  
• The sequential transformative strategy is a two-phase project with a theoretical lens 
overlaying the sequential data collection phases. The theoretical perspective guides the 
study and is more important  than the use of the methods alone (Creswell, 2009). According 
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to Creswell (2009), the advantages of a sequential transformative researcher are that it may 
be able to give voice to diverse perspectives, to better advocate for participants, or to better 
understand a phenomenon or process that is changing as a result of being studied. However, 
it has a particular problem in that because there is little written on this approach, there is 
insufficient advice on how to use the transformation to guide the research methods. 
• The concurrent triangulation strategy is regarded as the most common of the mixed methods 
models. In this model, the qualitative and quantitative data are collected and analysed 
simultaneously  and the researcher uses the data to determine if there is confirmation, 
disconfirmation, cross-validation, or corroboration. The concurrent triangulation approach 
has the potential to result in well-validated and substantiated findings (Creswell, 2009). 
However, this model also has important limitations. First, to adequately study  two separate 
methods great effort and expertise is required. Second, comparing results derived from two 
analyses using data of different forms can be complex. Finally, there may be problems in 
resolving any discrepancies that occur in comparing results (Creswell, 2009). 
• The concurrent embedded strategy uses a primary method to guide the project and a 
secondary  database to support the process. As with the concurrent triangulation model, the 
concurrent embedded strategy collects quantitative and qualitative data simultaneously. This 
approach enables the researcher to gain broader perspectives than using the predominant 
method alone (Creswell, 2009). Creswell (2009) argues that this model has three particular 
attractions: a single data collection period, the advantages of the two types of data, and by 
using the two methods, perspectives can be gained from the different types of data or from 
different levels within the study. There are also weaknesses of this model. First, the data 
requires to be transformed so they can be integrated within the analysis phase of the 
research. Second, discrepancies may occur in comparison of two databases. Finally, unequal 
157
evidence results from an unequal prioritisation of the two methods may result  in a 
disadvantage when interpreting final results (Creswell, 2009).
• The concurrent transformative strategy is guided by the use of a specific theoretical 
perspective as well as the simultaneously collection of quantitative and qualitative data. 
According to Creswell (2009), this approach may be based on an ideology such as critical 
theory, or a conceptual or theoretical framework. The concurrent transformative model 
shares features with both the triangulation and the embedded models and thus also shares 
the strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches. Creswell (2009) argues this model also 
has the added advantage of positioning mixed methods research within a transformative 
framework.  
5.3.   Chosen Research Design and Methods
 The above literature review of research design and methodology suggests that there is not a 
single, standard, correct  method of carrying out research. Each design has its own strengths and 
weaknesses, as does each data collection method. The choice of research design and data collection 
methods depends on the availability  of resources and how best the method can generate the required 
information (Hassard in Smith & Dainty, 1991; Bennett in Smith & Dainty, 1991). This research is 
positioned within the board process literature (Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000; Huse, 2005; 
Minichilli et al., 2009; Van Ees et al., 2009; Wan & Ong, 2005; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). The 
approach is deductive in that it builds a model to represent cause, effect, and other relationships 
drawing on existing theoretical concepts in the literature (Bennett in Smith & Dainty, 1991; Popper, 
1959; Raphael in Monk & Raphael, 2001). Because the objective of this research is to establish the 
relationships between board governance orientation, board governance processes, board role 
performance, and board effectiveness, quantitative analysis is most appropriate to establish the 
158
relationships. This approach thus follows the quantitative approach taken in some of the board 
process research (e.g., Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000; Minichilli et al., 2009; Wan & Ong, 2005; 
Zona & Zattoni, 2007).  To ensure maximisation of validity and reliability, this study conducted a 
thorough literature review in all perspectives pertinent to corporate governance, and specifically 
board processes, board roles and board effectiveness. The following sections will discuss these 
issues.
Survey Research
 Survey research is the prime vehicle of this research. The principal advantages of survey  
research are: it can collect a great deal of data about an individual respondent at one time at low 
cost; and the survey research method is versatile enough to be used in virtually any setting (Bennett 
in Smith & Dainty, 1991; Jobber in Smith & Dainty, 1991). 
 Jobber (in Smith & Dainty, 1991) emphasises that survey  research is characterised by a 
structured or systematic set of data. Information is gathered about the same variables or 
characteristics from at least two (normally far more) cases and ends up with a data matrix. There are 
three major methods to elicit information from respondents: the personal interview, the mail 
questionnaire, and the telephone survey. A survey research should possess the following 
characteristics (Jobber in Smith & Dainty, 1991):
• Survey research is a quantitative method, requiring standardised information from and/or 
about the subjects being studied. 
• The main data collection method is by  asking people structured and predefined questions. 
Their answers, which might refer to themselves or to some other unit of analysis, constitute 
the data to be analysed.
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• Information is generally collected about a fraction of the studied population, but it is 
collected in such a way as to be able to generalise the findings to the population. The sample 
should be large enough to allow extensive statistical analysis.
Oppenheim (2000) distinguishes two types of survey research: descriptive survey and analytical 
survey. 
• Descriptive survey is aimed largely  at  fact-finding in nature, or making predictions. Its 
purpose is to count, and chiefly tell us how many (what proportion of) members of a 
population have a certain opinion or characteristics or how often certain events occur 
together. They  are not designed to explain anything or to show causal relationships between 
one variable and another.
• Analytical survey is aimed at  exploring causal relationships between variables, and often 
undertaken to test  specific propositions or hypotheses. It answers the question of ‘why’ 
rather than ‘how many’ or ‘how often’. 
 Based on the above literature of survey research, this study uses analytical survey  as the 
dominant component, because the objectives of this research are to identify the relationship 
between firm (or board) governance orientation, board governance processes, board role 
performance and board effectiveness. Hypotheses of relationships between these variables are 
formulated through literature review and will be analysed using quantitative data collected via 
survey research. The sampling methods, measurement and scales, validity and reliability of research 
design and data collection methods for the survey research will be further discussed in the following 
sections.
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Sampling Methods
 Sampling allows researchers to draw conclusions about the population by selecting units 
that are representative of the population (Maylor & Blackmon, 2005). There are two principal types 
of sampling: probability  and non-probability sampling (Blumberg et al, 2008; Maylor & Blackmon, 
2005). 
There are several types of random sampling, such as simple random sampling, stratified random 
sampling, cluster sampling, and stage sampling (Blumberg et al., 2008; Brymon and Bell, 2007)).
• Simple random sampling involves taking a random sample directly from the population. 
However, it is limited by the availability of a complete list of the population, one that 
could be very large and not feasible or even possible to obtain.
• Stratified random sampling consists of taking random samples from various strata, 
which are different sub-populations within a larger population. By defining strata, the 
researcher can identify more relevant ones that are worth investigating. 
• Cluster sampling randomly selects clusters of subjects, thus avoids the difficulty  of 
sampling from a large population.
• Stage sampling is an extension of cluster sampling and involves successive random 
selections from each previously selected cluster.
 Non-random sampling provides less justifiably representative samples, but is used for the 
sake of cost  efficiency and convenience. Typical techniques that have been applied in previous 
research are: purposive sampling, quota sampling, convenience, accidental or volunteer sampling, 
and snowball sampling (Blumberg et al., 2008; Bryman & Bell, 2007).
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• Purposive sampling is achieved by the researcher through hand-picking subjects on the 
basis of traits to give what is felt or believed to be a representative sample. This requires 
all the relevant variables or traits to be identified so the sample would include a cross-
section of persons possessing these.
• Quota sampling involves the researcher non-randomly  selects subjects from identified 
strata until desired numbers are reached.  Such an approach ensures that each group is 
of the same size, which can be important for some inferential statistical tests. The 
disadvantage is that the numbers may not reflect the true proportions of sub-populations 
in the whole population.
• Snowball sampling involves the researcher identifies a small number of subjects with 
the required characteristics, who in turn identify  others etc. This is of value when a 
researcher has little idea of the size or extent of a population, or there simply may be no 
records of population size. The disadvantage is that it is difficult to defend the 
representativeness of the sample.
 Indeed, there is widespread recognition among organisational researchers that investigations 
using sample survey are rarely based on probability samples. Instead, convenience samples tend to 
prevail. Bryman & Bell (2007) offer an explanation as to why  non-probability sampling is 
widespread:
• Practical reasons such as increased difficulty in gaining access to firms for survey 
research.
• Strategic reasons, in other words a non-random sampling may be deemed better than a 
random one, or a random sample may not be a feasible plan of action. Random 
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sampling is unlikely to be feasible in the event that there is no frame or when the frame 
would be absurdly expensive or even impossible construct.
Sampling Error
 Sampling errors result  from actually  taking the sample in a less random manner (Maylor & 
Blackmon, 2005). Non-sampling errors occur being unrelated to the method of sampling, i.e. the 
sample may be random and representative, but the resulting data may  not be complete or accurate. 
The sources of errors may come from the following (Maylor & Blackmon, 2005):-
• Missing data may be due to the inability  to contact a selected subject or not all the 
selected subjects choosing to participate, resulting in volunteers.
• Response errors will arise from subjects providing inaccurate information, or the 
questions may be misunderstood.
• Processing errors can arise from coding data or entering it into computer files.
• Errors from methods of data collection include such problems as timing of a survey, 
wording of questions and mediums used.
Sampling Frame
 The population was drawn from the Hemscott  Company Guru database available through 
the University of Wolverhampton. Hemscott is a financial database containing information on 
300,000 British companies. Private company data is supplied by  Dun and Bradstreet Inc. Up to five 
years of financial information, share price data, a variety  of descriptive details and board of 
directors information are provided in the database. It allows researchers to search for companies by 
their name, by sector, or by various other criteria. In addition, Hemscott has a director search 
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criteria, which allows researchers to search by director name, position, nationality, position, 
remuneration, director shareholdings and other relevant criteria useful to board researchers. 
Hemscott uses three categories of company type: UK Listed, UK Private, and UK Listed/Private. 
 The Hemscott database contains information on the board of directors of listed and private 
companies. This facilitates the search for respondents, in this case chairpersons of boards to whom 
the survey was targeted. In addition, it allowed for the collection of firm performance data. From 
Hemscott, all the listed companies on the database in November/December 2009 were selected for 
the sampling frame. This constituted a total of 1665 companies. 
Measurement and Scales
 Survey instrument development is an important phase of this research, as it is the main 
process through which the validity  and reliability  of the measurements, as discussed previously in 
this chapter, is achieved. Measurement is one of the most fundamental elements in research. It  is a 
problem shared by  researchers in all disciplines where an attempt is made to quantify observations 
(Blumberg et al., 2008; Bryman & Bell, 2007; Maylor & Blackmon, 2005).  According to Blumberg 
et al., (2008) in measuring, first a mapping rule is devised, then the observation of property 
indicants is translated using this rule.
 The rules that we use to assign numbers to observations result in various levels of 
measurement. Several types of data are possibly dependent on the assumptions about the mapping 
rules. In addition, each data type has its own set of underlying assumptions about how numerical 
symbols correspond to real world observations (Blumberg et al., 2008). There are four levels of 
measurement with different properties involved, namely nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio scales 
(Blumberg et al., 2008). 
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• A nominal scale is one in which numbers are assigned to individuals or phenomena. Their 
purpose is merely to give a label to a class or category. Nominal characteristics do not show 
any order of distinctions. Using nominal data, very little statistical analysis can be carried out. 
Only percentages, frequencies, and the mode can be calculated, and limited statistical 
techniques such as Chi-square can be used to determine significant differences between 
categories. 
• Ordinal level data are numbers that are assigned to data on the basis of some order, i.e. the 
data is in an order that ranges from the bottom to the top. However, it is not possible to 
quantify precisely how much difference there is between the categories.
• Interval level data represent numbers used to rank items such that numerically equal distance 
on the scale represents equal distance in the property being measured. This is, in addition to 
classification and order, we have equal units of measurement. There are precisely defined 
intervals between and among observations. What is lacking with an interval scale is a stable 
starting point (an absolute zero), and consequently, the scales cannot be interpreted in any 
absolute sense. However, we can perform a large number of mathematical operations with 
interval data, which are not possible with nominal and ordinal data.
• A ratio scale is a type of scale that uses numbers that rank items in order that the intervals are 
equal in measurement and have an absolute zero point. With ratio data, all descriptive as well 
as inferential statistics are applicable. 
 Table 5-3 provides a summary of characteristics of all the measurement scales from 
Blumberg et al., (2008). In social science research, many attitude scales are presumed to be interval 
(Blumber et al., 2008, Bryman & Bell, 2007). For example, the Likert  scale that requires 
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respondents to state their degree of agreement or disagreement to a given statement. Blumber et al., 
(2008) emphasise that it is obvious that the interval between each of these degrees of agreement or 
disagreement is not exactly equal, but more researchers treat these data as if the intervals are equal. 
This is because the result of most statistical techniques is not seriously affected by this minor non-
compliance to the interval scale requirements. 
Table 5-3. Types of data and their measurement characteristics
Type of data Characteristics of data Basic empirical operation Example
Nominal
Classification but no 
order, distance or origin Determination of equality
Gender (male, 
female)
Ordinal
Classification and order 
but no distance or unique 
origin
Determination of greater or 
lesser value
Doneness of meat 
(well, medium-
well, medium-
rare, rare)
Interval
Classification, order and 
distance but no unique 
origin
Determination of equality of 
intervals or differences
Temperature in 
degrees
Ratio
Classification, order, 
distance and unique origin
Determination of equality of 
ratios Ages in years
Source: Blumberg et al., (2008)
 In this questionnaire, most of the data were assessed by Likert scales, which are treated as 
an interval scale. A seven point scale was used because as Blumberg et al., (2008) point out many 
researchers contend that the greater the number of points on a rating scale, the greater the sensitivity 
of measurement and extraction of variance. The reasons for using a Likert scale are: (1) These 
scales have been found to communicate interval properties to the respondent, and therefore produce 
data that can be assumed to be intervally  scaled (Bryman & Bell, 2007; Maylor & Blackmon, 
2005); (2) In board literature, Likert scales are normally treated as interval scales (for example, 
Minichilli et al., 2009 and Zona & Zattoni, 2007). This enables the research to describe the nature 
of research subjects, as well as to explain the relationships between variables by employing 
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inferential statistics. With the exception of the board governance orientation construct, efforts were 
made to utilise or adapt existing measurement scales. The board governance processes of 
cohesiveness, conflict, communications, effort norms, trust and the use of knowledge and skills 
utilised existing measurement scales. Similarly, the control role, service role, strategy  role and 
board effectiveness constructs utilised existing measurement  scales. In the case of board governance 
orientation, where there is not an appropriate existing scale, constructs are developed carefully from 
strong theoretical foundation. A full discussion is provided in section 5.4. 
Validity and Reliability of Research Design
 The quality  and impact  of management research depends upon the appropriateness and 
rigour of the research methods chosen. Issues on design choices such as instrumentation, data 
analysis, and construct validation, etc. affect research findings and conclusions. This leads to the 
continuous focus on reliability  and validity of research methods. Many authors have addressed the 
issues from different aspects, resulting in a wide range of labels that are used to describe reliability 
and validity of measures in the methodological literature (Blumberg et al., 2008; Yin, 2009). The 
following section identifies the methods undertaken within this research to ensure validity and 
reliability.
Validity
 Validity refers to the extent to which a test measures what is wanted to be measured. It is 
generally  agreed that no one research strategy can adequately cover all aspects of validity. 
Researchers need to adopt different strategies to maximize different kinds of validity. Triangulation 
is suggested as an effective strategy  to achieve more valid and reliable research results. However, 
due to limitations of research resources, the nature of research projects, and the skills of the 
researcher, triangulation is not always possible. In the particular case of this research, the prime task 
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is to identify the relationships between variables. Quantitative methods are more effective in 
solving the concerned issues. The aspects of validity as mentioned in section 5.2 above are dealt 
with care. 
 The content  validity is optimised though extensive literature review. The operationalisation 
of each measurement is checked against the relevant content domain for the construct. Efforts have 
been made to use the measures that  have been previously  tested. In some instances, modifications 
were made and new measures were created. These will be listed in the following sections. New 
items used in the survey questionnaire and hypotheses development followed from a critical review 
of theories and previous research findings. 
 External validity  of this research is achieved through adopting a quantitative research 
strategy, followed by critical review of all relevant research fields in terms of identifying theoretical 
foundations and cross-comparison with previous research findings. Survey  research is adopted and 
aims to achieve a generalisable findings. Details of questionnaire administration are reported in the 
later section of this chapter. 
Reliability
 Reliability  demonstrates that the operations of a study can be repeated with the same results. 
The reliability of this research is achieved through the following measures: 
• Minimising the source of unreliability, multi-item indicators, and the use of questions from 
reputable studies.
• Minimising source of unreliability: Various researchers argue that a question may  be 
unreliable due to bad wording: people may  understand a question differently  on different 
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occasions (Blumberg et al., 2008; Yin, 2009). Another source of error is when people have no 
opinion or have insufficient information. In the survey, bad wording is minimised by 
extensive review of past literature, critical discussion with the supervisor, expert review of the 
questionnaire, and a pilot test  by five current members of different boards of directors. 
Difficult questions were reworded, and ambiguous questions were amended or deleted.
• Multi-item measure: Yin (2009) argues that multi-item indicators are the best way to create 
reliability, as well as offering an easier method of assessing their reliabilities. Moreover, 
single-item measures are said to have almost certainly a strong yes-saying bias, while multi-
item measures eliminate this. This study used multi-item measures for all constructs with 
items ranging from 4 statements to 10 statements for each construct.
• Use of questions from reputable study: Effort has been made to use the measures from 
previous studies, but in some instances, modifications were made and new measures were 
created, using the steps specified above. The source of measuring instruments is explained in 
the next section of this chapter. Reliability of the measurement instruments was checked and 
achieved by using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. 
• Cronbach’s Alpha test of reliability: This is a model of internal consistency, based on the 
average inter-item correlation. Cronbach’s Alpha was calculated for each construct in the 
study and the results are reported in the following chapter.
 The importance of validity  and reliability of research in generalising research findings is 
discussed above. Black (1993, p55) notes “without generalizability of results, social science 
research in general will tend to limp along, not benefiting from the efforts of others, collecting 
results on a piecemeal basis.” The more generalisable the results, the greater the possibility  that one 
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can begin to resolve conflicting hypotheses. By following the identified methods, this research is 
aimed to achieve optimised validity and reliability. 
Questionnaire Design
 Questionnaire design is a very important  part of this research. As previously mentioned, 
measurements are carefully selected from existing research when available. In cases when existing 
measurement scales are not available, questions were drawn from strong theoretical background. 
The questionnaire uses a 7-point Likert  scale, usually ranging from 1=strongly disagree, 
2=disagree, 3=slightly disagree, 4=neither disagree or agree, 5=slightly  agree, 6=agree, 7=strongly 
agree.
Format of Questionnaire
 The format of the questionnaire is a most important  criterion that determines response rate 
(Blumberg et al., 2008; Bryman & Bell, 2007). The appearance of the questionnaire and how the 
questions are structured within it can influence a respondent’s co-operation, as well as the quality  of 
data collected (Blumberg et al., 2008; Bryman & Bell, 2007, Maylor & Blackmon, 2005). Blumberg 
et al., (2008) specify that in a mail survey, both the layout and appearance of the questionnaire are 
crucial, because they are the only elements that will entice respondents to cooperate. 
 Although the questionnaire used in this study  appears lengthy (7 pages), certain measures 
were incorporated to ensure a reasonably good response rate. For example, much effort  was devoted 
to ensure that the layout was pleasing to the eyes of the respondents. A self-addressed pre-paid 
envelope was included to encourage responses. A front  sheet was provided in addition to a cover 
letter, explaining the importance of the research, identifying the time it would reasonably be 
expected to take to complete the questionnaire, and allowing the respondents to indicate whether 
they  wished to be provided with an executive summary of the results of the study. Questions were 
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deliberately  grouped into sections and sub-sections using sub-numbering systems to enhance the 
format of the questionnaire. Instead of ending up with over hundred of individual questions, 
questions were grouped into sections.
 It is often thought that a lengthy questionnaire will not attract  the respondent to co-operate. 
However if the sample is made up of people with a special interest in the subject or with a high 
standard of literacy, they will not be deterred by lengthy  questionnaires (Blumberg et al., 2005; 
Bryman & Bell, 2007). It  is, however, largely  recognised in board research that response rates are 
relatively low (Dalton et al., 2003; Dailly et al., 2003; Pettigrew, 1992).
Pilot Test
 A pilot  test of the survey was conducted in October 2009. Five existing company directors 
known to the author and the supervisory team completed the draft questionnaire and as a result of 
their comments difficult questions were reworded, and ambiguous questions were amended or 
deleted.
The Survey
 Between December 2009 and April 2010, the pretested questionnaire and a cover letter 
introducing the study (see Appendix), its potential value and the importance of the company’s 
participation were mailed to the chair of the board of directors of each of the 1665 companies. 
Whilst a number of board studies use CEOs as the key  respondent (e.g. Minichilli et al., 2009), this 
study uses board chairs. This was done as it was believed board chairs would be more independent 
and less biased in their answers than CEOs. Each participant was assured about the confidential 
nature of the responses. They also had the option of receiving an executive summary  of the outcome 
from the research by  placing a tick on the front page of the questionnaire. Six weeks following the 
mailing, reminder emails were sent out. Following on from email replies, replacement copies of the 
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questionnaire were sent out to 20 companies. The initial mail out  led to 72 replies and the reminder 
email elicited just 2 further responses. A number of apologies were received from companies who 
would not be able to complete the questionnaire, as well as a number of returned mails due to 
wrong addresses, departure from addresses, or companies that had gone into liquidation. Figures are 
shown in the Tables 5-4. and 5-5. below.
Table 5-4. The Response Rate of Apologies and Undelivered Mail
Number Percentage*
Apologies 53 3.18%
Returned Mails Undelivered 71 4.26%
Total 124 7.44%
*Percentage is based on a total of 1665 companies
Table 5-5. The Survey Response Rate
Number of Responses Percentage*
Mailing 72 4.32%
E-mail follow up 2 0.12%
Total Response 74 4.44% (adjusted 4.64%)
 A low response rate is not uncommon in board research, although in comparative terms this 
is a very low response rate. As Dailly et al., (2003) contended, data on boards have been 
extraordinarily difficult  to obtain and hence why most of the traditional board research used 
archival data gathering techniques. Whilst  a number of board process researchers have seen much 
better response rates (between 10 and 20%) in similar surveys in recent years, these have been 
conducted in continental Europe and countries in the Far East (Minichilli et al., 2009; Wan and 
Ong, 2005; Zona & Zattoni, 2009). A number of factors may help to explain the very  low response 
rate. There were two reasons identified by those apologising for their failure to complete the 
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questionnaire: (a) it  is company policy not to fill in questionnaires, and (b) we are very busy 
preparing for the end of the financial year and do not have time to complete your questionnaire. 
There is also anecdotal evidence that an increasing number of larger companies in the UK are 
refusing to participate in survey  research. An experienced UK Professor undertaking board research 
made it known that she was finding it difficult to undertake interviews with company board 
members that have previously been very willing to participate. 
Characteristics of the Sample
 Characteristics of the sample are presented in Tables 5-6. and 5-7.
Table 5-6. Sample Characteristics of Business Sector
Type of Business 
Number of 
Responding 
Companies
Response Sample (%) 
(n = 74)
Original Sample (%) 
(n = 1665)
Oil & Gas 4 5.41% 7.28%
Basic Materials 7 9.46% 9.76%
Industrials 21 28.38% 24.55%
Consumer Goods 6 8.11% 7.35%
Health Care 3 4.05% 4.80%
Consumer Services 9 12.16% 11.29%
Telecommunications 0 0.00% 1.20%
Utilities 1 1.35% 1.38%
Financials 14 18.92% 21.02%
Technology 9 12.16% 11.37%
Total 74 100% 100%
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Table 5-7. Sample Characteristics of Business Size
Number of 
Employees
Number of 
Responding 
Companies
Response Sample 
(%) (n= 72)*
Original Sample (%) 
(n = 1550)^
0-99 18 25% 28.97%
100-249 10 13.89% 12.32%
250-499 6 8.33% 9.61%
500-999 7 9.72% 8.32%
1000+ 31 43.06% 40.78%
Total 72* 100% 100%
*There was only information on the number of employees for 72 out of the 74 respondents
^There was only information on the number of employees for 1550 out of 1665 companies
Non-Response Bias
 To check for non-response bias resulting from the sampling procedure, checks for 
differences in the business sector and business size (in terms of the number of employees), 
produced no significant differences between respondents and non-respondents (see Tables 5.6 and 
5.7)
Common Methods Bias
 Common method bias occurs where the variance attributable to the measurement method is 
one of the primary sources of measurement error (Podsakoff et  al., 2003). The dependent variable in 
the model is board effectiveness and since this is a self-reported measure checks for common 
methods bias are required. In this research, the Chairmen respondents on board effectiveness were 
self-reporting all variables within the model, including the dependent variable board effectiveness. 
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Common method bias could therefore derive from single-rater effects and/or item characteristic 
effects. 
 In order to deal with common method bias (Doty & Glick, 1998), a number of procedural 
remedies in the instrument development and data collection phase were applied (Podsakoff et al., 
2003). First, we protected the respondents’ anonymity by assuring confidentiality of their responses 
in the cover letter that accompanied the survey. Second, considerable time and effort were invested 
in improving the scale items and reducing item ambiguity. All survey questions were short, specific 
and used simple words to avoid ambiguous and vague formulations. To enhance the construct 
validity  of the survey measures, a pilot survey was undertaken  to assist in the fine-tuning of the 
questionnaire and in identifying potentially misleading items (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001).  
 To check for common methods bias, one statistical remedy was employed. Data on 
companies’ return on capital employed (ROCE) were collected and compared to the board 
effectiveness results. Regression analysis was employed to test the hypothesis that board 
effectiveness is directly  related to the firm’s financial performance, using ROCE as a measure of 
financial performance. 
Table 5-8. Regression Analysis of the Relationship between Board Effectiveness and ROCE
ROCE
Board Effectiveness 0.247*
Adjusted R2 0.046
F change 4.017
 The regression analysis results in Table 5-8, show that the hypothesis that board 
effectiveness is directly related to ROCE is accepted at the 5% level (ß = 0.247). Thus, from this 
sample of companies it can be inferred that common methods bias is not a problem.
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5.4. Reliability and Validity of the Measurement Model
 As discussed previously in this chapter, the objectives of this research are to identify the 
relationships between board governance orientation, board governance processes, board role 
performance, and board effectiveness and to analyse the predicted hypotheses developed from 
existing literature. This section will report on the analysis undertaken to ensure the validity  and 
reliability  of the measurement model developed in Chapter 4: Measurement Model and Hypothesis 
Development. Two of these constructs, board governance orientation and board effectiveness are 
new and thus the questionnaire survey questions used to measure these constructs were developed 
from existing literature. The Cronbach Alpha test was used to examine the construct reliability  and 
factor analysis was undertaken to examine the extent to which the observed variables are linked to 
their underlying factors. Factor analysis is a multivariate statistical method whose primary aim is is 
to simplify complex sets of data (Hair et al., 1987). It is used to identify  a relatively  small number 
of factors that could represent themes within a number of interrelated variables. Hair et al., (1987: 
235) identifies four functions factor analysis techniques can perform:
• Identify a set of latent dimensions in a large set of variables.
• Devise a method of combining or condensing large numbers of variables into distinctly 
different groups within a  larger population.
• Identify appropriate variables for a subsequent regression, correlation or discriminant 
analysis from a larger set of variables
• Create an entirely  new set of smaller variables to partially or completely replace the 
original set of variables for inclusion in subsequent regression, correlation or 
discriminant analysis.
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 In Chapter 4 Model and Hypotheses, it  was reported that board roles have been ambiguously 
defined and measured in prior empirical research. Thus, the data obtained through the questionnaire 
were subject  to exploratory  factor analysis in order to discover the underlying dimensions of board 
role performance. 
Board Governance Orientation
 Chapter 2 Literature Review reports that  there are four principal theories employed in 
corporate governance to explain board structural characteristics: agency theory, resource 
dependency theory, stakeholder theory, and stewardship theory. These theories offer alternative 
prescriptions for board structures and thus drawing on these theory it is hypothesised in Chapter 4 
Model and Hypotheses, that firms will have a different orientation towards corporate governance. 
The hypothesised board governance orientations are thus agency, resource dependency, stakeholder, 
and stewardship. The scales were developed from statements derived from the extant literature 
review. The next section reports on the theoretical derivation of these statements and the reliability 
analysis of the constructs. Prior to undertaking the reliability analysis of the constructs, a factor 
analysis was completed to examine the interrelationships between the variables. 
Agency Governance Orientation
 This was initially developed as a five-item measure drawn from theoretical statements by 
Alchian & Demsetz (1972), Eisenhardt (1989), Fama & Jensen (1983), Grossman and Hart (1986), 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) and Jensen and Murphy (1990).  The items are presented in Table 5-9.
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Table 5-9. Agency Orientation Items
1  Our board feels a moral responsibility to look after the interests of the shareholders. 
2  Board members look after their own interests. 
3  Board members closely monitor and control the actions of management. 
4  Board executives are aligned to shareholder interests through compensation packages.
5  Contractual arrangements specify how the returns on investment are divided between executives and shareholders. 
 Table 5-10. shows that the Cronbach Alpha for the five items was 0.359, below the generally 
accepted 0.7 and thus not reliable. Dropping item 2 shown in Table 5-10. improved the Cronbach 
Alpha score to 0.5 but still below the threshold for acceptability. The result suggests the Agency 
Governance Orientation was not a reliable construct.
Table 5-10. Reliability Analysis for Agency Orientation
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
0.359 5
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted
Agency 1 18.14 14.443 0.267 0.309
Agency 2 22.44 13.671 -0.039 0.500
Agency 3 18.87 12.461 0.298 0.241
Agency 4 19.09 11.007 0.349 0.173
Agency 5 20.66 8.316 0.225 0.281
 
Resource Dependency Orientation
 This was initially developed as a seven-item measure drawn from theoretical statements by 
Burt (1980), Carpenter & Westphal(2001), Daily & Schwenk (1996), Hillman & Dalziel (2003), 
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Gales & Kesner (1994), Hillman et al., (2000), Mizruchi (1996), Pfeffer (1972), Pfeffer & Salancik 
(1978), and Wernerfelt (1984). The items from the questionnaire are presented in Table 5-11. below.
Table 5-11. Resource Dependency Items 
16 Board members bring a variety of expertise and skills to the board and the company.
17 Board members’ skills and expertise help the company manage external links.
18 Board member skills and expertise help the company reduce its environmental uncertainty.
19 Board members provide advice and counsel to management.
20 Board members provide channels of communication between external organisations and the 
company.
21 Board members provide assistance in obtaining knowledge and information from outside the 
company.
22 Board members help to increase the company’s legitimacy in the market place.
Table 5.12. Reliability Analysis for Resource Dependency Orientation
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
0.797 7
Item-Total 
Statistics
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted
Resource 
Dependency 1
34.37 18.933 0.517 0.627 0.775
Resource 
Dependency 2
34.64 16.871 0.653 0.644 0.748
Resource 
Dependency 3
35.99 15.956 0.408 0.190 0.821
Resource 
Dependency 4
34.41 19.464 0.566 0.443 0.774
Resource 
Dependency 5
35.19 17.226 0.579 0.596 0.761
Resource 
Dependency 6
35.01 17.637 0.627 0.544 0.755
Resource 
Dependency 7
35.10 17.338 0.551 0.352 0.766
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 Table 5-12. shows that the Cronbach Alpha for the seven items was 0.797 and thus the 
Resource Dependency Orientation construct  can be accepted as reliable. The score increases to 
0.821 when item 18 shown in table 5-11. above is dropped, and thus the Resource Dependency 
Orientation would appear to be a reliable construct.
Stakeholder Orientation 
 This was initially developed as a six-item measure drawn from theoretical statements by 
Agle et al., (1999), Freeman & Evan (1990), Mitchell et al., (1997), Jawahar & McLaughlin (2001), 
Rowley (1997), and Trevino & Weaver (1999). The items are presented in Table 5-13. overleaf.
Table 5-13. Stakeholder Items
10 Our board views the company more broadly than one simply owned by the shareholders.
11 Our board pays serious attention to employee interests, even if they happen at times to conflict 
with narrow shareholder profit interests.
12 Our board pays serious attention to customer interests, even if they happen at times to conflict 
with narrow shareholder profit interests.
13 Our board feels that they (and the company) must act as custodians of local interests, and not just 
purely look after shareholder profits.
14 Our board pays serious attention to suppliers’ interests, even if they happen at times to conflict 
with narrow shareholder profit interests.
15 Our board pays serious attention to the company’s corporate social responsibility, even if they 
happen at times to conflict with shareholder profit interests.
 Table 5-14. shows that the Cronbach Alpha for the six items was 0.792 and thus the 
Stakeholder Orientation construct can be accepted as reliable.
Table 5-14. Reliability Analysis for Stakeholder Orientation
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
0.792 6
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Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted
Stakeholder 1 24.68 24.936 0.515 0.767
Stakeholder 2 24.80 24.446 0.675 0.736
Stakeholder 3 24.62 27.096 0.398 0.790
Stakeholder4 25.77 20.777 0.687 0.721
Stakeholder 5 26.08 24.678 0.477 0.776
Stakeholder 6 25.10 22.890 0.547 0.761
 
Stewardship Orientation
 This was initially developed as a four-item measure drawn from theoretical statements by 
Davis et al., (1997) and Donaldson & Davis (1991). The items are presented in Table 5-15. below.
Table 5-15. Stewardship Items
6 Board members allow management a large degree of autonomy to run the company. 
7 Our board is confident that management look after the company’s interests.
8 Our board’s control of senior management is seen as counter-productive as it lowers management 
motivation.
9 Executive board members are highly knowledgeable about the company.
 The Cronbach Alpha for the four items was originally  -0.044 as shown in Table 5-16. The 
value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items. This violates reliability model 
assumptions. Due to this result, item 3 was reverse scored leaving the revised Cronbach Alpha, 
shown in Table 5-17. as 0.484, still below the accepted value of 0.7. Deleting item 3 raised the 
Cronbach Alpha score to 0.528, but still not meeting the acceptable threshold for reliability.
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Table 5-16. Reliability Analysis for Stewardship Orientation
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
-0.044 4
Item-Total 
Statistics
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted
Stewardship 1 15.25 3.105 0.084 0.122 -.265a
Stewardship 2 14.42 4.248 0.106 0.367 -.173a
Stewardship 3 18.08 4.021 -0.242 0.117 0.528
Stewardship 4 14.05 4.108 0.203 0.234 -.263a
Table 5-17. Reliability Analysis for Stewardship Orientation
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
0.484 4
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted
Stewardship 1 18.21 5.138 0.263 0.434
Stewardship 2 17.38 5.823 0.542 0.280
Stewardship 4 17.01 6.847 0.282 0.442
Stewardship 3 18.08 4.021 0.242 0.528
 
Self-Typing Results for Board Governance Orientation
As the board orientation construct was new, a self-typing question was included in the questionnaire 
that would help to validate the multi-item constructs for the board governance orientations. The 
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questions asked the respondents to identify the (one) orientation that most closely resembled their 
board. identify the board’s orientation. The statements for each orientation are in Table 5-18.
Table 5-18. Governance Orientation Statements
Orientation 1 Our board is primarily concerned with controlling, monitoring, reviewing senior management 
team objectives and performance in order to protect shareholder interest.
Orientation 2 Our board has a high level of trust in senior management, and is primarily concerned with 
supporting and empowering senior management, which acts in the best interest of its company 
and its’ shareholders.
Orientation 3 Our board represents differing stakeholder groups and is primarily concerned with balancing the 
interests of these groups, and is achieving that through controlling, monitoring, reviewing senior 
management team objectives and performance.
Orientation 4 Our board is primarily concerned with providing a variety of resources (relevant skills & 
knowledge, information, advice & counsel) to help the senior management meet team objectives 
and performance in order to create shareholder value.
The results from the self-typing showed 25.7% identifying orientation 1 (agency), 40.0%% 
orientation 2 (stewardship), 12.9% orientation 3 (stakeholder), and 20.3% orientation 4 (resource 
dependency). These self-typing results did not respond/correlate with the results from the multi-
item measures.
Summary of Board Governance Orientation Results
 The self-typing results show some support for boards having different governance 
orientations. However, whilst the results from the Cronbach Alpha tests clearly show that the 
Resource Dependency  Orientation and Stakeholder Orientation are reliable constructs, the Agency 
Orientation and the Stewardship Orientation are not reliable constructs. Given these results, it  is 
impossible to test the hypotheses relating to board governance orientation and thus these are 
dropped at this stage. This will be discussed further in Chapter 7, Discussion.
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Board Governance Processes
 The board governance processes identified from Chapters 2 and 3 Literature Review and 
hypothesised in Chapter 4 The Model and Hypotheses are cohesiveness, communication quality, 
cognitive conflict, affective conflict, effort  norms, trust, and the use of knowledge and skills. Each 
of these processes used existing constructs and thus were examined using Cronbach Alpha’s test of 
reliability.
Cohesiveness 
 This was developed as a four-item measure based on O’Reilly  et al., (1989). The items are 
shown in Table 5-19.
Table 5-19. Cohesiveness Items
1  Board members are ready to defend each other from criticism by outsiders.
2  Board members are very willing to help each other with the job.
3  Board members get along with each other.
4  Board members always stick together.
Table 5-20. Reliability Analysis for Cohesiveness
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
0.704 4
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted
Cohesiveness 1 15.93 6.488 0.545 0.605
Cohesiveness 2 14.88 8.815 0.438 0.680
Cohesiveness 3 15.18 7.671 0.563 0.609
Cohesiveness 4 17.14 5.952 0.490 0.663
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 Table 5-20. shows that the Cronbach Alpha was 0.704 (>0.7) and thus cohesiveness is 
deemed to be a reliable construct.
Communication Quality 
 This was developed as an eight-item measure based on Massey & Dawes (2007a). The items 
are shown in Table 5-21.
Table 5-21. Communication Quality Items
33  The information provided by senior management is very useful for board meetings
34  Board members are satisfied with the information provided for board meetings.
35  The information provided is highly relevant to the required decisions.
36  The information provided for board meetings is highly credible.
37  The form and presentation of the information provided is very satisfactory.
38  The board chairperson always responds to his/her communication outside board meetings.
39  The board chairperson provides the board with feedback.
40  There is two-way communication between the board and the management.
Table 5-22 shows that the Cronbach Alpha was 0.907, indicating a high degree of reliability for the 
communication quality  construct. Whilst dropping item 38 in Table 5-21 increases the Cronbach 
Alpha score to 0.913 this improvement is not seen as significant, especially  given the high 
reliability shown by retaining all eight items.
Table 5-22. Reliability Analysis for Communication Quality
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
0.907 8
185
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted
Communication Quality 1 42.78 21.229 0.760 0.891
Communication Quality 2 43.03 19.888 0.771 0.889
Communication Quality 3 42.88 20.332 0.780 0.888
Communication Quality 4 42.86 20.148 0.820 0.885
Communication Quality 5 43.27 19.813 0.713 0.895
Communication Quality 6 42.78 22.007 0.507 0.913
Communication Quality 7 42.75 21.855 0.648 0.900
Communication Quality 8 42.74 21.862 0.663 0.899
 
 
Cognitive Conflict
 This was developed as an eight-item measure utilising five items from Wang and Ong’s 
(2005) cognitive conflict measure and three items from Massey & Dawes’s (2007a) functional 
conflict measure. The items are shown in Table 5-23.
Table 5-23. Cognitive Conflict Items
5  Our board considers the different viewpoints of its members.
6  Board decisions are settled amicably.
7  Board decisions are open and candid.
8  The atmosphere on the board encourages critical thinking. 
9  Board meetings often result in a clear decision.
10  There is constructive challenge of ideas, beliefs and assumptions on the board.
11  Board members who disagree respect each other’s viewpoints
12  Different opinions or views on the board focus on issues rather than individuals.
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Table 5-24. Reliability Analysis for Cognitive Conflict
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
0.899 8
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted
Cognitive Conflict 1 44.07 17.537 0.771 0.878
Cognitive Conflict 2 44.34 19.839 0.310 0.923
Cognitive Conflict 3 43.96 16.401 0.868 0.867
Cognitive Conflict 4 44.07 17.926 0.799 0.877
Cognitive Conflict 5 44.04 19.068 0.627 0.891
Cognitive Conflict 6 44.07 18.120 0.713 0.883
Cognitive Conflict 7 44.21 16.638 0.845 0.870
Cognitive Conflict 8 44.22 18.062 0.632 0.891
 Table 5-24 shows that the Cronbach Alpha for the eight-items was 0.899, indicating a high 
degree of reliability  for the cognitive conflict construct. Similarly to the communication quality 
construct the Cronbach Alpha score could be increased by  omitting one item, specifically item 6 in 
Table 5.23 above. However, given the already  highly  reliable eight-item construct it was decided to 
retain all eight items.
Affective Conflict
 This was developed as a six-item measure using 5 items from Wang and Ong’s (2005) 
affective conflict measure and one item from Massey & Dawes’s (2007a) dysfunctional conflict 
measure. The items are reported in Table 5-25.
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Table 5-25. Affective Conflict Items
13  There are personality clashes on the board during decision making.
14  Board members do not get along very well.
15  Board members are not ready to co-operate. 
16  At least one board member is unhappy with a decision.
17  If one board member wins, another loses.
18  When in board meetings, tensions frequently run high
Table 5-26. Reliability Analysis for Affective Conflict
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
0.832 6
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted
Affective Conflict 1 10.24 23.648 0.568 0.816
Affective Conflict 2 11.11 25.565 0.677 0.795
Affective Conflict 3 11.15 24.469 0.707 0.786
Affective Conflict 4 10.56 23.997 0.634 0.799
Affective Conflict 5 10.99 23.873 0.591 0.809
Affective Conflict 6 11.10 27.047 0.495 0.826
  Table 5-26 shows the Cronbach Alpha for the six items was 0.832, indicating that the 
Affective Conflict construct is reliable.
Effort Norms
 This was developed as a four-item measure following the suggestions of Forbes & 
Milliken’s (1999) conceptual paper on board of directors. The items used are reported in Table 5-27.
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Table 5-27. Effort Norms Items
19  Board members carefully scrutinise the information provided prior to board meetings.
20  Board members research issues relevant to the company before attending board meetings.
21  Board members take notes during meetings.
22  Board members participate actively during meetings.
Table 5-28 shows that the Cronbach Alpha for the four items was 0.703 (>0.7), which just meets the 
normal criteria for acceptable reliability. Omitting item 21 from Table 5-27, increases the Cronbach 
Alpha measure of reliability to 0.792 making the three-item measure of effort norms a significantly 
more reliable construct. Thus, item 21 was omitted from the effort norms construct  leaving items 
19, 20 and 22  shown in Table 5-27.
Table 5-28. Reliability Analysis for Effort Norms
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
0.703 4
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted
Effort Norms 1 17.09 6.744 0.614 0.567
Effort Norms 2 17.47 5.814 0.698 0.495
Effort Norms 3 17.76 6.296 0.340 0.792
Effort Norms 4 16.55 9.018 0.481 0.682
The Use of Knowledge and Skills
 This was developed as a four-item measure following the suggestions of Forbes & Milliken 
(1999) and one item from Zona & Zattoni (2007). The items used are reported in Table 5-29.
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Table 5-29. The Use of Knowledge and Skills Items
23  People on this board are aware of each others’ areas of expertise.
24  When an issue is discussed, the most knowledgeable people generally have the most influence.
25  Task delegation on this board represents a good match between knowledge and responsibilities. 
26  Our board makes best use of board members’ knowledge and skills
Table 5-30 shows that the Cronbach Alpha for the four-items was 0.803, indicating that the Use of 
Knowledge and Skills construct is a reliable measure. Whilst dropping item 34 shown in Table 5.29 
increases the Cronbach Alpha score to 0.847 this improvement is not seen as significant given that 
the measure would be based on three items.
Table 5-30. Reliability Analysis for The Use of Knowledge and Skills
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
0.803 4
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted
Use of Knowledge 1 17.57 6.413 0.726 0.745
Use of Knowledge 2 18.39 5.502 0.458 0.847
Use of Knowledge 3 18.19 4.566 0.722 0.700
Use of Knowledge 4 17.93 5.324 0.702 0.714
  
Trust
 This was developed as a six-item measure using four items from Huff and Kelley (2003) and 
two items from Gillespie (2003). The items used are reported in Table 5-31.
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Table 5-31. Trust Items
27  There is a very high level of trust throughout the board.
28  In this board, executives have a great deal of trust in non-executives.
29  If a board member makes a promise, the board will always trust that the person will do his or her best to keep the promise. 
30  Non-executive board members trust that the senior managers will make good decisions.
31  Board members rely on others’ task related skills and abilities.
32  Board members rely on others’ work-related judgements.
Table 5-32. Reliability Analysis for Trust
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
0.888 6
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted
Trust 1 29.10 17.920 0.751 0.861
Trust 2 29.47 16.985 0.742 0.864
Trust 3 29.18 18.713 0.626 0.882
Trust 4 29.38 18.886 0.729 0.865
Trust 5 29.49 19.014 0.720 0.867
Trust 6 29.50 19.746 0.688 0.872
 Table 5-32 shows that  the Cronbach Alpha for the six-items was 0.888, indicating that the 
Trust construct is valid.
Summary of Reliability Analysis of Board Roles
 Reliability  analysis using Cronbach Alpha as the measure shows that all seven board 
processes, identified from board and small teams literature, are reliable. From the original items for 
each variable only one item was required to be dropped and that was for the Effort  Norms construct. 
Given that the items were primarily developed from existing validated constructs this result was 
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expected. The final variables, cohesiveness, communication quality, cognitive conflict, affective 
conflict, effort norms, trust, and the use of knowledge and skills were completed by the means of 
the items.
Board Role Performance
 Through the review of the board literature, it is generally accepted that the board of directors 
undertake three distinct roles: control, service and strategy. However, as reported in Chapter 4 
Model and Hypotheses Development, empirical testing of the roles is problematic. Whilst there is a 
clearly  accepted definition of the control role, this is not the case for the service and strategy roles. 
Thus, in order to check for validity and reliability of the constructs, exploratory factor analysis was 
undertaken as a first step in order to discover the underlying dimensions of board role performance. 
This was followed by a reliability analysis of the factors identified from the analysis.
Control, Service and Strategy Roles
 To measure the three board roles, items from previous research were used. The original ten-
item control role measure was developed using the original items from Wan & Ong (2005). The 
original nine-item service role measure was developed using the original items from Huse (2007). 
The original four-item strategy role measure was developed using the items from Huse (2007). 
However, given the concerns raised in previous literature, as reported in Chapter 4 Model and 
Hypotheses Development, with regard to the ambiguity  in the boundaries of strategy and service 
roles and the alternative terms used such as networking role, it was determined a factor analysis was 
necessary to analyse the interrelationships between the variables.
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Factor Analysis
 As shown in Table 5-33, when factor analysis was undertaken for the sample, the KMO 
(Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin) measure of sampling adequacy was 0.727, and the Bartlett test of sphericity 
was 1087.287, significant at p<0.01. The KMO measure of sampling adequacy is an index for 
comparing the magnitude of the observed correlation coefficients to the magnitudes of the partial 
correlation. If the sum of the squared partial correlation coefficients between all variables is small 
when compared to the sum of the squared correlation coefficients, the KMO measure is close to 1. 
According to Kaiser (1974), measures in the 0.80’s are meritorious and measures in the 0.70’s are 
middling. The KMO result of 0.727 is thus middling according to this classification. Burns & Burns 
(2008) suggest a KMO greater than 0.5 is suitable for a satisfactory factor analysis to proceed. 
Given the result of 0.727 (>0.5) it is acceptable to proceed with the factor analysis. 
Table 5-33. KMO Test for Board Role Performance
KMO and Bartlett's Test
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy.
0.727
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 1087.287
df 253
Sig. 0.000
 Bartlett’s test of sphericity is used to test the hypothesis that the correlation matrix is an 
identity  matrix, that is, all diagonal terms are 1 and all off-diagonal terms are 0. If the hypothesis 
that the population correlation matrix is an identity cannot be rejected because the significance level 
is large, the use of the factor model should be reconsidered (Hair et al., 1987). In this study  due to 
significance level less than 0.01, it is safe to employ the factor model. 
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 Factor analysis normally  proceeds in four steps. First, the correlation matrix between all 
variables is computed. Unrelated variables can be identified from the matrix and associated 
statistics. Secondly, factor extraction, the number of factors necessary to represent the data and the 
method for extracting them, must be determined. Thirdly, factor rotation is undertaken to achieve 
simpler and more meaningful factor solutions. According to Hair et al., (1987), rotation of factors 
should improve interpretation by reducing the ambiguities that may occur in initial unrotated factor 
solutions. Finally, factor scores, which can be used in various analyses, need to be computed. 
 Burns & Burns (2008) suggest that Principal Components Analysis (PCA) is the most 
common method employed by researchers to extract factors. In PCA, linear combinations of the 
observed variables are derives such that maximum variance is extracted from the variables (Burns 
& Burns, 2008; Hair et al., 1987). The first principal component is the combination that accounts 
for the largest amount of variance in the sample. The second principal component accounts for the 
next largest amount of variance and is uncorrelated with the first. Successive components describe 
progressively  smaller portions of the total sample variance, and all are uncorrelated with each other. 
In general, the PCA transforms a set of correlated variables to a set of uncorrelated variables 
(factors).
 To decide how many factors are needed to represent the data, there are two primary 
methods. The first method uses eigenvalues. The number of factors can be chosen using their 
eigenvalues, choosing those factors with the largest eigenvalues. Kaiser’s rule suggests that only 
factors having eigenvalues (latent roots) greater than 1 are considered as common factors. 
Components with eigenvalues greater than 1 are components that explain more variation than did an 
original item. The second method is to use Cattell’s (1978) scree test. In the scree test, a graph is 
made of the eigenvalues and principal components. The cut-off point for selection of the correct 
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number of factors is the point of inflexion where the variation accounted for by a factor may be so 
small that is simply due to error. 
 Although the factor matrix obtained in the extraction phase indicates the relationship 
between the factors and the individual variables, it is usually difficult to identify  meaningful factors 
based on this matrix (Burns & Burns, 2008). As a result, rotation is used to increase interpretability 
by rotating factors so that there is more discrimination between high and low loading variables. The 
varimax method is the most commonly  used method of rotation (Burns & Burns, 2008). Varimax 
attempts to isolate those variables that have a high loading on a single factor. 
 The data in Section 3 questions 1-20 from the questionnaire (See Appendix 1) were 
subjected to factor analysis to detect  the underlying dimensions on board roles. An examination of 
the scree plot shown in Figure 5.1  below suggested either a six-factor solution or a two-factor 
solution. There is a clear inflexion point after the second factor, at which point the plot begins to 
level off, thus indicating a two-factor solution. The two factor solution that was generated accounts 
for 47.608% of the variance (see Table 5.34). The two factors have eigenvalues greater than 2, thus 
reinforcing the suggestion that a two factor solution is present.
 Table 5-35. shows the factor loadings for the two-factor model. The first factor is largely 
made up of items from the service role construct (service role items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9), an 
additional two strategy role items (strategy role 1 and 2) and one control role item (control role 10). 
Strategy role item 2 is significantly  cross-loaded onto factor 2 (>0.35) and thus is removed from 
factor 1. Service role item 1 is also significantly  cross-loaded onto factor 2 (0.456>0.35) and 
excluded from factor 1. Similarly, control role item 10 has significant cross-loadings onto factor 2 
and is excluded from factor 1. Accordingly, the factor 1 construct was made up of 9 items, service 
role items 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 and strategy role item 1. The mix of what were originally 
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conceived as service role items and strategy role items in one factor underlines the previously 
discussed ambiguity  in board role definition. Given the vast majority of items identified in the 
factor 1 construct relate to the service role board this construct may be termed as the service role of 
the board
 The second factor is largely made up of items from the control role construct (control role 
items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9), and an additional two strategy role items (strategy role items 3 and 
4). However, control role item 8 and strategy roles 3 and 4 are significantly cross-loaded onto factor 
1 and thus are excluded from the factor 2 construct. Accordingly, the factor 2 construct consists of 
control role items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9. Thus, this factor 2 construct is termed the control role of 
the board.
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Figure 5.1. Factor Scree Plot for Board Roles
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Table 5-34. Factor Analysis for Board Roles, Varimax Rotation
Total 
Variance 
Explained
Component Initial 
Eigenvalues
Extraction 
Sums of 
Squared 
Loadings
Rotation 
Sums of 
Squared 
Loadings
Total % of 
Variance
Cumulative 
%
Total % of 
Variance
Cumulative 
%
Total % of 
Variance
Cumul
ative %
1 8.557 37.203 37.203 8.557 37.203 37.203 5.975 25.980 25.980
2 2.393 10.405 47.608 2.393 10.405 47.608 4.974 21.628 47.608
3 1.882 8.181 55.789
4 1.456 6.331 62.120
5 1.275 5.545 67.665
6 1.185 5.154 72.819
7 0.926 4.027 76.846
8 0.758 3.294 80.140
9 0.700 3.042 83.183
10 0.601 2.612 85.794
11 0.566 2.460 88.255
12 0.482 2.094 90.348
13 0.456 1.983 92.331
14 0.316 1.375 93.705
15 0.305 1.327 95.033
16 0.275 1.197 96.230
17 0.196 0.851 97.080
18 0.168 0.732 97.813
19 0.150 0.653 98.465
20 0.117 0.510 98.975
21 0.108 0.471 99.446
22 0.068 0.295 99.741
23 0.060 0.259 100.000
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Table 5-35. Rotated Component Matrix for Two-Factor Solution
Rotated Component Matrixa
Component
1 2
Service Role 7 0.808 0.078
Service Role 9 0.762 0.026
Service Role 8 0.755 0.041
Service Role 3 0.683 0.143
Service Role 1 0.648 0.456
Strategy Role 1 0.643 0.224
Strategy Role 2 0.609 0.454
Service Role 5 0.606 0.177
Service Role 4 0.568 0.145
Service Role 6 0.555 0.160
Control Role 10 0.508 0.463
Service Role 2 0.459 0.115
Control Role 7 0.302 0.752
Control Role 6 0.148 0.731
Control Role 5 0.032 0.681
Control Role 3 -0.042 0.678
Control Role 2 0.234 0.664
Control Role 8 0.512 0.605
Control Role 4 -0.006 0.589
Strategy Role 4 0.519 0.577
Control Role 9 0.291 0.518
Control Role 1 0.285 0.459
Strategy Role 3 0.406 0.431
Summary of Factor Analysis of Board Roles
 The factor analysis identified two board roles, service and control. Examining the factor 
loadings where values greater than 0.3 are considered significant, greater than 0.40 are considered 
very important and values greater than 0.50 are considered very significant (Hair et al., 1987), it 
would suggest that a number of items have significant cross-loadings (>0.3) and thus these are 
excluded from either construct. The first factor is predominately service role items and is thus 
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termed service role. Those items that have significant loadings on the service role factor, but also 
have significant loadings on the control role factor are service role 1, and control role 10. These are 
excluded from the first factor, the service role construct. This leaves the service role construct 
consisting of service role items 7, 9, 8, 3, 5, 4, 6, 2 and strategy role item 1. This section reports the 
results of reliability  testing for the items identified earlier in Section 5.4 above. The second factor 
comprises mainly control role items and is thus termed control role. As per the service role factor, a 
number of items are cross loaded from factor 2, control role onto factor 1, the service role. These 
are control role items 7 and 8 and strategy roles 3 and 4. This leaves the control role construct 
consisting of control role items 6, 5, 3, 2, 4, 9, and 1. 
Reliability Analysis of Board Roles
 The factor analysis outlined in the preceding section identified that the board undertakes two 
principal roles. The following section reports on the reliability analysis for the two roles identified: 
service role and control role. 
Service Role
 The items in the service role construct are 8 service role items from Huse (2007) plus one 
startegy role item from Huse (2007) and these are reported in Table 5-36.
200
Table 5-36. Service Role Items
12 Board members contribute with advice on legal and technical accounting issues.
13 Board members contribute with advice on financial issues (internal financing and investment).
14 Board members contribute with advice on technical issues (both production and information technology).
15 Board members contribute with advice on marketing issues. 
16 Our board and its board members act as mentors for the CEO and the firm.
17 Board members contribute to building networks.
18 Board members contribute to lobbying and building legitimacy.
19 The company and the board often take advantage of the board members’ networks to gather information/intelligence and advice.
21 Our board is involved in making decisions on the company’s long term strategies and main goals
Table 5-37. Reliability Analysis for Service Role Construct
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
0.843 9
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted
Service Role 7 44.21 44.083 0.695 0.816
Service Role 9 44.41 42.816 0.627 0.819
Service Role 8 44.65 42.003 0.651 0.816
Service Role 3 43.92 45.964 0.607 0.825
Service Role 5 45.03 41.828 0.560 0.827
Service Role 6 44.45 41.708 0.523 0.833
Service Role 4 44.93 42.095 0.530 0.831
Service Role 2 44.48 44.539 0.429 0.841
Strategy Role 1 43.82 46.609 0.541 0.830
Table 5-37 shows that the the Cronbach Alpha for the 9-items was 0.843, indicating that the Service 
Role construct was reliable.
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Control Role 
 The items in the control role construct are eight items from Wan & Ong (2005). The items 
are shown in table 5-38.
Table 5-38. Control Role Items
1  Board members monitor top management’s decisions and decision-making.
2  Board members evaluate the performance of top executives.   
3  The board has an internal mechanism to evaluate firm performance yearly.
4  Board members are formally evaluated by other board members.
5  Board members analyse budget allocation versus performance. 
6  Board members require information showing progress against targets.
9  Board members engage in succession planning for the CEO.
Table 5-39. Reliability Analysis for the Control Role Construct
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
0.741 7
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted
Control Role 6 35.28 26.147 0.524 0.712
Control Role 5 35.65 22.906 0.541 0.691
Control Role 3 35.53 24.844 0.507 0.705
Control Role 2 35.33 24.901 0.563 0.699
Control Role 4 36.56 18.560 0.441 0.752
Control Role 9 36.10 21.469 0.506 0.699
Control Role 1 35.56 25.743 0.404 0.722
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 Table 5-39 shows that  the Cronbach Alpha for the eight items was 0.741, indicating that the 
control role construct is a reliable measure. Whilst dropping control role item 4 shown in Table 5-37 
increases the Cronbach Alpha score to 0.752 this improvement is not substantial and the eight-item 
construct was retained.
Board Effectiveness
 Board Effectiveness is a relatively new construct, and was developed as a five-item measure 
drawn from Aguilera (2005), Bradshaw et al., (1992), Cornforth (2001), Denis & McConnell 
(2003), Green and Greisinger (1996), Huse (2005), and Langevoort (2001). The items are presented 
in Table 5-40. below.
Table 5-40. Board Effectiveness Items
1 Our board adds value to the company.
2 Our board improves company performance in the interest of shareholders.
3 Our board improves company performance in the interest of stakeholders.
4 Board members are satisfied with the board performance. 
5 Our board is satisfied with board members’ role performance. 
 Table 5-41 shows that the Cronbach Alpha for the five-items was 0.812 indicating that the 
board effectiveness construct is a reliable measure. However, dropping item 3 raises the Cronbach 
Alpha to 0.838 so given this is a new construct this increased reliability is seen as important thus the 
decision was taken to drop  item 3 from Table 5-39. This leaves a four-item measure of Board 
Effectiveness. In the previous section 5.3, checks for common method bias in relation to the board 
effectiveness measure were outlined. Therefore, to check the validity of the board effectiveness 
measure board effectiveness was regressed against a firm performance measure, ROCE. This 
showed that board effectiveness was directly related to ROCE, thus validating the board 
effectiveness measure.
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Table 5-41. Reliability Analysis for Board Effectiveness
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items
0.812 5
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted
Board Effectiveness 1 23.95 7.723 0.618 0.780
Board Effectiveness 2 24.04 7.382 0.676 0.763
Board Effectiveness 3 24.38 7.060 0.429 0.838
Board Effectiveness 4 24.54 6.033 0.685 0.749
Board Effectiveness 5 24.39 6.324 0.705 0.742
 
5.5. Summary of Chapter 5
 This chapter first reviewed the different research paradigms and their strengths and 
weakness in different types of studies, and identified the appropriate research design and 
methodology for this particular research. Due to the quantitative nature, this research is based on 
existing theories of corporate governance and board process research. To test research hypotheses, a 
survey questionnaire was employed to collect quantitative data to be subsequently analysed using 
SPSS. This chapter reported the process of research design, sampling, questionnaire design and 
administration, as well as response rate, non-response bias, common methods bias, and company 
profiles of respondents in a descriptive manner. Following this, a detailed description of the 
construction of the measurement scale was presented. The board governance orientation has two 
reliable constructs, resource dependency and stakeholder orientations, but two measures (Agency 
orientation and stewardship orientation) with low Cronbach Alphas indicating that they are not 
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reliable. Thus, it was not possible to test the hypotheses relating to firms having different board 
governance orientation. 
 The board governance process items drawn from previously validated constructs all have 
Cronbach Alphas greater than 0.7 and thus are deemed reliable. Factor analysis of the board roles 
suggested a two factor solution accounting for 47.608% of total variance. The two factors identified 
were the service role and control role of the board respectively. Whilst  the sample size for the factor 
analysis could be considered small, the KMO measure of 0.727 is deemed middling according to 
Kaiser (1974) and acceptable by Burns & Burns (2008). The reliability analysis of the service and 
control roles showed the Cronbach Alphas of the items derived from the factor analysis to be 
greater than 0.7 and thus acceptable.
 The new construct, board effectiveness made up  of four items from existing literature had a 
Cronbach Alpha of 0.838 and thus is deemed to be reliable (>0.70). 
 In summary, measures for board governance processes, the service role and control role of 
the board, and board effectiveness are seen to be reliable and thus allow further statistical analysis 
to test  for the relationships between these variables as hypothesised in Chapter 4 Model and 
Hypothesis. The next chapter will present the findings of the regression analysis to test these 
hypotheses.
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Chapter 6: 
Data Analysis: Results and Findings
6.1 Introduction
 Chapter 5 Research Design and Methodology reported data analysis of the measurement 
models of firm governance orientation, board governance processes (cohesiveness, communication 
quality, cognitive conflict, affective conflict, effort norms, trust, and the use of knowledge and 
skills), board role performance (control, service, and strategy), and board effectiveness. Chapter 6 
reports the results of the regression analysis undertaken to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 
4 Research Model and Hypotheses.
 As reported in Chapter 5 Research Design and Methodology, the construct developed for 
board governance orientation was not reliable for two of the proposed orientations, agency 
governance orientation and stewardship orientation. Consequently, it is not possible to test 
hypotheses 1-6 relating to board governance orientation and its impact on board role performance 
and board effectiveness. The remainder of this chapter will thus report on the results looking at the 
hypothesised relationships between the various board governance processes, board role 
performance and board effectiveness. 
 Chapter 5 Research Design and Methodology, reports that the factor analysis undertaken on 
the board role items identified two board roles, control and service as opposed to the three identified 
in Chapter 4 Research Model and Hypotheses. Given the lack of definitional and construct clarity  of 
board roles in previous conceptual and empirical research the fact that the results suggested two 
distinct roles is an interesting finding and consistent with the roles named in Forbes & Milliken’s 
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(1999) seminal paper. These results show that there is no clearly defined strategy role and thus this 
chapter will examine hypotheses 8 to 13 for the control role and service role only.
 The remainder of this chapter will thus report on the testing of the hypotheses relating to 
board governance processes (cohesiveness, communication quality, affective conflict, cognitive 
conflict, the use of knowledge and skills, and trust), board control and service roles and board 
effectiveness.
6.2. Measurements
Dependent Variables
 The dependent variable is board effectiveness. This is measured by using the mean of the 
four items developed in section 5.4. Board Effectiveness in the previous chapter. 
Independent Variables
 There are seven independent variables. These are cohesiveness, cognitive conflict, affective 
conflict, effort norms, the use of knowledge and skills, trust, and communication quality. These are 
all measured using the means of the items developed in section 6.3 Board Governance Processes.
Mediating Variables
 There are two mediating variables, control role performance and service role performance 
respectively. These are measured using the means of the items developed in section 6.4. Board Role 
Performance. 
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Control Variables
 There are a number of control variables used at the firm and board level similar to the 
approach of Minichilli et al. (2009). Firm size was controlled for at the firm level. Firm size was 
measured as number of employees. A logarithmic transformation was used to control for 
heteroskedasticity. Board demographics were controlled for at the board level: Board size, inside-
outside ratio, CEO duality, and board members’ shareholdings (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; 
Minnichilli et al., 2009). All the board control measures used information from the Hemscott 
financial database. Board size was measured as the number of directors. The inside-outside ratio 
was measured as the percentage of executive directors. CEO-Chair duality  was measured as a 
dummy variable (0 = Separate CEO-chair; 1 = Dual CEO-chair). Board shareholdings was 
measured as the shareholdings of directors as a percentage of total shareholdings in the company. 
6.3. Results
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6-1 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables in the model. Board size ranged from 3 to 
14 members with an average size of 7.19 members. The average inside-outside ratio was 43.93%. 
Few boards had a dual CEO-chair with the vast majority separating the roles as recommended by 
the UK Combined Code. Firm size ranged from 1 employee to 386,157 with an average firm size of 
11,976.15 employees. With regard to the other variables a number of aspects stand out. First, the 
control role performance has a higher mean and lower standard deviation than the service role 
performance. This suggests boards rate themselves highly when it comes to the control role 
functions of the board. Given the emphasis on control in the UK Combined Code awareness of their 
responsibilities in this role is perhaps not surprising. Second, the relatively low mean for affective 
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conflict suggests boards have relatively little relationship conflict that interferes with the business of 
the board.
Table 6-1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation
Board effectiveness 4.00 7.00 6.09 0.66
Control role 4.00 7.00 6.00 0.75
Service role 3.56 7.00 5.55 0.82
Cohesiveness 1.50 7.00 5.26 0.86
Cognitive conflict 3.38 7.00 6.30 0.60
Affective conflict 1.00 5.33 2.17 0.98
Communication quality 4.38 7.00 6.13 0.65
Effort norms 2.50 7.00 5.74 0.84
Trust 2.00 7.00 5.87 0.85
The use of knowledge & skills 2.50 7.00 6.01 0.75
Board size 3 14 7.19 2.51
Inside-outside ratio 0.00% 75.00% 43.93% 16.17
CEO-chair duality 0 1 0.07 0.254
Firm size (no. of employees) 1 386,157 11,976.15 48,361.69
Board shareholdings 0.025% 59.159% 10.82% 15.29
Correlation Analysis
The correlation analysis in Table 6-2 shows significant  correlations among the independent 
variables and among the control variables. This result may be of concern due to potential 
multicollinearity between the variables. In the regression analyses which are reported in the 
following sections, VIF statistics were all below 5, thus suggesting there was no multicollinearity 
problem (Burns and Burns, 2008).
209
Table 6-2 Correlation analysis among the variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. Board effectiveness
2. Control role 0.544**
SR3. Service role 0.472** 0.401**
4. Communication 
quality
0.610** 0.547** 0.486**
5. Trust 0.622** 0.505** 0.530** 0.640**
6. Knowledge & skills 0.655** 0.522** 0.628** 0.745** 0.782**
7. Effort norms 0.533** 0.580** 0.520** 0.580** 0.579** 0.547**
8. Affective conflict -0.402** -0.474** -0.152 -0.402** -0.393** -0.257* -0.436**
9. Cognitive conflict 0.743** 0.696** 0.462** 0.665** 0.682** 0.718** 0.627** -0.528**
10. Cohesiveness 0.404** 0.309** 0.282* 0.214 0.503** 0.451** 0.182 -0.179 0.588**
11. Board 
shareholdings
-0.049 -0.398** -0.140 -0.175 0.053 -0.006 -0.246* 0.198 -0.058 0.226
12. CEO-chair duality 0.166 -0.051 0.133 0.013 0.029 0.062 0.012 -0.024 0.101 0.184 0.258*
13. Inside ratio -0.192 -0.455** -0.043 -0.106 -0.040 -0.077 -0.199 0.278* -0.130 0.013 0.478** 0.256*
14. Board size 0.187 0.166 0.042 0.054 0.025 0.006 0.021 -0.267* 0.078 -0.141 -0.182 0.153 -0.192
15. Firm size 0.219 0.337** -0.021 0.140 0.103 0.108 0.125 -0.212 0.191 0.039 -0.442** -0.150 -0.644 0.594**
The table shows the Pearson correlation coefficient: *<0.05; **<0.01
Regression Analyses 
 To test  the relationships in the model and the hypotheses developed in Chapter 4: Research 
Model and Hypotheses Development, regression analysis was utilised.  
The Relationship between Board Control Role and Board Effectiveness
Table 6-3. Regression Analysis of Board Control Role and Board Effectiveness
Board Effectiveness
Board control role 0.544**
Adjusted R2 0.286
F change 29.499
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2, and the value and significance of 
the F change. The levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
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 The results in Table 6-3. show the testing of Hypothesis 7a that board control role 
performance is positively related to board effectiveness. The results show board control role is 
positively related to board effectiveness at the 1% level and thus Hypothesis 7a, board control role 
performance is positively related to board effectiveness is accepted.
The Relationship between Board Service Role and Board Effectiveness
Table 6-4. Regression Analysis of Board Service Role and Board Effectiveness
Board Effectiveness
Board control role 0.485**
Adjusted R2 0.211
F change 19.756
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2, and the value and significance of 
the F change. The levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
 The results in Table 6-3. show the testing of Hypothesis 7b that board service role 
performance is positively related to board effectiveness. The results show board service role is 
positively related to board effectiveness at the 1% level and thus Hypothesis 7b, board service role 
is positively related to board effectiveness is accepted.
The Relationship Between Cohesiveness, Board Control  Role, Board Service Role and Board 
Effectiveness
 To test the remaining hypotheses, regression analysis based on the Baron & Kenny (1986) 
method was conducted following three steps. First, the independent variable was regressed against 
the mediating variables. Second, the independent variable was regressed against the dependent 
variable. Finally, both the independent and mediating variables were regressed against the 
dependent variable. According to Baron & Kenny (1986), if all these conditions hold in the 
predicted direction, then the effect of the independent  variable on the dependent variable must be 
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less in the third step  than the second step. This procedure was followed to test the relationship 
between all the board processes (cohesiveness, cognitive conflict, affective conflict, effort norms, 
the use of knowledge and skills, trust, and communication quality) and board effectiveness 
mediated by  the control role and service role of the board respectively. The regression analyses for 
all three steps were undertaken for two different models. The first model excludes the control 
variables, and the second model includes the control variables for tables 6-6 onwards. 
Complementing the causal step approach of Baron & Kenny (1986), a Sobel test was conducted 
similar to the approach of De Jong & Elfring (2010), to determine the significance of the mediating 
variables for all the independent variables.
Table 6-5. Regression Analysis of Cohesiveness and Board Effectiveness
Board Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2
Cohesiveness 0.404**
Cohesiveness squared 0.308**
Adjusted R2 0.151 0.132
F change 13.662** 11.838**
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2, and the value and significance of 
the F change. The levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01 
 The results in Table 6-5. show the testing of Hypothesis 8a that board cohesiveness has a 
curvilinear relationship  with board effectiveness. In Model 1, the independent variable, 
cohesiveness was regressed against the dependent variable, board effectiveness. To check whether 
the relationship between cohesiveness and board effectiveness was a non-linear one, a second 
model was used. In Model 2, cohesiveness squared was regressed against board effectiveness. The 
results show that  the relationship could be either a linear or a non-linear one. This is a somewhat 
paradoxical outcome. However, this could potentially be explained by  both the relatively small 
sample and that cohesiveness had a low variance (=0.73). These results suggest the relationship 
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between cohesiveness and board effectiveness may be a linear one and potentially  a non-linear one. 
The outcome does however suggest that Hypothesis 8a, board cohesiveness has a curvilinear 
relationship with board effectiveness, cannot be wholly supported. 
Table 6-6. Regression Analysis of Cohesiveness, Board Control Role, Board Service Role, and 
Board Effectiveness
Control Role Service Role Board Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Cohesiveness 0.315** 0.267* 0.282** 0.299* 0.404** 0.291*
Board size 0.129 0.173 0.293
Inside-outside ratio -0.342* -0.054 -0.228
CEO-chair duality 0.064 0.115 -0.167
Board shareholdings -0.395** -0.299* -0.143
Firm size -0.155 -0.276 -0.180
Adjusted R2 0.086 0.287 0.066 0.081 0.151 0.147
F change 7.465** 5.487** 5.854* 1.986 13.662** 2.919*
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2, and the value and significance of 
the F change. The levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
 The results presented in Table 6-6. provide the outcomes to the first  two steps of the Baron 
& Kenny (1986) method of testing for mediation for both Model 1 and Model 2. In the first step, the 
independent variable, cohesiveness was regressed against  the mediating variables, control role and 
service role. In the second step, the independent variable, cohesiveness was regressed against the 
dependent variable, board effectiveness. In Model 1, the independent variable, cohesiveness was 
significantly and positively related to the mediating variables, control role (ß = 0.315, p < 0.01), 
service role (ß = 0.282, p < 0.01) and the dependent variable, board effectiveness (ß = 0.404, p < 
0.01). In Model 2, the independent variable, cohesiveness was significantly  and positively related to 
the mediating variables, control role (ß = 0.267, p  < 0.05), service role (ß = 0.299, p < 0.05) and the 
dependent variable, board effectiveness (ß = 0.291, p < 0.05). These results meet the first two 
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criteria to establish mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986): the independent variable affects the 
dependent variable, and the independent variable affects the mediator. In addition to the 
independent variable, cohesiveness being positively related to the control role, two of the control 
variables were found to be related the control role. First, the inside ratio was negatively related to 
the control role (ß = -0.342, p  < 0.05), suggesting that the greater the number of insiders on the 
board the less active the board is in undertaking their control role. This finding is similar to that 
predicted in agency theory  (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Second, the 
proportion of shares held by board members was also significantly  negatively related to the control 
role (ß = -0.392, p < 0.01). This result is expected because of incentive alignment, there is less need 
for monitoring.
Table 6-7. Regression Analysis of Cohesiveness, Board Control Role and Board Effectiveness
Board Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2
Cohesiveness 0.281* 0.174
Board size 0.237
Inside-outside ratio -0.078
CEO-chair duality 0.139
Board shareholdings 0.031
Firm size -0.112
Control Role 0.423** 0.439**
Adjusted R2 0.312 0.272
F change 16.674** 4.578**
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2, and the value and significance of 
the F change. The levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
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Table 6-8. Regression Analysis of Cohesiveness, Board Service Role and Board Effectiveness
Board Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2
Cohesiveness 0.307** 0.181
Board size 0.230
Inside-outside ratio -0.208
CEO-chair duality 0.125
Board shareholdings -0.033
Firm size -0.078
Service Role 0.378** 0.369**
Adjusted R2 0.282 0.259
F change 14.531** 4.354**
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2,  and the value of the F change. The 
levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
 The results presented in Tables 6-7. and 6-8. provides the outcome of the third step of the 
mediation testing. The independent variable, cohesiveness was regressed against each mediating 
variable, control role and service role and the dependent variable, board effectiveness. This was 
completed for both mediators separately. At this stage, according to Baron & Kenny (1986), the 
mediating variables must affect the dependent variable and that the effect of the independent 
variable on dependent variable must be less than that in the second stage. In both models 1 and 2, 
the mediating variables, control role (ß = 0.423, p < 0.01; ß = 0.439, p <  0.01) and service role (ß = 
0.378, p < 0.01; ß = 0.369, p < 0.01) were positively related to the dependent variable, board 
effectiveness. The results also show that the beta value for the independent variable, cohesiveness 
was lower when including the mediating variables, control role (ß = 0.281 < 0.404; 0.174 < 0.291) 
and service role (0.307 < 0.404) and (0.181 < 0.291). This, thus meets the criteria for mediation 
following Baron & Kenny’s (1986) causal step approach. Complementing this approach, the Sobel 
test was conducted to determine the significance of the mediated effect of cohesiveness on board 
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effectiveness via the board control role and the board service role. The results confirm the 
mediating effects of the board control role (z = 2.26 > 1.96, p  < 0.05), and the board service role (z 
= 2.00 > 1.96, p < 0.05). Together, these results suggest that the board control role and the board 
service role mediate the relationship between cohesiveness and board effectiveness, a pattern of 
results that supports Hypothesis 8b, the relationship between board cohesiveness and board 
effectiveness is mediated by the board control role and board service role.
The Relationship Between Communication Quality and Board Effectiveness
 The results presented in Table 6-9. provide the outcomes to the first  two steps of the Baron 
& Kenny (1986) method of testing for mediation for both Model 1 and Model 2. In the first step, the 
independent variable, communication quality was regressed against the mediating variables, control 
role and service role. In the second step, the independent variable, communication quality  was 
regressed against the dependent variable, board effectiveness. In Model 1, the independent variable, 
communication quality was significantly and positively related to the mediating variables, control 
role (ß = 0.532, p < 0.01), service role (ß = 0.486, p < 0.01) and the dependent variable, board 
effectiveness (ß = 0.610, p < 0.01). Similar results were found in Model 2. Communication quality 
was significantly  and positively related to the mediating variables, control role (ß = 0.452, p < 
0.01), service role (ß = 0.451, p  < 0.01) and the dependent variable, board effectiveness (ß = 0.567, 
p < 0.01). These results meet the first  two criteria to establish mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986): 
the independent variable affects the dependent variable, and the independent variable affects the 
mediator. In addition to the independent variable, communication quality  being positively related to 
the control role, one of the control variables were found to be related the control role. The inside 
ratio was negatively related to the control role (ß = -0.398, p < 0.01), suggesting that the greater the 
number of insiders on the board the less active the board is in undertaking their control role. This 
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finding is similar to that predicted in agency  theory  (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976).
Table 6-9. Regression Analysis of Communication Quality, Board Control Role, Board Service 
Role, and Board Effectiveness
Control Role Service Role Board Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Communication quality 0.532** 0.452** 0.486** 0.451** 0.610** 0.567**
Board size 0.040 0.083 0.179
Inside-outside ratio -0.398** -0.117 -0.289*
CEO-chair duality 0.072 0.142 -0.164
Board shareholdings -0.191 -0.118 0.133
Firm size -0.122 -0.253 -0.127
Adjusted R2 0.273 0.399 0.225 0.201 0.363 0.371
F change 27.240 8.523 21.050 3.816 42.088 7.694
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2,  and the value of the F change. The 
levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
Table 6-10. Regression Analysis of Communication Quality, Board Control Role and Board 
Effectiveness
Board Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2
Communication quality 0.463** 0.443**
Board size 0.168
Inside-outside ratio -0.179
CEO-chair duality 0.144
Board shareholdings 0.185
Firm size -0.093
Control Role 0.267* 0.274*
Adjusted R2 0.400 0.407
F change 24.320 7.663
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2,  and the value of the F change. The 
levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
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Table 6-11. Regression Analysis of Communication Quality, Board Service Role and Board 
Effectiveness
Board Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2
Communication Quality 0.486** 0.447**
Board size 0.174
Inside-outside ratio -0.264*
CEO-chair duality 0.153
Board shareholdings 0.087
Firm size -0.089
Service Role 0.235* 0.225*
Adjusted R2 0.385 0.401
F change 22.556 7.414
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2,  and the value of the F change. The 
levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
 The results presented in Tables 6-10. and 6-11. provides the outcome of the third step of the 
mediation testing. The independent variable, effort norms was regressed against each mediating 
variable, control role and service role and the dependent variable, board effectiveness. This was 
completed for both mediators separately. At this stage, according to Baron & Kenny (1986), the 
mediating variables must affect the dependent variable and that the effect of the independent 
variable on dependent variable must be less than that in the second stage. In both models 1 and 2, 
the mediating variables, control role (ß = 0.267, p < 0.05; ß = 0.274, p <  0.05) and service role (ß = 
0.235, p < 0.05; ß = 0.225, p < 0.05) were positively related to the dependent variable, board 
effectiveness. The results also show that the beta value for the independent variable, communication 
quality was lower when including the mediating variables, control role (ß = 0.463 < 0.610; 0.453 < 
0.567) and service role (0.486 < 0.610) and (0.447 < 0.567). This, thus meets the criteria for 
mediation following Baron & Kenny’s (1986) causal step approach. Complementing this approach, 
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the Sobel test was conducted to determine the significance of the mediated effect of affective 
conflict on board effectiveness via the board control role and the board service role. The results 
confirm the mediating effects of the board control role (z = 2.21 > 1.96, p < 0.05), and the board 
service role (z = 1.961 > 1.96, p  < 0.05). Together, these results suggest that the board control role 
and the board service role mediate the relationship between communication quality  and board 
effectiveness, a pattern of results that supports Hypothesis 9a, communication quality  is positively 
related to board effectiveness and Hypothesis 9b, the relationship  between communication quality 
and board effectiveness is mediated by the board’s control role and the board’s service role.
The Relationship Between Cognitive Conflict and Board Effectiveness
Table 6-12. Regression Analysis of Cognitive Conflict, Board Control Role, Board Service Role, 
and Board Effectiveness
Control Role Service Role Board Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Cognitive conflict 0.670** 0.652** 0.426** 0.409** 0.743** 0.661**
Board size -0.037 0.036 0.120
Inside-outside ratio -0.329** -0.078 -0.217
CEO-chair duality 0.026 0.129 -0.105
Board shareholdings -0.253** -0.195 0.088
Firm size -0.046 -0.209 -0.057
Adjusted R2 0.441 0.639 0.169 0.174 0.546 0.490
F change 56.248** 21.099** 15.080** 3.347** 87.528** 11.901**
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2,  and the value of the F change. The 
levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
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Table 6-13. Regression Analysis of Cognitive Conflict, Board Control Role and Board Effectiveness
Board Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2
Cognitive conflict 0.726** 0.680**
Board size 0.119
Inside-outside ratio -0.227
CEO-chair duality 0.105
Board shareholdings 0.080
Firm size -0.058
Control Role 0.026 -0.030
Adjusted R2 0.541 0.482
F change 42.173** 10.048**
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2,  and the value of the F change. The 
levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
Table 6-14. Regression Analysis of Cognitive Conflict, Board Service Role and Board 
Effectiveness
Board Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2
Cognitive conflict 0.653** 0.557**
Board size 0.122
Inside-outside ratio -0.204
CEO-chair duality 0.092
Board shareholdings 0.086
Firm size -0.025
Service Role 0.200* 0.211*
Adjusted R2 0.565 0.509
F change 45.736** 10.924**
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2,  and the value of the F change. The 
levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
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 The results presented in Table 6-12. provide the outcomes to the first two steps of the Baron 
& Kenny (1986) method of testing for mediation for both Model 1 and Model 2. In the first step, the 
independent variable, cognitive conflict was regressed against the mediating variables, control role 
and service role. In the second step, the independent variable, cognitive conflict was regressed 
against the dependent variable, board effectiveness. In Model 1, the independent variable, cognitive 
conflict is significantly  and positively  related to the mediating variables, control role (ß = 0.670, p  < 
0.01), service Role (ß = 0.426, p < 0.01) and the dependent variable, board effectiveness (ß = 0.743, 
p < 0.01). In Model 2, the independent variable, cognitive conflict is significantly and positively 
related to the mediating variables, control role (ß = 0.652, p  < 0.01), service role (ß = 0.409, p  < 
0.01) and the dependent variable, board effectiveness (ß = 0.661, p < 0.01). These results meet the 
first two criteria to establish mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986): the independent variable affects the 
dependent variable, and the independent variable affects the mediator. In addition to the 
independent variable, cognitive conflict being positively related to the control role, two of the 
control variables were found to be related the control role. First, the inside ratio was significantly 
negatively related to the control role (ß = -0.329, p < 0.01), suggesting that the greater the number 
of insiders on the board the less active the board is in undertaking their control role. This finding is 
again similar to that predicted in agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Second, the proportion of shares held by board members was also significantly negatively related to 
the control role (ß = -0.253, p < 0.01). This result is again expected as incentive alignment means 
there is less need for monitoring.
 The results presented in Tables 6-13. and 6-14. provides the outcome of the third step of the 
mediation testing. The independent variable, cognitive conflict was regressed against each 
mediating variable, control role and service role and the dependent variable, board effectiveness. 
This was completed for both mediators separately. At this stage, according to Baron & Kenny 
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(1986), the mediating variables must affect the dependent variable and that the effect of the 
independent variable on dependent variable must be less than that in the second stage. In both 
models 1 and 2, the mediating variable, control role was not significantly related to the dependent 
variable, board effectiveness.  Thus, the control role of the board was found not to be a mediating 
variable in the relationship between cognitive conflict and board effectiveness. Alternatively, the 
other mediating variable, service role (ß = 0.200, p < 0.05; ß = 0.211, p < 0.05) was positively 
related to the dependent variable, board effectiveness. The results also show that the beta value for 
the independent variable, cognitive conflict was lower when including the mediating variable, 
service role (0.653 < 0.743) and (0.557 < 0.661). This meets the criteria for mediation following 
Baron & Kenny’s (1986) causal step approach. Complementing this approach, the Sobel test was 
conducted to determine the significance of the mediated effect of cognitive conflict on board 
effectiveness via the board service role. The result suggested that the service role was not a 
significant mediator of the relationship between cognitive conflict and board effectiveness at the 
five per cent  level of significance, however was a significant mediator at the ten per cent  level (z = 
1.90 > 1.96, p < 0.1). These results clearly show that the board control role does not mediate the 
relationship  between cognitive conflict and board effectiveness. The result for the service role as 
mediator was less clear. The Baron & Kenny (1986) method supports the mediating effect of the 
board’s service role on the relationship  between cognitive conflict  and board effectiveness. The 
more stringent Sobel test result indicated that the mediating effect of the board service role was 
only significant at ten per cent. However, this result may be explained by the relatively small 
sample upon which the Sobel test was conducted and, that according to Preacher & Hayes (2004), 
the Sobel test is best suited to large samples. Thus, the Sobel test does not necessarily mean that the 
mediating effect of the board service role was not supported. Overall, the results indicate that 
Hypothesis 10a, board cognitive conflict is positively  related to board effectiveness was supported, 
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and Hypothesis 10b, the relationship between cognitive conflict  and board effectiveness is mediated 
by the board’s control role and the board’s service role was partially supported.
The Relationship Between Affective Conflict and Board Effectiveness
Table 6-15. Regression Analysis of Affective Conflict, Board Control Role, Board Service Role, 
and Board Effectiveness
Control Role Service Role Board Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Affective conflict -0.478** -0.362** -0.152 -0.084 -0.402** -0.259*
Board size -0.068 0.071 0.126
Inside-outside ratio -0.236 -0.079 -0.189
CEO-chair duality 0.104 0.175 -0.215
Board shareholdings -0.327** -0.235 -0.062
Firm size -0.028 -0.241 -0.089
Adjusted R2 0.217 0.342 0.009 0.000 0.150 0.119
F change 20.168 6.815 1.603 0.993 13.493 2.504
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2,  and the value of the F change. The 
levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
 The results presented in Table 6-15. provide the outcomes to the first two steps of the Baron 
& Kenny (1986) method of testing for mediation for both Model 1 and Model 2. In the first step, the 
independent variable, affective conflict was regressed against the mediating variables, control role 
and service role. In the second step, the independent variable, affective conflict was regressed 
against the dependent variable, board effectiveness. In Model 1, the independent variable, affective 
conflict was significantly and negatively  related to the mediating variable, control role (ß = -0.478, 
p < 0.01), and to the dependent variable, board effectiveness (ß = -0.402), but not to the other 
mediating variable, service role. In Model 2, similar results were obtained. Affective conflict was 
negatively related to the control role (ß = -0.362, p  < 0.01) and to board effectiveness (ß = -0.259, p 
< 0.05), but not  significantly  related to the service role. These results for the control role meet the 
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first two criteria to establish mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986): the independent variable affects the 
dependent variable, and the independent variable affects the mediator. In addition to the 
independent variable, affective conflict being negatively related to the control role, one of the 
control variables were found to be related the control role. The proportion of shares held by  board 
members was also significantly  negatively related to the control role (ß = -0.327, p < 0.01). This 
result is once again as expected. Greater incentive alignment reduces the need for monitoring.
Table 6-16. Regression Analysis of Affective Conflict, Board Control Role and Board Effectiveness
Board Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2
Affective conflict -0.188 -0.089
Board size 0.157
Inside-outside ratio -0.078
CEO-chair duality 0.166
Board shareholdings 0.092
Firm size -0.076
Control Role 0.425** 0.470**
Adjusted R2 0.272 0.252
F change 13.858 4.219
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2,  and the value of the F change. The 
levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
 The results presented in Tables 6-16. and 6-17. provides the outcome of the third step of the 
mediation testing. The independent variable, affective conflict was regressed against the mediating 
variable, control role and the dependent variable, board effectiveness. At this stage, according to 
Baron & Kenny (1986), the mediating variables must affect the dependent  variable and that the 
effect of the independent variable on dependent variable must be less than that in the second stage. 
In both models 1 and 2, the mediating variable, control role (ß = 0.425, p < 0.01; ß = 0.470, p  < 
0.01) was positively  related to the dependent variable, board effectiveness. The results also show 
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that the beta value for the independent variable, affective conflict  was lower when including the 
mediating variables, control role (ß = |0.188| < |0.402|; |0.089| <|0.259|). This, thus meets the criteria 
for mediation following Baron & Kenny’s (1986) causal step  approach. Complementing this 
approach, the Sobel test was conducted to determine the significance of the mediated effect of 
cohesiveness on board effectiveness via the board control role and the board service role. The 
results confirm the mediating effects of the board control role (z = -2.816 < -1.96, p < 0.01). 
Together, these results suggest that the board control role mediates the relationship between 
affective conflict and board effectiveness, but the board service role was found not to be a 
mediating variable. Overall, these results support  Hypotheses 10c, board affective conflict is 
negatively related to board effectiveness, and partially support Hypothesis 10d, the relationship 
between affective conflict and board effectiveness is mediated by the board’s control role and the 
board’s service role.
Table 6-17. Regression Analysis of Affective Conflict, Board Service Role and Board Effectiveness
Board Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2
Affective conflict -0.328** -0.224
Board size 0.060
Inside-outside ratio -0.157
CEO-chair duality -0.143
Board shareholdings 0.035
Firm size 0.011
Service Role 0.420** 0.413**
Adjusted R2 0.306 0.277
F change 16.183 4.673
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2,  and the value of the F change. The 
levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
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The Relationship Between Effort Norms and Board Effectiveness
Table 6-18. Regression Analysis of Effort Norms, Board Control Role, Board Service Role, and 
Board Effectiveness
Control Role Service Role Board Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Effort norms 0.562** 0.476** 0.520** 0.488** 0.533** 0.472**
Board size 0.033 0.077 0.180
Inside-outside ratio -0.319* -0.036 -0.209
CEO-chair duality 0.049 0.122 -0.148
Board shareholdings -0.159 -0.097 0.143
Firm size -0.046 -0.178 -0.058
Adjusted R2 0.306 0.416 0.259 0.228 0.274 0.255
F change 32.351 9.195 25.525 4.351 28.577 4.945
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2,  and the value of the F change. The 
levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
Table 6-19. Regression Analysis of Effort Norms, Board Control Role and Board Effectiveness
Board Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2
Effort norms 0.353** 0.302*
Board size 0.168
Inside-outside ratio -0.095
CEO-chair duality 0.130
Board shareholdings 0.200
Firm size -0.042
Control Role 0.315** 0.358*
Adjusted R2 0.330 0.320
F change 18.472 5.629
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2,  and the value of the F change. The 
levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
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Table 6-20. Regression Analysis of Effort Norms, Board Service Role and Board Effectiveness
Board Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2
Effort norms 0.399** 0.321*
Board size 0.176
Inside-outside ratio -0.204
CEO-chair duality 0.142
Board shareholdings 0.075
Firm size -0.037
Service Role 0.264* 0.277*
Adjusted R2 0.319 0.316
F change 17.418 5.490
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2,  and the value of the F change. The 
levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
 The results presented in Table 6-18. provide the outcomes to the first two steps of the Baron 
& Kenny (1986) method of testing for mediation for both Model 1 and Model 2. In the first step, the 
independent variable, effort norms was regressed against the mediating variables, control role and 
service role. In the second step, the independent variable, effort norms was regressed against the 
dependent variable, board effectiveness. In Model 1, the independent variable, effort norms was 
significantly and positively related to the mediating variables, control role (ß = 0.562, p < 0.01), 
service role (ß = 0.520, p < 0.01) and the dependent variable, board effectiveness (ß = 0.533, p < 
0.01). Similar results were found in Model 2. Effort norms was significantly and positively related 
to the mediating variables, control role (ß = 0.476, p  < 0.01), service role (ß = 0.488, p < 0.01) and 
the dependent variable, board effectiveness (ß = 0.472, p < 0.01). These results meet the first two 
criteria to establish mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986): the independent variable affects the 
dependent variable, and the independent variable affects the mediator. In addition to the 
independent variable, effort norms being positively related to the control role, one of the control 
variables were found to be related the control role. The inside ratio was negatively related to the 
227
control role (ß = -0.319, p < 0.05), suggesting that the greater the number of insiders on the board 
the less active the board is in undertaking their control role. This finding is similar to that predicted 
in agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
 The results presented in Tables 6-19. and 6-20. provides the outcome of the third step of the 
mediation testing. The independent variable, effort norms was regressed against each mediating 
variable, control role and service role and the dependent variable, board effectiveness. This was 
completed for both mediators separately. At this stage, according to Baron & Kenny (1986), the 
mediating variables must affect the dependent variable and that the effect of the independent 
variable on dependent variable must be less than that in the second stage. In both models 1 and 2, 
the mediating variables, control role (ß = 0.315, p < 0.01; ß = 0.358, p <  0.05) and service role (ß = 
0.264, p < 0.05; ß = 0.277, p < 0.05) were positively related to the dependent variable, board 
effectiveness. The results also show that the beta value for the independent variable, effort norms 
was lower when including the mediating variables, control role (ß = 0.353 < 0.533; 0.302 < 0.472) 
and service role (0.399 < 0.533) and (0.321 < 0.472). This, thus meets the criteria for mediation 
following Baron & Kenny’s (1986) causal step approach. Complementing this approach, the Sobel 
test was conducted to determine the significance of the mediated effect of effort norms on board 
effectiveness via the board control role and the board service role. The results confirm the 
mediating effects of the board control role (z = 2.44 > 1.96, p  < 0.05), and the board service role (z 
= 2.08 > 1.96, p < 0.05). Together, these results suggest that the board control role and the board 
service role mediate the relationship between effort norms and board effectiveness, a pattern of 
results that supports Hypotheses 11a, board effort norms are positively related to board 
effectiveness and Hypothesis 11b, the relationship between board effort norms and board 
effectiveness is mediated by the board’s control role and the board’s service role.
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The Relationship Between The Use of Knowledge & Skills and Board Effectiveness
Table 6-21. Regression Analysis of The Use of Knowledge & Skills, Board Control Role, Board 
Service Role, and Board Effectiveness
Control Role Service Role Board Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Use of knowledge & skills 0.496** 0.438** 0.628** 0.658** 0.655** 0.557**
Board size 0.006 0.019 0.141
Inside-outside ratio -0.354** -0.044 -0.228
CEO-chair duality 0.070 0.118 -0.161
Board shareholdings -0.267* -0.159 0.037
Firm size -0.043 -0.118 -0.30
Adjusted R2 0.235 0.395 0.386 0.449 0.421 0.364
F change 22.783 8.495 44.987 10.251 54.140 7.582
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2,  and the value of the F change. The 
levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
Table 6-22. Regression Analysis of The Use of Knowledge & Skills, Board Control Role and Board 
Effectiveness
Board Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2
The use of knowledge & skills 0.529** 0.432**
Board size 0.139
Inside-outside ratio -0.127
CEO-chair duality 0.141
Board shareholdings 0.113
Firm size -0.017
Control Role 0.251* 0.286*
Adjusted R2 0.460 0.404
F change 31.219 7.685
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2,  and the value of the F change. The 
levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
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Table 6-23. Regression Analysis of The Use of Knowledge & Skills, Board Service Role and Board 
Effectiveness
Board Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2
The use of knowledge & skills 0.575** 0.451**
Board size 0.152
Inside-outside ratio -0.227
CEO-chair duality 0.166
Board shareholdings 0.000
Firm size -0.036
Service Role 0.110 0.120
Adjusted R2 0.406 0.356
F change 24.904 6.376
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2,  and the value of the F change. The 
levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
 The results presented in Table 6-21. provide the outcomes to the first two steps of the Baron 
& Kenny (1986) method of testing for mediation for both Model 1 and Model 2. In the first step, the 
independent variable, the use of knowledge & skills was regressed against the mediating variables, 
control role and service role. In the second step, the independent variable, the use of knowledge & 
skills was regressed against the dependent  variable, board effectiveness. In Model 1, the 
independent variable, the use of knowledge & skills was significantly and positively  related to the 
mediating variables, control role (ß = 0.496, p < 0.01), service role (ß = 0.628, p < 0.01) and the 
dependent variable, board effectiveness (ß = 0.655, p < 0.01). Similar results were found in Model 
2. The use of knowledge & skills was significantly and positively related to the mediating variables, 
control role (ß = 0.438, p  < 0.01), service role (ß = 0.658, p < 0.01) and the dependent variable, 
board effectiveness (ß = 0.557, p  < 0.01). These results meet the first two criteria to establish 
mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986): the independent  variable affects the dependent variable, and the 
independent variable affects the mediator. In addition to the independent variable, the use of 
knowledge and skills being positively related to the control role, two of the control variables were 
found to be related the control role. First, the inside ratio was negatively related to the control role 
(ß = -0.354, p < 0.01), suggesting that the greater the number of insiders on the board the less active 
the board is in undertaking their control role. This finding is similar to that predicted in agency 
theory  (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Second, the proportion of shares held by 
board members was also significantly negatively related to the control role (ß = -0.267, p < 0.05). 
 The results presented in Tables 6-22. and 6-23. provides the outcome of the third step of the 
mediation testing. The independent variable, the use of knowledge & skills was regressed against 
each mediating variable, control role and service role and the dependent variable, board 
effectiveness. This was completed for both mediators separately. At this stage, according to Baron 
& Kenny (1986), the mediating variables must affect the dependent variable and that the effect of 
the independent variable on dependent variable must be less than that in the second stage. In both 
models 1 and 2,  the mediating variable, service role was not significantly related to the dependent 
variable, board effectiveness. Thus, the service role was not found to be a mediator of the 
relationship  between the use of knowledge & skills and board effectiveness. On the other hand, the 
other mediating variable, control role was significantly related to the dependent variable, board 
effectiveness (ß = 0.251, p < 0.05; ß = 0.286, p < 0.05).  The results also show that  the beta value 
for the independent variable, the use of knowledge & skills was lower when including the 
mediating variable, control role (0.529 < 0.655) and (0.432 < 0.557). This, thus meets the criteria 
for mediation following Baron & Kenny’s (1986) causal step  approach. Complementing this 
approach, the Sobel test was conducted to determine the significance of the mediated effect of the 
use of knowledge & skills on board effectiveness via the board control role. The result suggested 
that the control role was a significant mediator of the relationship between the use of knowledge & 
skills and board effectiveness at the five per cent level of significance (z = 2.21 > 1.96, p < 0.05). 
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Together, these results suggest that the board control role mediates the relationship between the use 
of knowledge & skills and board effectiveness, but the board service role was not a mediator. This, 
thus supports Hypothesis 12a, board use of knowledge and skills is positively  related to board 
effectiveness and partially  supports Hypothesis 12b, the relationship between the use of knowledge 
and skills and board effectiveness is mediated by  the board’s control role and the board’s service 
role.
The Relationship Between Trust and Board Effectiveness
Table 6-24. Regression Analysis of Trust, Board Control Role, Board Service Role, and Board 
Effectiveness
Control Role Service Role Board Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Trust 0.494** 0.432** 0.530** 0.552** 0.622** 0.518**
Board size -0.006 0.020 0.131
Inside-outside ratio -0.279* 0.008 -0.174
CEO-chair duality 0.096 0.162 -0.191
Board shareholdings -0.335** -0.243* -0.018
Firm size -0.011 -0.118 -0.010
Adjusted R2 0.233 0.386 0.271 0.315 0.378 0.311
F change 22.239 8.092 26.613 6.141 44.069 6.120
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2,  and the value of the F change. The 
levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
 The results presented in Table 6-24. provide the outcomes to the first two steps of the Baron 
& Kenny (1986) method of testing for mediation for both Model 1 and Model 2. In the first step, the 
independent variable, trust was regressed against the mediating variables, control role and service 
role. In the second step, the independent  variable, trust was regressed against the dependent 
variable, board effectiveness. In Model 1, the independent variable, trust was significantly and 
positively related to the mediating variables, control role (ß = 0.494, p < 0.01), service role (ß = 
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0.530, p < 0.01) and the dependent variable, board effectiveness (ß = 0.622, p < 0.01). Similar 
results were found in Model 2. Trust  was significantly and positively related to the mediating 
variables, control role (ß = 0.432, p < 0.01), service role (ß = 0.552, p < 0.01) and the dependent 
variable, board effectiveness (ß = 0.518, p  < 0.01). These results meet the first two criteria to 
establish mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986): the independent variable affects the dependent 
variable, and the independent variable affects the mediator. In addition to the independent variable, 
trust being positively  related to the control role, two of the control variables were found to be 
related the control role. First, the inside ratio was negatively related to the control role (ß = -0.279, 
p < 0.05), suggesting that the greater the number of insiders on the board the less active the board is 
in undertaking their control role. This finding is similar to that predicted in agency theory (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Second, the proportion of shares held by board members 
was also significantly negatively related to the control role (ß = -0.335, p < 0.01).
Table 6-25. Regression Analysis of Trust, Board Control Role and Board Effectiveness
Board Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2
Trust 0.490** 0.379**
Board size 0.133
Inside-outside ratio -0.084
CEO-chair duality 0.160
Board shareholdings 0.090
Firm size -0.007
Control Role 0.268* 0.323*
Adjusted R2 0.425 0.365
F change 26.836 6.584
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2,  and the value of the F change. The 
levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
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Table 6-26. Regression Analysis of Trust, Board Service Role and Board Effectiveness
Board Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2
Trust 0.507** 0.378**
Board size 0.144
Inside-outside ratio -0.179
CEO-chair duality 0.180
Board shareholdings -0.038
Firm size -0.011
Service Role 0.201 0.210
Adjusted R2 0.388 0.336
F change 22.860 5.853
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2,  and the value of the F change. The 
levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
  The results presented in Tables 6-25. and 6-26. provides the outcome of the third step  of the 
mediation testing. The independent variable, trust was regressed against each mediating variable, 
control role and service role and the dependent variable, board effectiveness. This was completed 
for both mediators separately. At this stage, according to Baron & Kenny (1986), the mediating 
variables must affect the dependent variable and that the effect of the independent variable on 
dependent variable must be less than that in the second stage. In both models 1 and 2,  the 
mediating variable, service role was not significantly related to the dependent variable, board 
effectiveness.  Thus, the service role was not found to be a mediator of the relationship between the 
trust and board effectiveness. On the other hand, the other mediating variable, control role was 
significantly related to the dependent variable, board effectiveness (ß = 0.268, p  < 0.05; ß = 0.323, p 
< 0.05).  The results also show that the beta value for the independent variable, trust was lower 
when including the mediating variable, control role (0.490 < 0.622) and (0.379 < 0.518). This, thus 
meets the criteria for mediation following Baron & Kenny’s (1986) causal step approach. 
Complementing this approach, the Sobel test  was conducted to determine the significance of the 
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mediated effect of trust on board effectiveness via the board control role. The result suggested that 
the control role was a significant  mediator of the relationship between trust and board effectiveness 
at the five per cent level of significance (z = 2.26 > 1.96, p  < 0.05). Together, these results suggest 
that the board control role mediates the relationship between trust and board effectiveness, but the 
board service role was not a mediator. This supports Hypothesis 13a, board trust is positively 
related to board effectiveness, and partially supports Hypothesis 13b, the relationship between 
board trust and board effectiveness is mediated by the board’s control role and the board’s service 
role.
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Summary of Hypothesis Testing
Table 6-27. Summary of Hypotheses
Hypothesis Result
H7a: Board control role is positively related to board effectiveness Supported
H7b: Board service role is positively related to board effectiveness Supported
H8a: Board cohesiveness has a curvilinear relationship with board effectiveness Not supported
H8b: The relationship between board cohesiveness and board effectiveness is mediated 
by the board control role performance and service role performance Supported
H9a: Communication quality is positively related to board effectiveness Supported
H9b: The relationship between communication quality and board effectiveness is 
mediated by the board control role performance and service role performance Supported
H10a: Board cognitive conflict is positively related to board effectiveness Supported
H10b: The relationship between cognitive conflict and board effectiveness is mediated 
by the board control role performance and service role performance Partly supported
H10c: Board affective conflict is negatively related to board effectiveness Supported
H10d: The relationship between board affective conflict and board effectiveness is 
mediated by the board control role performance and service role performance Partly supported
H11a: Board effort norms are positively related to board effectiveness Supported
H11b: The relationship between board effort norms and board effectiveness is mediated 
by the board control role performance and service role performance Supported
H12a: Board use of knowledge & skills is positively related to board effectiveness Supported
H12b: The relationship between board use of knowledge & skills and board effectiveness 
is mediated by the board control role performance and service role performance Partly supported
H13a: Board trust is positively related to board effectiveness Supported
H13b: The relationship between board trust and board effectiveness is mediated by the 
board control role performance and service role performance Partly supported
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Relationship between Board Governance Processes, Board Structural  Characteristics, Board 
Role Performance, and Board Effectiveness
 The previous analysis has examined the impact of each board process in isolation and tested 
the mediated relationship between individual board processes and board effectiveness. However, the 
processes in the boardroom do not exist in isolation. The following section will, therefore, use a 
multiple regression analysis to examine whether the structural (i.e. control) variables or process 
variables provide a better explanation for board role performance and board effectiveness.
Table 6-28. Regression Analysis of Board Governance Processes, Board Structural Characteristics, 
Board Role Performance and Board Effectiveness
Board Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2
Board size 0.201 0.163
Inside-outside ratio -0.299 -0.266
CEO-chair duality 0.195 0.120
Board shareholdings 0.028 0.044
Firm size -0.145 -0.070
Cohesiveness -0.023
Cognitive conflict 0.575**
Affective conflict 0.118
Effort norms 0.025
The use of knowledge & skills 0.101
Trust 0.109
Communication quality 0.082
Control role -0.117
Service role 0.064
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.480
F change 1.684 5.220**
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2,  and the value of the F change. The 
levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
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 Table 6-28 shows the relationship between all the board governance processes, control role 
performance, service role performance, and board effectiveness. Model 1 includes only  the control 
variables, whilst model 2 includes the control variables, independent variables, and mediating 
variables variables. Model 1 with a very low adjusted R square of 0.047 and an insignificant F 
change of 1.684 shows that the control variables have no significant impact upon board 
effectiveness. Model 2 is significant, however, with an adjusted R square of 0.480 and a significant 
F change of 5.220. These results show that the board processes have more explanatory power of 
board effectiveness than board structural characteristics. Furthermore, Model 2 shows that  the key 
variable explaining board effectiveness is cognitive conflict, i.e., critical debate between board 
members is key  criterion of effective boards. These results for the service and control roles are not 
surprising given the preceding analysis that these are mediating processes through which board 
effectiveness is either enhanced or ameliorated. 
Relationship between Board Governance Processes, Board Structural Characteristics, and 
Board Control Role Performance
 Table 6-29 shows the relationship  between all the board governance processes and the board 
control role performance. Model 1 includes the control variables, whereas Model 2 includes the 
control variables, and independent variables. Model 1 has an adjusted R square of 0.202 and a 
significant F change of 4.497. This is principally due to two significant structural variables, inside-
outside ratio and board shareholdings, which are inversely  related to the control role performance. 
Model 2 has a higher adjusted R square of 0.613 and a significant F change of 9.451. These results 
show that whilst board structural variables have an impact on the board control role performance, 
the board processes increase the strength of the model significantly. The results show that the key 
board process explaining the control role performance of the board is cognitive conflict. 
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Table 6-29. Regression Analysis of Board Governance Processes, Board Structural Characteristics 
and Board Control Role Performance
Control Role
Model 1 Model 2
Board size 0.054 -0.057
Inside-outside ratio -0.410** -0.261*
CEO-chair duality 0.097 0.044
Board shareholdings -0.274* -0.265*
Firm size -0.133 -0.006
Cohesiveness -0.062
Cognitive conflict 0.568**
Affective conflict -0.042
Effort norms 0.075
The use of knowledge & skills 0.127
Trust 0.058
Communication quality -0.115
Adjusted R2 0.202 0.613
F change 4.497** 9.451**
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2,  and the value of the F change. The 
levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
Relationship between Board Governance Processes, Board Structural Characteristics, and 
Board Service Role Performance
 Table 6.30 shows the relationship between all the board governance processes and the board 
service role performance. Model 1 includes the control variables, whereas Model 2 includes the 
control variables and the independent variables. Model 1 has a very low adjusted R square of 0.008 
and an insignificant F change of 1.116, whereas Model 2 has a much higher adjusted et al.,R square 
of 0.480 and a significant F change of 5.933. These results show that the board processes are more 
significant explanatory variables of board service role performance than board structural 
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characteristics. Specifically, the key board process explaining the service role performance of the 
board is the use of knowledge and skills.
Table 6-30. Regression Analysis of Board Governance Processes, Board Structural Characteristics 
and Board Service Role Performance
Service Role
Model 1 Model 2
Board size 0.103 0.073
Inside-outside ratio -0.128 0.044
CEO-chair duality 0.178 0.100
Board shareholdings -0.232 -0.219
Firm size -0.274 -0.089
Cohesiveness 0.131
Cognitive conflict -0.038
Affective conflict 0.085
Effort norms 0.250
The use of knowledge & skills 0.582**
Trust 0.142
Communication quality -0.192
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.480
F change 1.116 5.933**
Note: The table shows the standardised coefficients (ß), the value of the adjusted R2,  and the value of the F change. The 
levels of significance are *<0.05; **<0.01
 
6.4. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 6
 This chapter has presented the results of the hypotheses testing conducted to investigate the 
relationships between various board governance processes, board role performance and board 
effectiveness. The findings suggest that all the primary hypotheses between board governance 
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processes and board effectiveness are supported with one exception. It could not be determined that 
cohesiveness has a curvilinear relationship  with board effectiveness. The results suggested that the 
relationship  could either be a linear one or a curvilinear one. In addition, the hypotheses regarding 
the mediating roles of board control role performance and board service role performance are either 
fully  supported or partially  supported in all cases. The final finding is that in examining the 
relationship  between the board processes and the board control role performance one or two of the 
control variables, the inside ratio and the percentage of shares held by board members were found 
to be significantly  negatively related to board control role performance. The next chapter will 
provide a discussion relating these findings to existing knowledge of board structure, board 
processes, and board outcomes.
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CHAPTER 7: 
DISCUSSION
7.1. Introduction
 Chapter 6 reported the results of the testing of the hypotheses regarding the relationship 
between board governance processes (cohesiveness, communication quality, cognitive conflict, 
affective conflict, effort norms, trust, and the use of knowledge & skills) and board effectiveness 
mediated by the control role performance and the service role performance of the board. In Chapter 
7, the findings will be discussed, identifying contributions to knowledge and outlining implications 
for board theory and board practice. 
 There are a number of implications for theory arising from the findings. First, the study 
shows that board processes are greater predictors of board service role performance and board 
effectiveness than board structural characteristics. Second, the study shows that both board 
processes and two agency theoretic predictors help  explain board control role performance. Third, 
by examining multiple board mechanisms, this study provides a more comprehensive treatment of 
the behaviours that may influence board outcomes than previous research. Fourth, a new measure of 
board effectiveness is used. Fifth, the study finds that cognitive conflict  is a key predictor of board 
control role performance and board effectiveness, whereas the use of knowledge & skills is a key 
predictor of board service role performance. Sixth, this study  finds that boards primarily  undertake 
two distinct roles, control and service. These findings have implications for board practice and 
board policy. This chapter will discuss these findings and will be structured as follows. In Section 
7.2, the implications for theory outlined above will be discussed in detail. In Section 7.3, the 
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implications for board practice and board policy will be highlighted. In Section 7.4, a summary of 
the findings will be presented. 
7.2. Implications for Board Theory
 The research findings have various implications for theories of corporate governance and 
our understanding of board effectiveness. First, the study shows that the identified board process 
variables are greater predictors of board effectiveness than board structural variables, although a 
small number of the structural variables affect board control role performance. Second, by 
examining multiple board mechanisms this study provides a more comprehensive treatment of 
board effectiveness than previous research. Third, this study provides a new measure of board 
effectiveness and finds that board control role performance and board service role performance are 
mediators of the relationship  between the majority of board processes and board effectiveness. 
Fourth, the results show that cognitive conflict is a key determinant of board control role 
performance and board effectiveness, whilst the use of knowledge and skills is the primary 
explanatory  variable of board service role performance. Fifth, the results show that boards primarily 
undertake two roles, control and service. Sixth, the self evaluation statement in the questionnaire 
suggests boards have different board governance orientations. The implications of each of these 
findings for board theory will be further explored in this section.
Process Versus Structure
 The majority of previous board studies use input-output measures with inconclusive results. 
This study  focused on the relationship between process-output relationships, but also examined 
inputs. The results show that board processes are greater predictors of board control role 
performance, board service role performance and board effectiveness than board structural 
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characteristics. Specifically, when examined separately, six board processes (cohesiveness, 
communications quality, cognitive conflict, effort norms, the use of knowledge & skills, and trust) 
positively affect  board service role performance and board effectiveness, whilst affective conflict 
negatively affects board effectiveness. This finding supports the findings of other more recent 
studies on boards of directors (Minichilli et al., 2009; Van den Heuvel et al., 2006; Van Ees et al., 
2008; Zona & Zattoni, 2007), but also generates new insights. This research provides evidence that 
various board processes affect board effectiveness, via either, or both, the control role performance 
and the service role performance of the board. 
The Relationship between Cohesiveness and Board Effectiveness
Cohesiveness
Control Role
Service Role
Board 
Effectiveness
Control Variables:
Inside-outside ratio 
(ß = -0.342*)
Board shareholdings 
(ß = -0.395**)
ß = 0.267*
ß = 0.299*
ß = 0.439**
Note: ** shows significance at 1% level, * shows significance at 5% level
ß = 0.291*
ß = 0.369**
Control Variable: 
Board shareholdings 
(ß = -0.299*)
Figure 7-1. Model of the Mediated Relationship between Cohesiveness and Board Effectiveness
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 Figure 7-1. shows that both the control role performance and the service role performance 
mediates the relationship between cohesiveness and board effectiveness. There are a number of 
interesting dimensions to the findings of the relationship  between cohesiveness and board 
effectiveness. First, the relationship between cohesiveness and board effectiveness was found to be 
both a linear one and potentially  a non-linear one. The small team literature (Janis 1983; Mullen & 
Copper, 1994) suggests that the link between cohesiveness and team performance (or effectiveness) 
is not a simple one as very high levels of cohesiveness may be viewed as an antecedent of 
groupthink and thus lead to a reduction in the quality of decision-making. The results of this study 
do not fully support the view that very high levels of cohesiveness are detrimental to board 
effectiveness, but they  are similar to the findings of Beal et al., (2003) who found a positive 
relationship  between cohesiveness and small group performance. The results in this study  may, 
however, be due to the relatively small sample and that  the response to the cohesiveness measure 
had a low variance (=0.73). 
 Second, both the control role performance and the service role performance mediates the 
relationship  between cohesiveness and board effectiveness. Previous board process research has 
usually  defined board performance as its ability to carry out its various roles or tasks. Thus, to 
measure board performance researchers have simply measured the boards’ ability to carry out  its 
various roles or tasks (Minichilli et al., 2009; Van Ees et al., 2008; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). This 
research measures board role performance separately  from board effectiveness and thus is able to 
show that board role (or task) performance is a mediator of the relationship between cohesiveness 
and board effectiveness. This study thus advances research on boards through the provision of 
evidence that board roles are mediators of the board processes-board effectiveness relationship. 
This is an important finding for theory development and its importance will continue to be shown in 
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considering the relationship between other board governance processes and board effectiveness in 
the rest of this section. 
 Third, two of the control variables (insider ratio and proportion of shares held by  the board) 
were found to negatively affect  the boards’ control role performance. These results are different to 
most of the previous studies examining the impact of board processes on board performance (e.g., 
Minichilli et al., 2009; Van den Heuvel et al., 2006; Van Ees et al., 2008; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). 
These findings are supportive of two agency  theoretic recommendations for boards, that  board 
performance is enhanced by  more outside directors and where board members are more closely 
aligned to firm performance through ownership of board shares. However, whether the results show 
that simply increasing the proportion of outside directors improves board control role performance 
or that outside directors affect the cohesiveness of the board is unclear and would require further 
study. These results are replicated for other board processes and further discussion will take place 
during this section. Unique to cohesiveness, one control variable, the proportion of shares held by 
the board was negatively related to the service role performance of the board. This suggests board 
members with higher proportions of shares play less of a service role than those with a lower 
proportion. The shareholdings of board members may also affect the cohesiveness of the board 
more than for other processes. The other control variables (board size, inside-outside ratio, CEO-
chair duality, firm size. were not found to affect the service role performance of the board for 
cohesiveness. For all the other board processes all the control variables were insignificant.   
The Relationship between Communication Quality and Board Effectiveness
 Figure 7-2. shows that both the control role performance and the service role performance 
mediates the relationship between communication quality and board effectiveness. The relationship 
between communication quality and board effectiveness has lower beta values of 0.453 when the 
246
control role performance is included and 0.447 when the service role performance is included, thus 
meeting the Baron & Kenny (1986) test for mediation. 
Communication 
Quality
Control Role
Service Role
Board 
Effectiveness
Control Variables:
Inside-outside ratio 
(ß = -0.398**)
ß = 0.452**
ß = 0.451**
ß = 0.274*
ß = 0.225*
Note: ** shows significance at 1% level, * shows significance at 5% level
ß = 0.567**
ß = -0.289*
Figure 7-2. Model of the Mediated Relationship between Communication Quality  and Board 
Effectiveness
 The findings that good communication quality had a positive outcome for the boards’ 
control and service role performance and board effectiveness is not surprising and supports previous 
research showing the benefits of good communications quality (Eisenhardt et  al., 1997; Jehn, 1995; 
Maltz & Kohli, 1996; Massey  & Dawes, 1997; Menon et al., 1999). This finding, whilst not 
unexpected, is a notable contribution to research on boards. Previous studies (e.g., Payne et al., 
2009) have shown the benefits of good information for the effectiveness of boards, no study to my 
knowledge has examined the effects of communication quality. This finding highlights the 
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importance of the quality  of communications for the effective working of a board and suggests 
more work is required on the antecedents of communications quality is required in order to better 
understand the process.
 A further finding of note with regard to the relationship  between communications quality, 
board control role, and board effectiveness is the influence of the inside-outside ratio. The insider 
ratio was significantly inversely related to the board’s control role performance and board 
effectiveness. This suggests boards with more outsiders better perform their control role tasks and 
are more effective. However, it is unclear without further study whether the insider ratio influences 
performance outcomes or communication quality itself. 
The Relationship between Cognitive Conflict and Board Effectiveness
 Figure 7-3. shows that the service role performance mediates the relationship between 
cognitive conflict and board effectiveness. The relationship between cognitive conflict and board 
effectiveness has a lower beta value (ß = 0.557) when the service role performance is included in 
the model, thus meeting the Baron & Kenny (1986) criterion for mediation. Interestingly, the 
control role performance of the board was not found to be a mediating variable between cognitive 
conflict and board effectiveness although cognitive conflict does have a significant positive affect 
on the control role performance of the board. The results suggest that cognitive conflict has a direct 
affect on both the control role performance of the board and board effectiveness. The high beta 
value (> 0.6) suggests cognitive conflict  is an important explanatory variable for board 
effectiveness and this particular finding will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
 Similar to the cohesiveness result, two control variables: the insider-outsider ratio and 
proportion of shares held by the board, were found to be significantly negatively related to the 
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control role performance of the board. This finding will be discussed in more detail later in this 
section.
Cognitive Conflict
Control Role
Service Role
Board 
Effectiveness
Control Variables:
Inside-outside ratio 
(ß = -0.329**)
Board shareholdings 
(ß = -0.253**)
ß = 0.652**
ß = 0.409**
ß = 0.211*
Note: ** shows significance at 1% level, * shows significance at 5% level
ß = 0.661**
Figure 7-3. Model of the Mediated Relationship between Cognitive Conflict  and Board 
Effectiveness
The Relationship between Affective Conflict and Board Effectiveness
 Figure 7-4. shows that the control role performance mediates the negative relationship 
between affective conflict and board effectiveness. The relationship  between affective conflict and 
board effectiveness has a lower absolute beta value (ß = -0.089) when the control role performance 
is included in the model, thus meeting the Baron & Kenny (1986) criterion for mediation. 
Interestingly, there was no relationship  found between affective conflict and the service role 
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performance of the board. Whilst it is expected that personal conflicts may impede a board’s ability 
to undertake its control role, one would expect that  such personal conflicts would similarly lessen 
the board’s ability to undertake its service role (Amason, 1996; Jehn, 1997). The lack of a 
significant negative relationship  between affective conflict and the service role of the board may be 
explained by an intervening variable influencing the emotions resulting from affective conflict as 
opposed to affective conflict itself. However, given that personal animosity is likely  to make teams 
less effective the negative relationship between affective conflict and board effectiveness is an 
expected outcome and follows the findings of various team studies (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; 
Langfred, 2007; Li & Hambrick, 2005). 
Affective Conflict
Control Role
Board 
Effectiveness
Control Variables:
Board shareholdings 
(ß = -0.327**)
ß = -0.362**
ß = 0.470**
Note: ** shows significance at 1% level, * shows significance at 5% level
ß = -0.259*
Service Role
ß = 0.413**
Figure 7-4. Model of the Mediated Relationship between Affective Conflict and Board 
Effectiveness
250
 This research provides a unique contribution to research on boards in investigating both 
cognitive conflict  and affective conflict, and in particular finding that they have distinctly different 
outcomes. Previous team studies have found that affective conflict is positively correlated with 
cognitive conflict and that higher levels of task-related (cognitive) conflict can lead to higher 
relationship  (affective) conflict (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003). This study finds that cognitive conflict 
and affective conflict are distinct concepts and that they have significantly  different outcomes. 
Previous studies on conflict also showed that they are distinctive (from factor analyses) but 
nevertheless correlated. For example Minichill et al., (2009) and Zona & Zattoni, (2007) argued that 
their possibly  inconclusive results relating the cognitive conflict and board task performance could 
be explained because of the mitigating impact  of affective conflict  (which they did not measure). 
This study contributes to knowledge on boards by measuring cognitive conflict and affective 
conflict separately and finding that cognitive conflict  enhances the service role performance of the 
board and board effectiveness, whereas affective conflict negatively affects the control role 
performance of the board and board effectiveness.  This is an important finding for theory because 
it suggests that cognitive conflict and affective conflict are distinct concepts and that they have 
different outcomes. 
 An additional finding is that one of the control variables, the proportion of shares held by the 
board was inversely related to the control role performance of the board. This suggests that boards 
which hold higher proportions of shares are aligned to shareholders and thus do not require board 
members to actively control the actions of the executive (Himmelberg et al., 1999; Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990). This will be discussed further later in this section.
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The Relationship between Effort Norms and Board Effectiveness
 Figure 7-5. shows that both the control role performance and the service role performance 
mediates the relationship between effort norms and board effectiveness. The relationship between 
effort norms and board effectiveness has lower beta values of 0.302 when the control role 
performance is included and 0.321when the service role performance is included, thus meeting the 
Baron & Kenny (1986) test for mediation. The findings that higher levels of effort had a positive 
outcome for the boards’ control and service role performance and board effectiveness supports the 
results of some prior studies (e.g., Minichill et al., 2010; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). However, this 
result is counter to the findings of Van Ees et al., (2008) who found that effort norms were not 
associated with board role performance. This difference may best be explained by  the alternative 
definitions and measures of board role performance used in the two studies and/or by  country 
differences. First, the different measures of board role performance. In their study, Van Ees et  al., 
(2008) defined board role performance as encompassing two roles, monitoring and strategy. In this 
research, as discussed in Chapter 5 Research Methodology  and Design, two board roles were found, 
control (or monitoring) and service. However, this difference is largely semantics in that the items 
used in the Van Ees et al., (2008) strategy role construct were similar to those used in the service 
role construct in this piece of research. However, there were additional items used in the service 
role construct in this thesis, thus there is no direct comparison and this may partly explain the 
different findings. Second, the findings may simply reflect country differences. The Van Ees et al., 
(2008) study was based on companies in the Netherlands whereas this study was in the United 
Kingdom. Such country differences may have an important  effect, but different contingencies was 
not the focus of this study.  
 An additional noteworthy  finding is that the insider ratio was significantly inversely  related 
to the board’s control role performance. This suggests that boards with more outsiders better 
252
perform their control role tasks and are more effective. However, similarly to the findings on 
previous board processes it is unclear without further study  whether the insider ratio influences 
performance outcomes or effort norms itself.
Effort Norms
Control Role
Service Role
Board 
Effectiveness
Control Variables:
Inside-outside ratio 
(ß = -0.319*)
ß = 0.476**
ß = 0.488**
ß = 0.358*
ß = 0.277*
Note: ** shows significance at 1% level, * shows significance at 5% level
ß = 0.472**
Figure 7-5. Model of the Mediated Relationship between Effort Norms and Board Effectiveness
The Relationship between The Use of Knowledge & Skills and Board Effectiveness
 Figure 7-6. shows that the control role performance mediates the relationship between the 
use of knowledge & skills and board effectiveness. The relationship  between the use of knowledge 
& skills and board effectiveness has a lower beta value (ß = 0.432) when the control role 
performance is included in the model, thus meeting the Baron & Kenny (1986) criterion for 
mediation. Interestingly, the service role performance of the board was not found to be a mediating 
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variable between the use of knowledge & skills and board effectiveness although the use of 
knowledge & skills does have a significant positive affect on the service role performance of the 
board. The results suggest that the use of knowledge has a direct affect on both the service role 
performance of the board and board effectiveness. The high beta value (> 0.6) suggests the use of 
knowledge & skills is an important explanatory variable for the service role performance of the 
board and this particular finding will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
Use of knowledge 
& skills
Control Role
Service Role
Board 
Effectiveness
Control Variables:
Inside-outside ratio 
(ß = -0.354**)
Board shareholdings 
(ß = -0.267*)
ß = 0.438**
ß = 0.658**
ß = 0.286*
Note: ** shows significance at 1% level, * shows significance at 5% level
ß = 0.557**
Figure 7-6. Model of the Mediated Relationship between The Use of Knowledge & Skills and 
Board Effectiveness
 As well as the mediation affect of the control role performance on the relationship between 
the use of knowledge & skills and board effectiveness, it was also found that two control variables: 
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the insider-outsider ratio and the proportion of shares held by the board, were significantly 
negatively related to the control role performance of the board. This finding will be discussed in 
more detail later in this section.
The Relationship between Trust and Board Effectiveness
 Figure 7-7. shows that the control role performance mediates the relationship between trust 
and board effectiveness. The relationship between trust  and board effectiveness has a lower beta 
value (ß = 0.379) when the control role performance is included in the model, thus meeting the 
Baron & Kenny (1986) criterion for mediation. The finding that trust was positively related to the 
control role performance of the board is counter-intuitive. It would be expected that higher trust 
levels would negate the necessity  for board members to actively  control the actions of executives. 
A higher disposition to trust would lessen the need to control the actions of executives, whilst lower 
trust would likely to enhance the need for control mechanisms (Schoorman et al., 2007). However, 
this particular finding may suggest that trust is necessary for board members to rely on information 
provided by  executives for carrying out control role tasks such as annual performance evaluations 
of the firm and of the board. Interestingly, the service role performance of the board was not found 
to be a mediating variable between trust and board effectiveness although trust  does have a 
significant positive affect  on the service role performance of the board. The results suggest that trust 
has a direct affect on both the service role performance of the board and board effectiveness.
 These findings provide a useful contribution to the research in boards. No previous research 
to my knowledge has conceptualised trust as a board process. In their study, Van Ees et al., (2008) 
treated trust as a moderating variable between board processes and board role performance. This 
study found that trust is an important determinant of the board’s control role performance, board 
service role’s performance and board effectiveness. The finding that trust is important for board 
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effectiveness is in line with similar findings from research into the importance of trust  to team 
effectiveness (Costa, 2003; Gillespie & Mann, 2004; Lee, 2004). Given the findings that trust is 
important to board control role performance, board service role performance and board 
effectiveness, future studies of the antecedents of board trust would be useful for a fuller 
understanding of the workings of boards.
Trust
Control Role
Service Role
Board 
Effectiveness
Control Variables:
Inside-outside ratio 
(ß = -0.279*)
Board shareholdings 
(ß = -0.335**)
ß = 0.432**
ß = 0.552**
ß = 0.323*
Note: ** shows significance at 1% level, * shows significance at 5% level
ß = 0.518**
Figure 7-7. Model of the Mediated Relationship between Trust and Board Effectiveness
   As well as the mediation affect of the control role performance on the relationship between 
trust and board effectiveness, it was also found that two control variables: the insider-outsider ratio 
and the proportion of shares held by the board, were significantly negatively  related to the control 
role performance of the board. This finding will be discussed in more detail later in this section.
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The Relationship between Board Processes, Board Structure, and Board Control Role and 
Service Role Performance.
 This study advances knowledge about the factors that influence board effectiveness and the 
influences on the control role and service role of the board of directors in the UK. Many of the prior 
studies have been from Continental Europe or South East  Asia (e.g., Minichilli et al., 2010; Wan & 
Ong, 2006; Zona & Zattoni, 2007), whilst there has, to my knowledge, been no empirical studies 
focussing on board processes and behaviours in the UK using quantitative data.  The results 
discussed previously  in this section show that board processes and behaviours are more important in 
explaining board effectiveness than board structural characteristics such as board size, CEO-Chair 
duality, inside-outside ratio, and proportion of shares held by board directors.  These findings are 
similar to a number of non-UK studies (e.g. Minichilli et al., 2009; Van den Heuvel et al., 2006; 
Wan & Ong, 2005). These structural characteristics are those derived from agency  theory  and 
resource dependency theory. According to agency theory, board structure and executive 
compensation are key determinants for firm performance (Daily et al., 2003). Specifically, agency 
theorists suggests boards should have a majority of outside (non-executive) directors, and a separate 
CEO-Chair to perform the board’s monitoring and control role (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In addition, agency theory also advocates that executives should be 
aligned to shareholders’ interests through compensation packages tied to firm performance 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). The importance of 
board structure is also recognised in resource dependency theory. According to resource 
dependency theorists, the primary role of the board is a service one linking the organisation with its 
external environment (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). In fulfilling their service role, resource 
dependency theorists suggest board members provide resources, such as information skills, advice 
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and counsel to management, access to key stakeholders, networking, and legitimacy, to a firm 
(Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Gales & Kesner, 1994; Hillman et al., 2000; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Critical to the board structure is that different directors are able to bring different resources 
to the organisation (Hillman et al., 2000). Thus, according to resource dependency, larger boards are 
better able to bring such resources (Hillman et al., 2000; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
 Previous research has suggested that board structural variables have limited predictive 
power in explaining board role (or task) performance (e.g. Minichilli et al., 2009; Van Ees et al., 
2008, Zona & Zattoni, 2007). This study does, however, find that two structural variables are 
significant in explaining the control role performance of the board. First, the inside ratio was found 
to be significantly  negatively  related to the control role of the board when examining the 
relationship  between a number of the board processes and the control role of the board. This means 
boards with a higher proportion of insiders on the board are less effective in undertaking their 
control role. This suggests that  boards with a higher proportion of outside (non-executive) directors 
are more active in their control role activities. This is a finding in line with the predictions of 
agency theory (Fama, 1980; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and also of recent 
empirical research from Minichilli et al., (2010). Given the relatively  limited support  for the 
benefits of outside directors in previous empirical work, this result may be particularly  applicable to 
the UK with the strong emphasis in the codes on good governance that  have a longer history  in the 
UK than in other countries (Minichilli et al., 2009; Roberts et al., 2005). The finding may also be 
specific to the unitary  board structure that is the dominant  type in the UK, as opposed to continental 
Eurpope where dual-tiered structures are the norm. The policy implications of this finding will be 
discussed later in this chapter. Second, the proportion of shares held by the board of directors was 
also found to be significantly  negatively related to the control role of the board when examining the 
relationship  between a number of the board processes and the control role of the board. This finding 
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is also supportive of agency theory predictions. Higher levels of share ownership by executive 
board members is less likely to require board members to actively control the actions of the 
executive as they  are aligned to act in the interests of shareholders through compensation packages 
consisting of shares and share options (Daily et al., 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989). This result is 
somewhat contrary to the results of Minichilli et al., (2009) who found that board shareholding was 
positively related to networking, one of the service role tasks of the board and not related to the 
control role tasks of the board. One explanation may simply be the different way board 
shareholding was measured. Minichilli et al., (2009) measured board shareholdings as the number 
of board members with shareholdings over the total number of shareholdings, whereas this study 
measured board shareholdings as the shareholdings of directors as a percentage of total 
shareholdings in the company. An alternative rationale may be the finding is specific to the UK and 
this requires further research to confirm, or otherwise, any  country specific differences. Given the 
possibility that the findings may suggest some country specific differences this has significant 
implications for board theory. There is powerful support from the recent cross-country  study  of 
factors influencing board task (or role) performance of Minichilli et al., (2010) for more cross-
country  studies in order to better understand the impact of the national context. They  found that 
there were considerable differences in board task (role) performance across the two countries in the 
study, Italy  and Norway and that national context moderates the relationship between board 
processes and board performance (Minichilli et al., 2010). There are still considerable similarities 
between Italy and Norway (e.g. small, family-owned businesses) and hence it  is even more 
imperative to have studies in Anglo-Saxon contexts like this UK focused study.
 The analysis showed that the insider-outsider ratio and board shareholdings were negatively 
related to the control role of the board, but the extent to which more outsider directors on the board 
enhances process variables, such as the knowledge and skills, cognitive conflict and effort norms, 
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that influence the control role performance of the board is unclear from this research. It is possible 
that the ratio of inside to outside directors and other board structural characteristics may influence 
the group dynamics of boards and could be antecedents of some process variables. A dynamic 
capabilities approach (Teece et al., 1997) would enhance our understanding of the contribution of 
individual board members and the board as a whole to enhancing the control role (and service role) 
performance of the board. 
 The findings that two board structural characteristics have some predictive powers in 
explaining board control role performance has some similarities to the research of Minichilli et al., 
(2009), although the actual board structural characteristics that  influence the control role 
performance of the board are different in the two studies. Minichill et al., (2009) found that board 
size was a factor in predicting board control role performance, whereas this study found no 
significant result for board size. 
 Whilst, this study finds that two of the board structural characteristics recommended by 
agency theory  enhance the control role performance of the board, there is no support for the benefits 
of CEO-chair duality. This lack of support for the benefits of CEO-chair duality is similar to the 
finding of Brickley et  al., (1997). This result may support the stewardship theorists who advocate 
the benefits of a unitary leadership  structure (Davis et  al., 1997). However, given that the 
overwhelming majority  of companies in the sample had a separate CEO-chair it  is unclear whether 
the results are supportive of stewardship  theorists. They do not, however, support agency theory’s 
recommendation of a separate CEO-chair. Therefore, overall the support for agency theory 
predictions is mixed.  
 Whilst there was some evidence that board structural characteristics have some effect on 
board control role performance, they had little predictive power in understanding how the board 
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performs its service role tasks and board effectiveness, and this is similar to the findings of other 
research (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Van Ees et al., 2008; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). The analysis 
shows that board processes are far more powerful predictors of service role performance and this 
finding replicates that  found in prior empirical research (e.g. Minichilli et al., 2009; Van den Heuvel 
et al., 2006;  Zona & Zattoni, 2007). 
Multiple Mechanisms of Board Effectiveness
 This study finds that, when examined separately, six board processes (cohesiveness, 
communications quality, cognitive conflict, effort norms, the use of knowledge & skills, and trust) 
positively affect board effectiveness, whilst affective conflict negatively affects board effectiveness. 
By examining these seven board processes, this study provides a more comprehensive treatment of 
the behaviours that may influence board outcomes than previous research which examined sub-sets 
of the multiple mechanisms identified in this research (e.g., Minichilli et al., 2009; Van den Heuvel 
et al., 2006; Wan & Ong, 2005). In addition, with the exception of affective conflict all the board 
processes affect the control role of the board and the service role of the board. Affective conflict 
was found to negatively affect the control role of the board, but not to have a significant affect on 
the service role of the board. The possible reasons for this finding were discussed in the previous 
section.
 The results from this study examining multiple mechanisms to explain board effectiveness 
provides important findings for board research. A unique contribution of this research is the finding 
that the control role and/or the service role of the board mediates the relationship between a number 
of board processes and board effectiveness. Mediation is about processes that strengthen 
relationships between variables (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Previous research has used board role 
performance as a dependent variable. Uniquely, this study finds that board role performance 
mediates the relationship between board processes and board effectiveness. This has important 
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implications for future research on boards. It suggests that board role performance may be a means 
in which boards can add value to their organisation. There are three specific findings of note with 
regard to the mediation effect. First, both the control role and the service role of the board mediate 
the relationship between cohesiveness and board effectiveness, communication quality and board 
effectiveness, and effort norms and board effectiveness. Second, the service role of the board 
mediates the relationship between cognitive conflict and board effectiveness. Third and finally, the 
control role of the board mediates the relationship between affective conflict and board 
effectiveness, the use of knowledge & skills and board effectiveness, and trust and board 
effectiveness.  Performing control roles and services are processes that lead to board effectiveness. 
Measure of Board Effectiveness
 The results from this study provide new contributions to the research on board effectiveness. 
Prior studies have suggested that board processes affect board role or task performance and used 
these as proxies for board effectiveness (Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000; Minichilli et al., 2009; Van 
deb Heuvel et al., Zona & Zattoni, 2007). This study used the survey data to measure board 
effectiveness through a four-item construct drawn from existing literature (Aguilera, 2005; 
Bradshaw et al., 1992; Cornforth, 2001; Denis & McConnell, 2003; Green and Geisinger 1996; 
Huse 2005; and Langevoort, 2001), in addition to measuring the board control role performance and 
the board service role performance. The four-item measure was averaged into a general 
“effectiveness’ scale with a Cronbach alpha equal to 0.84. This measure is different  to the measure 
of board effectiveness developed simultaneously  by Payne et al., (2009) in that the items are more 
about the contribution of the board to performance of the firm in general as opposed to the more 
specific assessment of board roles (or tasks) in the Payne et al., (2009) measure. In addition the 
measure of board effectiveness was validated by linking it to firm performance and found a 
significant positive relationship. Thus, this measure of board effectiveness is valid for assessing the 
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value creating potential of boards. This direct measurement of board effectiveness is an original 
contribution to the research on boards of directors.
Role of Cognitive Conflict and The Use of Knowledge and Skills
 When examining the relationship between all the independent variables, mediating variables 
and dependent variables in a multiple regression, this study finds that cognitive conflict has a 
strongly, significant positive impact on board effectiveness. The concept of cognitive conflict 
highlights the importance of critical debate in improving team decision-making. Team members’ 
disagreement allows them to see different viewpoints and enable alternative perspectives to better 
inform debates, and enhance the quality of decisions (Amason, 1996; Amason & Sapienza, 1997; 
Eisenhardt et al., 1997). This suggests that  the most important factor in explaining board 
effectiveness is critical debate and implicitly shows that the concept of groupthink is anathema to 
board effectiveness. This has implications for the composition and the working style and 
development of boards. Boards require an environment where critical debate is encouraged. The 
implications of this finding for board policy  and practice will be discussed in more detail later in 
this chapter. Similarly, critical debate has a positive impact on the board’s control role when 
examining the relationship  between the independent variables and the hypothesised mediators. 
These results are in line with a number of previous studies, according to which one of the most 
important antecedents of board role performance and board effectiveness is the presence of a 
challenging boardroom environment, characterised by open and constructive debate among inside 
and outside board members (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Minichilli 
et al., 2009; Roberts et al., 2005). 
 An additional feature of the importance of cognitive conflict is the lack of association 
between cognitive conflict and affective conflict. Some researchers that have found cognitive 
conflict not to affect the control role or service role performance of the board have argued that the 
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effect of content on performance outcomes may be ambiguous due to the dangers of task related 
conflict spilling over into personal issues that arouse negative emotions Zona & Zattoni, 2007). 
These negative emotions can lead to positive aspects of task related conflicts being offset with 
adverse performance outcomes (Jehn,  1995; Zona & Zattoni, 2009). This research, however, finds 
that the positive aspects of conflict much outweigh the negative dimensions. This shows that 
conflict may be managed and thus has considerable potential benefits to enhancing board 
effectiveness.  
 A further finding when including all independent and mediating variables was that  the use of 
knowledge and skills has a positive impact on the board’s service role. This result is unsurprising as 
maximising the benefits of the service role tasks of the board, including the provision of advice, 
mentoring and networking, requires the optimal use of board members knowledge and skills 
(Forbes & Milliken, 1999). The results from this study implicitly  suggest that  there was the 
presence and use of the knowledge and skills suitable for the board to effectively perform their 
service role, i.e. board members have a range of functional area knowledge and skills and firm-
specific knowledge and skills that enable boards to provide advice, act as mentors and help build 
network relationships (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Given the strength of these findings, further 
research may seek to better understand the combinations of knowledge and skills that are critical to 
service role performance and the mechanisms by which these are activated, drawing perhaps on 
resource-based and dynamic capabilities perspectives.  
Board Roles
 As reported in Chapter 6: Data Analysis: The Measurement Model, the factor analysis of 
board roles showed that there were two primary roles undertaken by the board. These were 
identified as the control role and service role of the board. As reported in Chapter 4: Model and 
Hypotheses Development, there is general consensus in previous research surrounding the control 
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or monitoring role of the board. However, there is considerable divergence with regard to the other 
roles of the board (Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Johnson et al., 1999; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; 
Ruigrok et al, 2006; Stiles, 2001; Van den Heuvel et al., 2006; Wan & Ong, 2005; Zona & Zattoni, 
2007). This is primarily the result  of definitional overlap and conceptual ambiguity. For example, in 
Zona & Zattoni’s (2007) study, the service role construct employed uses questions that are found in 
the strategy role construct employed by Wan & Ong (2005). Further, Minichilli et al., (2009) 
divided the strategy role of boards in two, strategy control and strategic participation. The former 
was defined as one of three control tasks undertaken by the board, whereas the latter was defined as 
one of three service tasks undertaken by the board (Minichill et al., 2009). Various roles identified 
within the literature include resource dependency, networking, service, and strategy (Van den 
Heuvel et al., 2006; Wan & Ong; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). The findings in this study are supportive 
of the board carrying out two distinct  roles, control and service. This result is similar to that  of 
Minichilli et  al., (2009) in finding the strategy role of the board can be viewed as part of the control 
role or the service role of the board and not  a distinct one in itself. Specifically, the strategy item in 
the service role construct related to the involvement of board members in strategic decisions. Thus, 
in common with calls from Pugliese et al., (2009) this finding leads to a suggestion that there is a 
need for more research that investigates the board’s strategic involvement and for the development 
of better measurements. This findings on board roles here, suggests future studies should 
concentrate on two primary roles of the board, control and service, but also that there is further 
theoretical and empirical research specifically  examining the board’s involvement in strategic 
decision-making. Crucially, this finding suggests that to enhance our understanding of what makes 
boards effective it is important to move beyond definitional and conceptual ambiguity, especially 
when measuring board effectiveness. 
Board Governance Orientation
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 The previous discussion identifies the substantive findings and theoretical contributions 
emanating from this study. However, an additional finding is worthy of note. This relates to the 
proposed new construct in board research, board governance orientation. As reported in Chapter 4: 
Model and Hypothesis Development, board governance orientation was a concept drawn from four 
existing board theories: agency theory, resource dependency  theory, stakeholder theory, and 
stewardship theory. It was hypothesised that firms would have different  board governance 
orientations and additional hypotheses were made that different board governance orientations 
would have a differential impact on board control role, board service role, and board strategy role 
performance. There were two ways in which board governance orientation was measured in the 
survey: a) through orientation items, and b) self-typing statements to provide cross checks for the 
items. The self reporting statements in the survey suggested that different board governance 
orientations exist with 40% of the respondents identifying a stewardship orientation, 25.7% 
identifying an agency orientation, 12.9% identifying a stakeholder orientation, and 20.3% 
identifying a resource dependency orientation. However, as reported in Chapter 6: Data Analysis: 
The Measurement Model, testing of the hypotheses proved impossible. A factor analysis of the 
Board Governance Orientation showed that some of the identified factors lacked theoretical and 
conceptual clarity. In addition, a reliability  analysis showed that only  two of the four proposed 
board governance orientations (resource dependency orientation and stakeholder orientation) were 
reliable constructs. 
 Given the findings from the self-reporting statements of the contention that firms have 
different board governance orientations it is interesting to examine why the factor analysis provided 
no clear results and why only two of the constructs were reliable. There are two possible 
explanations for these results. First, the theoretical underpinning of the constructs requires further 
work. However, given that respondents suggest that boards do have different orientations and all 
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four suggested were identified by some respondents there appears some support  empirically for the 
theoretical proposition that boards have different governance orientations. A second explanation 
would relate to the measurements employed. The questions in the survey were drawn from existing 
literature, but given that the agency and stewardship  orientation items provided low Cronbach 
Alphas in assessing their reliability, there would appear to be an issue with the items on these two 
particular orientations. This could have arisen for a number of reasons upon which one can only 
speculate. One, is that as agency theory and stewardship theory are often perceived as being at 
opposite ends of the organisational theory spectrum, particularly in terms of behavioural 
assumptions, that  the questions were seen to be about behaviours rather than orientations. Two, the 
questions were insufficiently  clear for the respondents, although the pilot  test of the survey did not 
pick up  any issues with questions. Three, the ordering of the questions was such that the 
stewardship items immediately followed the agency items and this was not helpful in identifying 
separate constructs. 
 Overall, there was some evidence that boards have different governance orientations, but for 
the reasons identified it proved impossible to test this and to examine whether different governance 
orientations lead to different board outcomes. It is an area worthy  of future research, but it requires 
greater thought on the theoretical issues, and more critically on the measurement issues. 
7.3. Implications for Board Practice and Policy
 The empirical findings also have implications for board practice and policy. First, the 
important contribution played by  board processes to improving board control role performance, 
board service role performance and board effectiveness has implications for the dynamics and 
composition of the board. The ability of a board to work as team is critical to board effectiveness, 
but this means boards need to pay close attention to the ability  of board members to work in an 
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open, constructive manner, that is board members must be willing to take on board different 
opinions and to work together for the benefit  of the organisation. This has important implications 
for the nomination and selection committees of boards.  Characteristics of openness, willingness to 
engage in critical debate, the ability to take account of others’ viewpoints would appear to be 
critical to boards’ effectiveness and thus these are the person characteristics that selection 
committees should be looking for in appointing new directors. The finding that boards with more 
outside directors better perform their control role also suggests selection committees should pay 
attention to the balance of outside and inside directors on the board. However, given that  the ratio of 
insiders to outsiders had no effect on the service role performance or much to board effectiveness 
the person characteristics appear more important than whether the board structure favours a balance 
of outside directors. The additional finding that the use of knowledge and skills was instrumental in 
explaining the service role performance of the board also has implications for board selection. 
Boards require a diverse range of knowledge and skills and thus in getting the right balance on the 
board, selection committees need to undertake an audit of existing members skills and knowledge 
before looking for new board members. These findings support the contention of McNulty  et al., 
(2005) that it is necessary  to go beyond simply looking at matters of the composition of the board in 
terms of the independence of the board to the composition in terms of person characteristics that 
lead to open, and constructive debate in the boardroom. In addition, this study found that the mere 
presence of knowledge and skills alone are not sufficient, they  need to be used. The implication for 
boards is that they need to create mechanisms and opportunities for this to happen through for 
example, board evaluations and board development programmes.
 Second, the results of this study identified two particular processes that were vital to the 
effectiveness of boards. This has implications for the workings of the board and in particular the 
role of the board chairperson. Cognitive conflict was found to be very important to the control role 
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performance of the board and to board effectiveness. The willingness and ability of board members 
to engage in critical debate, to take on different viewpoints may lead to higher levels of 
investigation helping boards make better decisions. The findings suggest task related disagreements 
are beneficial to better board level decision-making and to better control of the executive. This 
result suggests board chairs need to create an open atmosphere where differences of view are 
allowed to be expressed and an environment to enhance the effective operational dynamics of the 
board. It  also requires that the chairperson ensures that all the necessary  information upon which 
such constructive debate is available to board members with sufficient time for the careful scrutiny 
that can lead to open dialogue and disagreement. An annual review of board performance may 
contribute to better group dynamics through a greater understanding of individuals contribution to 
board effectiveness.
 The use of knowledge and skills was shown to be critical to the service role role 
performance of the board. It  is thus important that board chairs ensure those directors with specific 
expertise are involved in all board discussions and decisions where their knowledge and skills are 
able to be best utilised. This also may have implications for leadership  processes and behaviours 
inside the board room and to the concept  of ‘shared leadership‘ (Vandewaerde et al., 2011). This 
means to take advantage of members’ different knowledge and skills board chairs should consider 
undertaking an annual audit of members’ skills and knowledge to identify gaps and look to see how 
such gaps can best be filled. This may mean new members being brought onto the board or that 
existing members undergo relevant training to enhance their individual contribution to board 
effectiveness. 
 Third, the empirical findings have implications for board compensation. The results show 
that board shareholdings were inversely related to the control role of the board. This may mean that 
higher share ownership of board members creates an alignment to the shareholders interests and 
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therefore do not actively need to control the actions of the executive. However, this could also mean 
that giving board members shares as part  of their compensation actually lessens their attention to 
their control role, which is somewhat counter-intuitive. However, this may depend on the actual 
level of share ownership that is required to have a controlling interest in the firm. For boards, this 
has implications for the role of remuneration committees in ensuring board share ownership 
schemes enhance control role performance of the board and align the interests of board members 
and shareholders. In this sense, what may  be key  is the percentage of board members’ wealth that is 
at stake in ensuring the firm makes decisions with appropriate balance of risks (O’Byrne, 2001; 
Nyberg et al., 2010). 
 Finally, the empirical findings have implications for corporate governance policy. Existing 
codes of governance (e.g. UK Combined Code) place great emphasis on board structures and the 
importance of board independence. These results suggest that  whilst recommendations on minimum 
numbers of outside (non-executive) directors should become mandatory rather than optional codes 
must also recognise the need for boards to engage in critical debate and for such debate to be made 
transparent possibly through reporting procedures. With a diverse range of knowledge and skills 
also being important, policy makers also need to be cognisant of the need for boards to make the 
range of skills and knowledge of board members transparent for stakeholders. This could mean that 
policy should require companies to undertake annual audits of board members and to publish this 
information.
7.4. Summary of Contributions to Knowledge
 There are a number of new contributions this research makes to knowledge on boards of 
directors. First, the control role performance and the service role performance are found to be 
mediators of the relationship between a number of board processes and board effectiveness. There 
270
are three specific findings of note with regard to the mediation effect. One, both the control role and 
the service role of the board mediate the relationship between cohesiveness and board effectiveness, 
communication quality and board effectiveness, and effort norms and board effectiveness. Two, the 
service role of the board mediates the relationship between cognitive conflict and board 
effectiveness. Three, board processes influence board effectiveness via the performance of the 
control and service roles of the board. 
 The second major contribution is the examination of a more comprehensive set  of 
mechanisms influencing board effectiveness than has been hitherto undertaken. An increasing 
number of empirical studies have examined a smaller set of mechanisms, but this research by 
investigating a broader range of processes has been able to identify the critical importance of 
cognitive conflict to the board’s control role performance and board effectiveness and that of the 
use of knowledge and skills to the board’s service role performance. 
 The third major contribution is the use of a new measure of board effectiveness. The four 
item construct measures board effectiveness using more general questions about the performance of 
boards than the measure recently used by Payne et al., (2009). 
 The final contribution is that this is one of the first empirical studies examining board 
processes and board structures and their respective impact on board effectiveness using data 
collected in the UK. As various authors suggest in order to better understand the workings of board 
of directors, greater cross-country  comparison is required and this research adds to the studies that 
have taken place in Continental Europe and South-East Asia (Huse, 2007; Minichilli et al., 2009; 
Minichilli et al., 2010; Pugliese et al., 2009; Wan & Ong, 2005).
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CHAPTER 8:
CONCLUSION
8.1. Introduction
 This research had a number of objectives. Through a thorough review of the literature a 
model was developed and tested to investigate the factors influencing board effectiveness. To test 
the model and hypotheses, data was collected using a postal survey of board chairpersons in UK 
listed companies. Analysis of this data has led to a number of important findings which increase our 
knowledge of the antecedents of board effectiveness, an area many board researchers have been 
calling for in recent years (Huse, 2005; Minichilli et al., 2009; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005; Roberts et 
al., 2005). This chapter will provide a summary of the research conclusions, an outline of the 
research’s contribution to knowledge, an identification of the limitations of this study, and an 
outline of future areas of research. 
8.2. Conclusions of the Research
 A detailed literature review exploring the research on boards suggested that there is limited 
understanding of the factors explaining board effectiveness. One of the stated aims of this study was 
to investigate these factors in order to add to knowledge and to identify  how boards may help to add 
value to a company. From this literature review, a model and hypotheses were developed to 
examine the relationships between board governance orientation, board governance processes, 
board role performance, and board effectiveness. To be able to test the veracity  of the model, data 
were collected through a postal survey  of 1665 board chairpersons of UK listed companies, drawn 
from the Hemscott Company Guru database. Two of these concepts, board governance orientation 
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and board effectiveness were thought to be new contributions to the corporate governance literature. 
As such, instruments were developed through a review of the literature and items included in the 
questionnaire with existing items used for the other constructs in the model. The survey was pre-
tested by five current board directors and minor amendments were made to the wording of some of 
the questions. 
 The data, obtained through the postal questionnaire, pertaining to the new concepts, board 
governance orientation were subject to a factor and reliability  analysis. This, however, provided no 
meaningful results. Reliability analysis suggested two of the board governance orientation 
constructs, resource dependency orientation and stakeholder orientation were reliable with 
Cronbach Alphas greater than 0.7. However, the other two constructs, agency  governance 
orientation and stewardship governance orientation were found to have low Cronbach Alphas and 
thus not reliable. Whilst  the self-reporting statement in the survey suggested boards do have four 
different orientations, this reliability issue and the disappointingly low response rate (74 usable 
responses, 4.64%) meant that the hypotheses relating to board governance orientation could not be 
tested. The reasons why this new concept was not  found to derive reliable results was discussed in 
detail in Chapter 7 Discussion, but  briefly can either be due to theoretical issues with the concept or 
measurement issues. This meant that the original model was amended to drop  the board governance 
orientation concept. Consequently, it was not possible to test hypotheses 1 - 6 inclusive.
 Factor analysis was also conducted on the board role performance items and this showed 
that there was a two-factor solution. The items emerging from the factor analysis suggested boards 
carry  out two primary roles, control and service. This finding is in line with recent empirical work 
carried out by  Minichilli et al., (2009). Reliability  analysis on the control and service roles 
demonstrated that the constructs were reliable. The board governance processes (cohesiveness, 
communication quality, cognitive conflict, affective conflict, effort norms, trust, and the use of 
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knowledge and skills) using existing validated items were subject to reliability test and all proved 
reliable. Finally, the second new concept, board effectiveness was found to be reliable with a four-
item instrument.
 Following ensuring the reliability and validity of the revised measurement model, 
hypothesis testing of the remaining hypotheses 7 - 13 was conducted using regression analysis. The 
hypotheses relating to the mediating impact of the strategy  role of the board were also dropped 
given the factor analysis showed that the board undertakes two primary roles, control and service. 
In order to test  the hypotheses relating to the mediating effect of the board control role performance 
and the board service role performance, the method proposed by Baron & Kenny (1986) was 
followed along with the application of the Sobel Test to check for the significance of the Baron & 
Kenny (1986) method, similar to the approach of De Jong & Elfring (2010). Of the remaining 
hypotheses, all but one were accepted or partially accepted at the 5% significance level. 
Specifically, the following hypotheses were deemed to be accepted.
Hypothesis 7a: Board control role performance is positively related to board effectiveness.
Hypothesis 7b: Board service role performance is positively related to board effectiveness.
Hypothesis 8b: The relationship between board cohesiveness and board effectiveness is mediated by 
the board control role performance and the board service role performance.
Hypothesis 9a: Communication quality is positively related to board effectiveness.
Hypothesis 9b: The relationship between communication quality and board effectiveness is 
mediated by the board control role performance and the board service role performance.
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Hypothesis 10a: Board cognitive conflict is positively related to board effectiveness.
Hypothesis 10c: Board affective conflict is negatively related to board effectiveness.
Hypothesis 11a: Board effort norms are positively related to board effectiveness.
Hypothesis 11b: The relationship between board effort norms and board effectiveness is mediated 
by the board control role performance and the board service role performance.
Hypothesis 12a: Board use of knowledge and skills is positively related to board effectiveness.
Hypothesis 13a: Board trust is positively related to board effectiveness.
In addition, the following hypotheses were partially accepted.
Hypothesis 10b: The relationship between board cognitive conflict and board effectiveness was 
mediated by the service role performance of the board, but not by the control role performance of 
the board.
Hypothesis 10d: The relationship between board affective conflict and board effectiveness was 
mediated by the control role performance of the board, but not by the service role performance of 
the board. 
Hypothesis 12b: The relationship between board use of knowledge and skills and board 
effectiveness was mediated by the control role performance of the board, but not by the service role 
performance. 
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Hypothesis 13b: The relationship between board trust and board effectiveness was mediated by the 
control role performance of the board, but not by the service role performance.
 The one hypothesis that could not be accepted was Hypothesis 8a: Board cohesiveness has a 
curvilinear relationship with board effectiveness. The results suggested this relationship could have 
been either linear or curvilinear. This apparent contradiction most likely results from the relatively 
small sample size. 
 These results suggest that board processes are significant predictors of board effectiveness 
and that the control role performance of the board and service role performance of the board are 
mediators of this relationship. In addition, the results showed that one or two of the control 
variables, inside-outside ratio and proportion of shares held by members had a significant negative 
effect on the control role performance of the board for all the board processes. Only for the 
relationship  between cohesiveness and board effectiveness was a control variable, the percentage of 
shares owned by board members, related to the service role performance of the board. These 
findings suggest that one board composition variable, the inside-outside ratio and one compensation 
variable, the proportion of shares owned by board members are negatively related to the control role 
performance of the board. 
 An additional finding of this research was that when the model was tested including all the 
variables, cognitive conflict  was the primary predictor on board effectiveness. When board 
effectiveness was excluded, cognitive conflict was the main predictor of the control role 
performance of the board whilst the board’s use of knowledge and skills was the principal predictor 
of the service role performance of the board.  The results confirm recent empirical findings of the 
importance of board processes in explaining board effectiveness (Minchilli et al., 2009; Payne et  al., 
2009; Van Ees et al., 2008; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). 
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8.3. Contributions to Knowledge
 There are a number of new contributions this research makes to knowledge on boards of 
directors. First, the control role performance and the service role performance are found to be 
mediators of the relationship between a number of board processes and board effectiveness. 
Previous research has used the control role performance and service role performance as outcomes. 
This study shows that the control role performance and service role performance are mediating 
processes that lead to board effectiveness rather than outcomes themselves.  
 The second major contribution is the examination of a more comprehensive set  of 
mechanisms influencing board effectiveness than has been hitherto undertaken. An increasing 
number of empirical studies have examined a smaller set of mechanisms, but this research by  has 
investigated a broader range of processes including one new process, communication quality  and 
one rarely studied in boards, affective conflict. Consequently, the study has been able to identify the 
critical importance of cognitive conflict to the board’s control role performance and board 
effectiveness and that of the use of knowledge and skills to the board’s service role performance. 
 The third major contribution is the use of a new measure of board effectiveness. The four 
item construct measures board effectiveness using more general questions about the performance of 
boards than the measure recently used by Payne et al., (2009). Previous studies suggest board roles 
are outcomes whereas they are in fact mediating processes that lead to board effectiveness. This 
new measure will allow future research to assess the value creating potential of boards. 
 The fourth contribution is that this is one of the first empirical studies examining board 
processes and board structures and their respective impact on board effectiveness using data 
collected in the UK. As various authors suggest in order to better understand the workings of board 
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of directors, greater cross-country  comparison is required and this research adds to the studies that 
have taken place in Continental Europe and South-East Asia (Huse, 2007; Minichilli et al., 2009; 
Minichilli et al., 2010; Pugliese et al., 2009; Wan & Ong, 2005). Whilst the results show some 
commonalities between the UK and other countries, they also suggest some significant differences. 
This suggests that that there is a need to recognise the importance of national context as a 
contingency variable in corporate governance research (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
 The fifth and final contribution this research makes relates to the the implications of the 
findings for UK board practice and UK policy on corporate governance in general and specifically 
on boards of directors. The results suggest greater emphasis on the board processes that  enhance 
board effectiveness. Primarily, this requires boards to create the environment conducive for 
members to actively participate in critical debate. This has implications for the role of the chair of 
the board as they have responsibility to ensure a healthy working environment that allows board 
members to engage in constructive dialogue whilst avoiding potentially  damaging personal 
animosity. The findings also suggest that boards need to have members with a range of knowledge 
and skills and that  there need to be mechanisms to ensure that knowledge is used . This has 
important implications for the selection of board members and for board development. These results 
also suggest the need for boards to conduct regular reviews and evaluation of board members, to 
optimise the contribution of each member. The results also suggest that boards with a higher 
proportion of outside (non-executive directors) better perform their control role. This is supportive 
of rules regarding the number of outside directors on boards. This may imply that existing UK 
recommendations, where companies that do not meet the minimum requirement can simply report 
in the annual accounts whenever they fail to meet the criteria, should become mandatory for listed 
companies over a certain size. However, care has to be taken in any tightening of requirements 
regarding minimum numbers of outside directors as they have to balance the benefits for the control 
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role performance of the board with that of the needs to create boards with a diverse range of 
knowledge and skills and an environment that encourages cognitive conflict, which were shown to 
have significant benefits for the service role of the board and board effectiveness respectively. 
8.4. Limitations of the Study
 As with most research efforts, this study is inevitably constrained by limitations and these 
limitations apply to the conclusions. Generally, the study suffers from five main limitations. First, 
the sample size was very  small. Access to boards is notoriously  difficult  and this may limit the 
extent to which the conclusions can be generalised. However, non-response bias checks undertaken 
suggest the respondents were representative of the sample population, thus increasing the strength 
of the generalisability of the results. Second, the use of the board chair as a single respondent may 
lead to a specific view on the questions that may have been different had the CEO been used or if 
multiple board members been used. Unfortunately, in agreement with Minichilli et al., (2009), the 
use of multiple respondents is equally likely to have its limitations and may lead to even more 
biases. Continued disagreements between board members may emerge in the responses of multiple 
board members and this may make it likely that an overall board response to the questions biases 
the results even more than with a single respondent (Minichilli et al., 2009). In sum, despite the 
various arguments favouring the use of the board chairpersons’ views, the risk of normative and 
single respondent biases remain and must be recognised. Third, the study used a single country and 
thus the findings may be limited to the UK and not generalised to other countries. Unfortunately, 
cross country studies also have their limitations in board research. This may  be due to different 
legal structures, which can create comparative problems. One, legal requirements may mean 
countries have  different board structures, for example single tier boards versus multiple tier boards. 
Two, legislation may specify the requirements of board members to do different  things in different 
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countries. Three, the presence of blockholders may influence results as boards may not be the main 
decision-making body (Nelson, 2006; Seifert et al., 2005: Wu, 2004). These difficulties may lead to 
problems in undertaking comparator cross-country  studies. However, not withstanding the problems 
of cross-country comparison, the use of a single country  has the limitation with regard to the 
creation of a single unifying theoretical framework of corporate governance. It  does, however, 
highlight the need for a multi-theoretic perspective advocated by many board researchers (Aguilera, 
2005; Daily  et  al., 2003; Minichill et al., 2009; Payne et al., 2009; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005; Roberts 
et al., 2005; Sundaramarthy and Lewis, 2003; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). It also supports the need for 
further cross-country  studies drawing on a unified theoretical  framework (Minichilli et al., 2010). 
Fourth, the study is cross-sectional and thus has similar problems to any cross-sectional study, in 
that it may be time specific and lack generalisability over time. Whilst longitudinal studies have 
their own limitations, the specific findings from this study mean these may be tested again at some 
point in the future. Fifth, whilst the study  provides insights into the board processes and structures 
that influence board role performance and board effectiveness, it  does not examine the antecedents 
of the processes or the dynamic interactions of the various processes. Thus, whilst the study shows 
that seven processes impact upon the board control role performance and board effectiveness, there 
is no theoretical framework developed to explore the factors leading to, for example, board trust, 
board use of knowledge and skills, board cognitive conflict and affective conflict. 
8.5. Recommended Directions for Future Research
 The findings and limitations of this study point to a number of areas requiring further 
research. First, a study examining the impact of different board governance orientations on board 
processes, board role performance and board effectiveness is an area worthy of further exploration. 
Despite the issues surrounding the measurement of board governance orientation, partly  as a result 
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of the small sample size in this study, the positive results of the self reporting statements of board 
chairs in suggesting boards do have different orientations towards governance points to it being a 
fruitful area for future research. Second, a longitudinal study  could be considered and the lack of 
longitudinal data has been highlighted as a limitation of this study. Given the positive nature of the 
some of the findings from the study, it opens up  the possibility  of repeating the study at a future 
point in time to enable longitudinal research. This will allow the results of the study to be compared 
with future studies and help  increase the understanding of board effectiveness. Third, a cross-
country  study could be undertaken to better understand the impact of national contexts on board 
processes, role performance and board effectiveness. The study  could be replicated using data from 
other countries enabling cross-country comparison. As recently suggested by Minichilli et al., 
(2010), a cross-country  study  would allow researchers to investigate board processes and board 
effectiveness both within-country and between-countries and thus help in developing a universal 
framework for investigating corporate governance. Fourth, a study  of the antecedents of board 
processes could enhance the understanding of the factors leading to board effectiveness. The 
findings that board processes are predictors of board role performance and board effectiveness lead 
to questions regarding the antecedents of board processes, such as, communication quality, board 
cognitive and affective conflict, board trust, and the board’s use of knowledge and skills. Future 
research examining the factors that lead to board cohesiveness, effort norms, trust, conflict, etc, is 
an area that has considerable opportunities for opening up another direction in which to obtain a 
greater understanding of what makes boards effective. There are a number of interesting areas with 
regards to the antecedents of board processes which future studies could examine. For example, the 
extent to which diversity is an antecedent of the use of knowledge and skills, the extent to which 
social fault-lines influence cohesiveness, conflict and trust on the board are potentially  important 
areas that could enhance our understanding of the workings and effectiveness of boards. These 
suggestions also require a multi-theoretic approach to board studies. Specifically, studies drawing 
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on resource-based and dynamic capabilities perspectives would help develop our understanding of 
the antecedents of board processes. Fifth, the study could be repeated using multiple board 
respondents to explore the effects of the perceptions of other board members on board processes 
and board performance in line with suggestions from Hillman et al., (2008) and Minichilli et al., 
(2010).  Sixth, this study has used the board as the unit of analysis. The contribution of the 
individual director was not the focus of this study. This points to the need to taking a multi-level 
approach in future studies on boards along the lines of Greve et al’s (2011) study of top 
management teams. Studies adopting a multi-level unit of analysis will help enhance our 
understanding of both the contribution of individual directors and the board as a team to board 
effectiveness. 
8.6. Final Conclusions
 This study  has provided a useful contribution to the existing literature on board processes 
and their impact on board role performance and board effectiveness. It provides an empirical study 
in the UK context and finds support for the Continental European and South East Asian studies that 
board processes are important  predictors for board role performance and board effectiveness. It 
contributes to the research on boards in several ways. First it examines a more comprehensive set of 
mechanisms to explain board effectiveness than has hitherto taken place. Second it provides a new 
four-item measure of board effectiveness. Third it  finds that board control role performance and 
board service role performance are mediators of the relationship between many  board processes and 
board effectiveness. Fourth it adds to the much argued necessity for a multi-theoretic approach to 
corporate governance. Fifth it has a number of implications for board practice and board policy. 
Specifically, the findings of the importance of cognitive conflict and the use of knowledge and 
skills to board control role performance and board effectiveness highlights the need for boards to 
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create the best environment to encourage critical debate and the importance of board selecting 
members with a diverse range of knowledge and skills. Finally, it  offers suggestions on future 
directions for research on boards. 
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APPENDIX 1 - QUESTIONNAIRE
Board Governance Orientation, Board Governance 
Processes and Board Effectiveness Survey
The purpose of this survey is to investigate how board governance orientation and board processes impact 
upon board role performance and board effectiveness. The results will contribute to a better understanding 
of board processes and how board processes contribute to board performance in UK companies, and is 
being used as part of my doctoral research. 
This questionnaire should take you no longer than 20 minutes to complete. Please return it in the pre-paid 
envelope provided.  Any information you provide will be kept in strictest confidence. Only summaries will 
be incorporated into the final report and no companies or individuals will be identified. 
 
If you require additional information, please do not hesitate to contact me at the address printed below. 
Your contribution and prompt response will be highly appreciated. If you would like to receive an 
executive summary of this research, or if you would like to know further details of this research, please 
indicate by ticking the relevant boxes below.
Stuart S Farquhar
University of Wolverhampton Business School
SB203 
Shropshire Campus
Telford TF2 9NT
Tel: 01902 323920
Email: S.S.Farquhar@wlv.ac.uk
I would like to receive an executive summary of the research report. (Please tick)       
I would like to know more about this research (Please tick) via Email      Telephone        Post  
Please provide your preferred contact details if you have answered yes to either of the above.
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………...
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………...
Instructions on filling in the questionnaire
Please read each of the following statements carefully and tick () the number that corresponds to 
the extent you agree or disagree with the statement using the following scale:
7 = strongly agree  (Yes, the statement perfectly describes our board practices.)
6 = agree  (Yes, the statement describes our board practices.)
5 = slightly agree (Yes, but only to some extent does the statement describes our board practices.)
4 = neither disagree nor agree  (I don’t know.)
3 = slightly disagree  (No, to some extent the statement does not describe our board practices.)
2 = disagree  (No, the statement does not describe our board practices.)
1 = strongly disagree  (No, the statement does not describe our board practices at all.) 
Section I. 
Strongly 
disagree
Not               
sure
Strongly agree
1 Our board feels a moral responsibility to look after the interests of the 
shareholders. 
      
2 Board members look after their own interests.       
3 Board members closely monitor and control the actions of management.       
4 Executive board members are aligned to shareholder interests through 
compensation packages.
      
5 Contractual arrangements specify how the returns on investment are 
divided between executives and shareholders. 
      
6 Board members allow management a large degree of autonomy to run the 
company. 
      
7 Our board is confident that management look after the company’s 
interests.
      
8 Our board’s control of senior management is seen as counter-productive 
as it lowers management motivation.
      
9 Executive board members are highly knowledgeable about the company.       
10 Our board views the company more broadly than one simply owned by 
the shareholders.
      
11 Our board pays serious attention to employee interests, even if they 
happen at times to conflict with narrow shareholder profit interests.
      
12 Our board pays serious attention to customer interests, even if they 
happen at times to conflict with narrow shareholder profit interests.
      
13 Our board feels that they (and the company) must act as custodians of 
local interests, and not just purely look after shareholder profits.
      
14 Our board pays serious attention to suppliers’ interests, even if they 
happen at times to conflict with narrow shareholder profit interests.
      
15 Our board pays serious attention to the company’s corporate social 
responsibility, even if they happen at times to conflict with shareholder 
profit interests.
      
16 Board members bring a variety of expertise and skills to the board and 
the company.
      
17 Board members’ skills and expertise help the company manage external 
links.
      
18 Board member skills and expertise help the company reduce its 
environmental uncertainty.
      
19 Board members provide advice and counsel to management.       
20 Board members provide channels of communication between external 
organisations and the company.
      
21 Board members provide assistance in obtaining knowledge and 
information from outside the company.
      
22 Board members help to increase the company’s legitimacy in the market 
place.
      
      
Instructions on filling in the questionnaire
Please read each of the following statements carefully and tick () the number that corresponds to the extent to 
which your board undertakes the following processes using the following scale:
7 = strongly agree  (Yes, the statement perfectly describes our board practices.)
6 = agree  (Yes, the statement describes our board practices.)
5 = slightly agree (Yes, but only to some extent does the statement describes our board practices.)
4 = neither disagree nor agree  (I don’t know.)
3 = slightly disagree  (No, to some extent the statement does not describe our board practices.)
2 = disagree (No, the statement does not describe our board practices.)
1 = strongly disagree  (No, the statement does not describe our board practices at all.) 
Section 2.
This section is about how the board functions, and the processes involved in its functioning.
Strongly 
disagree
Not sure Strongly agree
1 Board members are ready to defend each other from criticism by 
outsiders.
      
2 Board members are very willing to help each other with the job.       
3 Board members get along with each other.       
4 Board members always stick together.       
5 Our board considers the different viewpoints of its members.       
6 Board decisions are settled amicably.       
7 Board decisions are open and candid.       
8 The atmosphere on the board encourages critical thinking.       
9 Board meetings often result in a clear decision.       
10 There is constructive challenge of ideas, beliefs and assumptions on the 
board.
      
11 Board members who disagree respect each other’s viewpoints       
12 Different opinions or views on the board focus on issues rather than 
individuals.
      
13 There are personality clashes on the board during decision making.       
14 Board members do not get along very well.       
15 Board members are not ready to co-operate.       
16 At least one board member is unhappy with a decision.       
17 If one board member wins, another loses.       
18 When in board meetings, tensions frequently run high       
19 Board members carefully scrutinise the information provided prior to 
board meetings.
      
20 Board members research issues relevant to the company before attending 
board meetings.
      
21 Board members take notes during meetings.       
22 Board members participate actively during meetings.       
23 People on this board are aware of each others’ areas of expertise.       
24 When an issue is discussed, the most knowledgeable people generally 
have the most influence.
      
25 Task delegation on this board represents a good match between 
knowledge and responsibilities. 
      
26 Our board makes best use of board members’ knowledge and skills       
27 There is a very high level of trust throughout the board.       
28 In this board, executives have a great deal of trust in non-executives.       
29 If a board member makes a promise, the board will always trust that the 
person will do his or her best to keep the promise. 
      
30 Non-executive board members trust that the senior managers will make 
good decisions.
      
31 Board members rely on others’ task related skills and abilities.       
32 Board members rely on others’ work-related judgements.       
33 The information provided by senior management is very useful for board 
meetings
      
34 Board members are satisfied with the information provided for board 
meetings.
      
35 The information provided is highly relevant to the required decisions.       
36 The information provided for board meetings is highly credible.       
37 The form and presentation of the information provided is very 
satisfactory.
      
38 The board chairperson always responds to his/her communication outside 
board meetings.
      
39 The board chairperson provides the board with feedback.       
40 There is two-way communication between the board and the 
management.
      
Section 3.
This section is about how the board undertakes a variety of roles or tasks. 
Strongly 
disagree
Not sure Strongly agree
1 Board members monitor top management decisions and decision-making.       
2 Board members evaluate the performance of top executives.         
3 The board has an internal mechanism to evaluate firm performance yearly.       
4 Board members are formally evaluated by other board members.       
5 Board members analyse budget allocation versus performance.       
6 Board members require information showing progress against targets.       
7 Board members review performance against the strategic plan.       
8 Board members review financial information for important issues/trends.       
9 Board members engage in succession planning for the CEO.       
10 Board members engage in succession planning for top managers besides 
the CEO.
      
11 Board members contribute with advice on general management issues.       
12 Board members contribute with advice on legal and technical accounting 
issues.
      
13 Board members contribute with advice on financial issues (internal 
financing and investment).
      
14 Board members contribute with advice on technical issues (both 
production and information technology).
      
15 Board members contribute with advice on marketing issues.       
16 The board and its board members act as mentors for the CEO and the firm.       
17 Board members contribute to building networks.       
18 Board members contribute to lobbying and building legitimacy.       
19 The company and the board often take advantage of the board members’ 
networks to gather information/intelligence and advice.
      
20 Our board is involved in making proposals on the company’s long term 
strategies and main goals
      
21 Our board is involved in making decisions on the company’s long term 
strategies and goals 
      
22 Our board is involved in putting decisions on the company’s long term 
strategies and main goals into action
      
23 Our board is involved in controlling the follow up of decisions on the 
company’s long-term strategies.
      
Section 4.
This section examines how effectively the board is undertaking its different roles/tasks.
Strongly 
disagree
Not                 sure Strongly agree
1 Our board adds value to the company.       
2 Our board improves company performance in the interest of shareholders.      
3 Our board improves company performance in the interest of stakeholders.      
4 Board members are satisfied with the board performance.       
5 Our board is satisfied with board members’ role performance.       
Section 5.
Governance Orientation
Please read the following four statements on governance orientation and tick the one in the box that most closely 
describes your company. Please tick one box only.
 Orientation 1 Our board is primarily concerned with controlling, monitoring, reviewing senior management team objectives and performance in order to protect shareholder interest.
 Orientation 2 Our board has a high level of trust in senior management, and is primarily concerned with supporting and empowering senior management, which acts in the best interest of its company 
and its’ shareholders.
 Orientation 3 Our board represents differing stakeholder groups and is primarily concerned with balancing the interests of these groups, and is achieving that through controlling, monitoring, reviewing 
senior management team objectives and performance.
 Orientation 4 Our board is primarily concerned with providing a variety of resources (relevant skills & knowledge, information, advice & counsel) to help the senior management meet team 
objectives and performance in order to create shareholder value.
Section 6.
Business Performance
Please answer each of the following questions by ticking a number that best corresponds to your business performance 
in comparison to your main competitors.
Performance compared to main competitors
Much worse About           same Much better
1 Return on capital employed       
2 Sales growth       
3 Earning / per share       
4 Training spend (per year)       
5 New products developed in the last five years       
Section 7.
Company Background (Optional)
This section provides background information pertaining to your company and it would be helpful and appreciated if 
you could fill in the details below. It is, however, entirely optional.
1 Company Name: ……………………………………………………………………
2 Year of Incorporation: ……………………………………………………………………
3 Number of employees: ……………………………………………………………………
4 What are the major business activities 
(products and services) of your company? 
q Services (please specify) ……………………………………        
q Retailing (please specify) …………………………………..
q Manufacturing (please specify) …………………………….
q Others (please specify) ……………………………………...
5 Your position in the company: ……………………………………………………………………
Thank you for filling in the questionnaire. Your contribution is much appreciated!

